PEOPLE v. EDWARD LEE

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A court has the discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level, as determined by use of the risk assessment instrument, based upon the facts in the record ( see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d 809, 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d 907, 907; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d 520, 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d 524, 525). However, "utilization of the risk assessment instrument will generally `result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception not the rule `"( People v Guarnan, 8 AD3d 545, quoting Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [Nov. 1997]; see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d at 525). A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines" (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Taylor, 47 AD3d at 908; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Hines, 24 AD3d at 525). Further, there must be clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a special circumstance to warrant such a departure ( see People v Bowens, 55 AD3d at 810; People v Burgos, 39 AD3d at 520; People v Agard, 35 AD3d 568, 568; People v Ventura, 24 AD3d 527; People v Dexter, 21 AD3d 403, 404).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a downward departure, as the defendant failed to present clear and convincing evidence of special circumstances warranting a departure from his presumptive risk level two designation ( see People v Lynk, 74 AD3d 929, lv denied 15 NY3d 708).