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CUNNINGHAM v. HUDSON

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.
Dec 7, 2010
RECENT ORDER OPINIONS

EDWARD TOUSSAINT, JR., Judge

Affirmed.

ef2004 WL 2496525, at *9-11.

Sub-Claim (a)

Cunningham asserts that his counsel failed to present evidence from the records of the Allen County Children's Services, as well as records of his mother's mental illness, the killing of her husband, her suicide attempts, and her substance abuse. Petitioner's sister, Tara Cunningham, his mother, Betty Cunningham, and Dr. Daniel Davis testified about Cunningham's terrible childhood. Tara told the jury that Betty's husband beat her three times a week in front of the children, as well as beating Cunningham. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 30. She further stated that the beatings caused Betty to stab him to death with the children present. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 31. Afterward, Betty began using drugs, and was also an alcoholic. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 32. She stayed away from home so that the children moved in with their grandmother. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 31. When Betty left, Cunningham would take care of his siblings. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 32. Tara also testified that Betty often physically abused Cunningham. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 33. The Children's Services removed the five children from the home three different times. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 34.

Betty Cunningham testified about the abuse from her husband, but said that Cunningham was whipped with a belt like a normal child. Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 42. The jury heard testimony about the beatings of Cunningham from his sister, as well as Betty's atrocious parenting skills, drug and alcohol abuse, mental illness, attempted suicide, and murder of her husband. The jury was not likely to believe that Betty's beatings of her son were normal.

The Respondent points out the pretrial history of this case. Defense counsel filed a Motion for Appropriation of Funds for a Defense Mitigation Specialist who would help in collecting records. Apx. Vol 1, pg. 214. They also moved for funds for a defense investigator, Apx. Vol. 1, pg. 217, and for a psychologist. Apx. Vol. 1, pg. 201. The Motions were granted and $8500 was appropriated for the mitigation specialist, investigator, and psychologist. Further, the court ordered the Allen County Children's Services, the Allen County Juvenile Court, the Family Resource Center, the Tri-Star n/k/a Lutheran Services, the Department of Corrections, and all hospitals, institutions, and doctors to release to defense counsel, or the investigator, all records pertaining to Cunningham. Apx. Vol. 1, pgs. 366, 367, 368.

It appears that Cunningham's counsel performed a complete investigation of his juvenile history, children's records, and his medical and penal history. A strategic decision to pursue or not to pursue a particular trial tactic "after thorough investigation of law and facts," is "virtually unchallengeable." Clark v. Mitchell 425 F.3d 270, 286 (6th Cir. 2005). The court must determine whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision whether or not to introduce evidence was reasonable. Id. at 284; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Reasonableness is assessed by considering the quantity of evidence known to counsel, as well as whether that evidence should have led a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527; Clark, 425 F.3d at 284.

Even if counsel were ineffective, Cunningham must show that he suffered prejudice. Prejudice exists where the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents differs in a substantial way — in strength and subject matter — from the evidence actually presented at sentencing. Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2005). The evidence Cunningham claims should have been presented appears to be similar to what counsel brought out at the trial. The Sixth Circuit held in Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 200-02 (6th Cir. 2003), that a petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to introduce additional mitigating evidence at sentencing where new evidence sought to be introduced was merely cumulative to that which had already been presented at mitigation. See Clark, 425 F.3d at 286. Cunningham is contending that if the evidence had been more elaborate he would not have received the death penalty. He has not shown that but for counsel's performance the outcome of the trial would have been different. Baze v.Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 321 (6th Cir. 2004).

Nurse Sharon Cage allegedly would have testified that Cunningham visited his mother every day. But Betty Cunningham testified to that effect. Thus, the nurse's testimony would have been cumulative, and failure to call her was not prejudicial.

Sub-Claim (b)

Cunningham asserts that his counsel were ineffective for failing to call a cultural expert to present to the jury the effect on Cunningham of his deprivations and the culture in which he lived as a child. Had such an expert testified, the jury could allegedly have learned of the cultural impact of Cunningham's family, neighborhood, and his unique experiences in the world. In addition, contends Cunningham, the cultural expert could have put his mother's problems into context, as well as his caring for his siblings despite his own suffering and abuse.

As previously discussed, counsel did a thorough investigation. It appears that they made an informed strategic decision to bring testimony through a psychologist rather than, or in addition to, a cultural expert. Testimony from a psychologist was appropriate. Any additional testimony from a cultural expert would have been, as the Ohio court of appeals found, cumulative and unnecessary.

Sub-Claims (c), (d)

Cunningham next contends that had counsel offered evidence during mitigation that he passed a Voice Stress Analyzer test administered by the police that included two of the questions pertaining to his guilt, and that he originally told police that his gun was inoperable, a different outcome would have resulted.

The United States Supreme Court has held that it had not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as providing a capital defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast "residual doubt" as to his guilt of the basic crime of conviction. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 525 (2006). A state has the authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted. "States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence `in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.'" Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion)). Residual doubt is not a mitigating factor under Ohio law. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 447 (6th Cir. 2001). It is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 403 (1997).

Cunningham contends that this evidence should not be considered residual doubt, but an argument that his gun was inoperable and his conduct constituted a lesser role in the murders. However, the rules of evidence apply to mitigation hearings, and polygraph examination results are generally inadmissible. State v. Sheppard, 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 237 (1998); United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1014 (6th Cir. 1991). The reason for this is the general skepticism that pervades the scientific community concerning the reliability of polygraph examination. Gantley, 172 F.3d at 430. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998).

Sub-Claim (e)

Finally, Cunningham alleges that his counsel were ineffective because the closing argument was too brief, an inadequate plea for his life. Counsel should have reviewed before the jury all of the mitigation evidence he has argued above. The mitigation closing argument consisted of forty-nine lines of transcript.

The Ohio Supreme Court in rejecting this argument stated:

Cunningham argues that counsel's penalty-phase closing argument was too brief and that counsel failed to argue relevant and humanizing defense mitigation testimony. Cunningham further contends that counsel should have made a more "powerful plea" to spare Cunningham's life. We rejected a similar argument in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d 373, finding that it is "nearly impossible for a reviewing court to discern the amount of emotion or feeling the argument showed." Moreover, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and reviewing courts should refrain from second-guessing tactical decisions of trial counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. During closing argument, Cunningham's counsel set forth the four sentencing options, outlined the mitigating factors established by the evidence, and asked the jury to consider those factors in making a determination. Counsel also informed jurors that they did not have to unanimously agree on the existence of mitigating factors before considering them against the aggravating circumstance, that any one mitigating factor is sufficient to support a life sentence, and emphasized that one juror alone could prevent the death penalty. Counsel also argued that Cunningham had accepted responsibility for his actions and shown remorse. Whether defense counsel should have spoken more forcefully in urging a life sentence is a tactical question, and Cunningham has failed to establish that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. See State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 256-257, 667 N.E.2d 369.
State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d at 216-217.

A criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel at closing arguments. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 701-702; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975). "Counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and deference to counsel's tactical decisions in his closing presentation is particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate defense strategy at that stage. Closing arguments should `sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact,'" Yarborough v. Gentry 540 U.S. 1, 5-6, (2003) (quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 862). "But which issues to sharpen and how best to clarify them are questions with many reasonable answers. Indeed, it might sometimes make sense to forgo closing argument altogether. Judicial review of a defense attorney's summation is therefore highly deferential, and doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas." Id.

The Court finds this claim to be without merit. The jury heard the evidence Cunningham wanted repeated just a few minutes earlier. Counsel may have made a strategic decision not to repeat what the jury recently heard. It might have made sense to eliminate such repetition. Even if counsel's closing argument should have been longer, the state court's decision is not contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

E. Jury Instructions Ground Eight The jury instructions deprived Mr. Cunningham of his right to defend against the State's charges, to confront the State's Witnesses, his right to a reliable sentence, as well as his rights to due process, and equal protection, and the State court decisions to the contrary are an unreasonable application of, or contrary to law, U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, VIII, AND XIV.

Sub-Claim (a)

Cunningham contends that two of the court's jury instructions violated his constitutional rights. The state court stated that defense counsel failed to object and waived all but plain error. Therefore, this sub-claim is procedurally defaulted. If it were to be considered, the Court would find it to be without merit. The first error allegedly occurred when the court instructed the jury regarding inconsistencies in witness testimony. The judge gave the following instruction:

Also, discrepancies in the witness's testimony, or between his or her testimony and that of others, if there are any, does not necessarily mean that you should disbelieve that witness, as people commonly forget facts or recollect them erroneously after the passage of time. In considering a discrepancy in a witness testimony, you should consider whether such discrepancy concerns an important fact or a trivial fact.

Tr. Vol. 8, pg. 1457.

According to Cunningham, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that discrepancies in witnesses' testimony were insignificant. This was a decision to be made by the jury as the trier of fact. The jury instruction allegedly unduly influenced the jury and prejudicially affected Cunningham's constitutional rights. Pet. pg. 113. Despite clear recognition from both the United States Supreme Court that inconsistencies weigh heavily in the evaluation of witness testimony, the trial court instructed Cunningham's jury in a manner allegedly calculated to neutralize the impact of any inconsistencies among and between the State's witnesses. It is argued that this did significant damage to Cunningham's defense, which was primarily presented through the cross-examination of the State's witness. Pet. pgs. 115-16.

Because errors in jury instructions typically are matters of state law that do not warrant federal relief, the instruction must violate a constitutional right. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Upon review, a court must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that prevents consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. The impropriety of the instruction must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and of the entire record. Id. Since jury instruction errors typically are matters of state law, the standard for demonstrating that a jury instruction caused constitutional errors in a habeas proceeding "is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977).

The Ohio Supreme Court found this claim to be without merit.

Cunningham argues in proposition of law II that the trial court instructed the jury in a manner calculated to defeat the effectiveness of cross-examination. Cunningham complains that the court instructed the jury that inconsistencies in testimony did not affect witness credibility.
During the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The court's instruction substantially tracked the standard credibility instruction in 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (2001), Section 405.20. The trial court, however, added the following language to the general charge:
"You should not decide any issue of fact merely on the basis of the number of witnesses who testify on each side of the issue. Rather, the final test in judging evidence should be the force and weight of the evidence, regardless of the number of witnesses on each side of an issue. The testimony of one witness, believed by you, is sufficient to prove any fact.
"Also, discrepancies in the witness' testimony, or between his or her testimony and that of others, if there are any, does not necessarily mean that you should disbelieve that witness, as people commonly forget facts or recollect them erroneously after the passage of time. In considering a discrepancy in a witness [sic] testimony, you should consider whether such discrepancy concerns an important fact or a trivial fact."
The trial court gave an identical preliminary instruction to the jury before trial.
Cunningham failed to object to this instruction and thus waived all but plain error. An erroneous jury instruction does not constitute plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus, following State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804.
There was no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court's credibility instruction. Crim.R. 30(B) permits the trial court to give the jury instructions of law relating to credibility and weight of the evidence. A single jury instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus. When the credibility instruction is viewed in its entirety, it is clear that the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard discrepancies in the evidence. Rather, the court charged the jury to consider discrepancies and weigh their significance when determining credibility.
Even were we to find error in the trial court's credibility instruction, plain error is lacking. Cunningham contends that this instruction significantly damaged his defense, which was presented primarily through cross-examination of the state's witnesses. Defense counsel sought to establish that Cunningham did not plan to rob or kill anyone that night, that he fired no shots, and that he did not participate in the robbery. The state's case against Cunningham rested primarily on the testimony of several eyewitnesses, and their testimony was consistent regarding Cunningham's degree of participation in the crimes. All but one of the surviving eyewitnesses identified Cunningham as one of the two assailants who held them at gunpoint while they were forced to surrender their valuables. Several witnesses testified that Cunningham fired his weapon into the group. Despite Cunningham's claims to the contrary, the eyewitness testimony of the state's witnesses was strongly corroborated. Cunningham has therefore failed to show that, but for the trial court's credibility instruction, the result of his trial would have been different.
Cunningham also argues that the effect of this guilt-phase instruction had a carryover effect on the penalty phase. We disagree. As discussed, there was no error in the trial court's credibility instruction. Moreover, the instruction was not repeated in the penalty phase. We reject proposition of law II.
State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d at 207-208. The Ohio court opined that eyewitness testimony was strongly corroborated. Although there were some inconsistencies, this Court agrees with the Ohio court. Several witnesses testified that Cunningham stood up from the couch, retrieved his gun, and hit Coron Liles in the mouth. Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 1021; Tr. Vol 6, pg. 1121. They also said that Cunningham ordered them into the kitchen, Id, and pulled away the table the victims were hiding under. Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 1022; Tr. Vol. 6, pg. 1125; Tr. Vol. 7, pg. 1279. Dwight Goodloe testified that he saw Cunningham shoot Liles in the mouth. Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 1028. Liles said that Cunningham shot him. Tr. Vol. 6, pg. 1130. Again, even though Cunningham may not have fired his gun, the evidence showed that he participated. Since the murder charge against him was based on prior calculation and design, not under a principal offender theory, the jury's verdict was justified.

The court gave the standard credibility instruction. The jurors were to assign to the testimony of each witness such weight as it deemed proper. Viewing the instructions as a whole, the Court finds no violation of due process.

Sub-Claim (b)

Cunningham also asserts that the additional jury instruction violated the Equal Protection Clause. This claim was not presented to the state courts and is procedurally defaulted. If it were to be considered, the Court would find it to be without merit. According to Cunningham, the jury should have determined the significance of any inconsistencies or contradictions without the trial court's undue influence. Instead, the trial court's instruction allegedly created an uneven playing field for the State and the defense. The State was allegedly protected from any weaknesses in its case found in a witness's testimony. The jury was told that it is "normal" to have inaccuracies in one's memory. The jury was not told similarly, that a witness can tell the same lie consistently. The balance was allegedly not kept true between the State and the defense in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Pet. 118-19.

The Respondent points out that the cases cited by Cunningham do not involve the Equal Protection Clause. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (defendant may be excluded from a jury view if the court tells the jury that the view has no other function than to give them understanding of the evidence); Wardius v. Oregon, 412, 470, 475 (1973) (due process requires the conclusion that it is unfair to require one party to provide discovery without the same requirement being imposed on the opposing party). Cunningham has not sufficiently supported this argument. As previously stated, the instructions as a whole preclude a finding that the particular instruction was unconstitutional.

Sub-Claim (c)

Cunningham contends that the court's instruction had a carry-over effect to the sentencing phase of the trial. He argues that this claim was presented to the state courts in his Murnahan application. A Murnahan application involves ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, an issue not involved here. The claim must be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented in federal court. Lott, 261 F.3d at 607, 611, 617, 619; Wong, 142 F.3d at 322. The instruction allegedly eviscerated the significance of the inconsistencies thus hampering the usefulness of the facts in mitigation. The jury did not hear this instruction during the penalty phase. There is no indication that they might have remembered this specific instruction. The Court finds this claim to be without merit.

Sub-Claim (d)

Cunningham claims that Ohio's reasonable doubt jury instruction is unconstitutional. The Respondent agrees that this claim is preserved for federal habeas review. The reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury was Ohio's statutory definition of reasonable doubt. The Sixth Circuit has ruled that Ohio's definition of reasonable doubt does not violate due process. Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.2d 865, 867-69 (6th Cir. 1963); Benge v. Johnson, 312 F. Supp.2d 978, 1029 (S.D. Ohio, 2004); Taylor v. Mitchell, 296 F. Supp.2d 784, 814 (N.D. Ohio, 2003). The court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt was not improper.

F. Miscellaneous Ground Ten Jeronique Cunningham's sentence of death is inappropriate, arbitrary and capricious and the State court decisions to the contrary rest on unreasonable determinations of facts, are contrary to, or an unreasonable application of law. Cunningham explains that his death sentence was arbitrary and capricious because he did not kill anyone, carried an inoperable gun, and lacked the prior calculation and design to kill anyone. This issue was raised in the Ohio Supreme Court but not discussed. The Court will consider it preserved for federal habeas review. The jury verdict and the trial court sentence were allegedly imposed without this critical fact. He contends that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments require that there must be a meaningful basis upon which to distinguish between those few cases in which the death penalty is justified and the many cases in which it is not. He further argues that the Ohio court unreasonably applied clearly established law regarding the proportionality limitations on the arbitrary imposition of death sentences. Pet. pgs. 148-49. Cunningham's mitigation evidence, the physical evidence regarding his gun and bullets, the fact that he showed remorse, and the fact that he was not the principal offender allegedly mitigate in favor of a life sentence.

This claim is without merit because no proportionality review is required by the Constitution. Buell, 274 F.3d at 368 (citing Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-51). Since Ohio law requires proportionality review, the review must be consistent with constitutional requirements. Dickerson v. Mitchell, 336 F. Supp.2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ohio, 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.3d 690 (2006). A trial judge has the duty to reweigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors before determining whether to impose a death sentence or a life sentence, R.C. 2929.03(D)(3), and to state this finding in a separate opinion. R.C. 2929.03(F). The judge must examine the state's proportionality review to determine whether the imposition of a death sentence on the petitioner is patently unjust or "shocks the conscience." The court is not to second guess the state court's comparison of other cases in which the death penalty was imposed. Dickerson,, 336 F. Supp.2d at 789; Taylor, 296 F. Supp.2d at 839. Because proportionality review is not required by the Constitution, states have a great latitude in defining the pool of cases used for comparison. Wickline v. Mitchell, 319 F.3d 813, 824 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit has held that by limiting proportionality review to previous cases wherein the death penalty has been imposed, the Ohio Supreme Court has complied with the latitude allowed. Id. at 824; Buell, 274 F.3d at 369. See Leonard v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, 2010 WL 2889102 (S.D. Ohio, Jul. 20, 2010) (citing Buell, 274 F.3d at 369) (Constitution does not require the state to provide for a system of proportionality review so proportionality review is not constitutionally required, and the state therefore has "great latitude" in defining its system of proportionality review).

Review of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion shows that it conducted a meaningful review of his sentence. Even though Cunningham may not have been the actual killer, Ohio law provides for a death sentence to be based on conduct amounting to prior calculation and design. R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). The evidence showed the existence of prior calculation and design. Cunningham's sister testified that she saw him wiping off a gun. Other witnesses testified that Cunningham fired his gun and that he shot Coron Liles. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), held that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy a sentence of death. Ground Fourteen The cumulative impact of the errors addressed in this Petition render Mr. Cunningham's conviction and sentence unreliable and unconstitutional. In his last claim for relief, Cunningham contends that the impact of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, trial court errors, invalid jury instructions, inadequate state remedies, and other errors combined to render his convictions and sentences unreliable. The Respondent argues that this claim was not exhausted in state court. Even though a cumulative error claim was brought in post conviction, it allegedly involved a different group of factual claims and legal arguments. Review of the state court decision shows this statement to be correct. See Vol. 7, pgs. 373, 401-02. Cunningham contends that this claim has not been defaulted as it was presented to the Ohio court in his Murnahan application. A Murnahan application preserves only claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a claim not involved in this case. Thus, this claim has not been exhausted and is procedurally defaulted. If considered, the Court would find it to be without merit as follows.

The Sixth Circuit ruled in Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2005), that constitutional errors that would not individually support habeas relief cannot be cumulated to support it. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006) (the law of this Circuit is that cumulative error claims are not cognizable on habeas because the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue). Further, Cunningham has not established that any error occurred in the state courts. Thus, this claim is without merit. Baze, 371 F.3d at 330.

G. Constitutionality Ground Thirteen The Ohio court's determination that Ohio's death penalty scheme does not violate the Constitution is predicated on an unreasonable determination of facts, contrary to, or an unreasonable application of law. Cunningham has raised nineteen reasons why Ohio's statutory death penalty is unconstitutional. The Respondent contends that twelve of them have not been presented to the state court. Since most of his assertions, if not all, have been determined by the Sixth Circuit and found to be without merit, they will be briefly discussed.

(a) Least Restrictive and No Compelling Interest

The Supreme Court held that it could not require a state legislature to select the least restrictive penalty as long as the penalty selected is not inhumanely cruel or disproportionate to the crime. Further, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), rejected this argument, finding that the death penalty serves compelling state interests and is not "invariably disproportionate to the crime" of murder. Id. at 183, 187; Williams, 380 F.3d at 966; Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 690 (6th Cir. 2001); Madrigal v. Bagley, 276 F.Supp.2d 744, 809 (N.D. Ohio, 2003).

(b) Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Since Furman, the legislatures of at least 35 states have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the death of another person. In 1974, the Congress of the United States enacted a statute providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death. These recently adopted statutes have attempted to address the concerns expressed by the Court in Furman primarily (i) by specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by making the death penalty mandatory for specified crimes. But all of the post- Furman statutes make clear that capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81. Ohio's death penalty statutes satisfy the concerns identified in Furman.

(c) Equal Protection

Cunningham contends that Ohio's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it imposes the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner. He must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination, i.e., that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). See Wiles v. Bagley, 2005 WL 1181859 * 43 (N.D. Ohio, May 18, 2005), aff'd, 561 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2009). The Sixth Circuit has rejected challenges claiming that race is a factor in the application of the death penalty in Ohio. Greer, 264 F.3d at 690 (petitioner failed to show a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting Ohio's death penalty statute). The Supreme Court in McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297, stated: "[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused." McCleskey presented to the Court a statistical study of the affect of race on the imposition of the death penalty. In Georgia, the prosecution sought the death penalty for 70% of black defendants with white victims but for only 19% of white defendants with black victims. McCleskey held that a capital defendant must show that the discriminators in the defendant's case acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. 481 U.S. at 292; Wiles, 2005 WL 1181859 at * 43. There is no evidence that race was involved in Cunningham's case.

(d) Prosecutorial Discretion

In Gregg, 428 U. S. at 188, the Supreme Court set forth the following capital sentencing procedures likely to prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty: (1) consideration of a pre-sentence report by the sentencing authority; (2) jury sentencing where the jury is adequately informed and given meaningful standards to guide its use of the information; (3) a bifurcated guilt phase/sentencing phase trial; (4) weighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors; (5) a sentencing decision based on specific findings; and (6) meaningful appellate review. Ohio's death penalty statutes contain these preventative sentencing procedures. Buell, 274 F.3d at 367. See Bryd, 209 F.3d at 539.

(e) Bifurcated Trial Denies Impartial Jury and Effective Assistance of Counsel

Death penalty statutes should be drafted in a manner that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. This is best accomplished by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and is provided with standards to guide its use of the information. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.

Although two hearings are required, there is no requirement that the same jury sit for both hearings. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-77 (1986). The Supreme Court has upheld against constitutional attack the Georgia capital sentencing plan which provided that the same jury must sit in both phases of a bifurcated capital murder trial. Id. 476 U.S. at 179-80.

The Supreme Court stated that it is "unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984). See Hartman,, 333 F.Supp.2d at 675. In fact, the Court in Lockhart noted that a defendant may even benefit at the sentencing phase from any "residual doubts" that the jury might have had during the guilt phase, and the evidence in both trials would be repetitive which might not be consistently fair to the state and perhaps not even to the accused. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180-81.

(f) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Caused by R.C. 2929.03(D)(1)

The statutory scheme requires that the findings of an examination pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) be furnished to the trial court, the trier of fact, and the prosecutor, and any information learned about the accused would be used against him at trial. Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.03(D)(1) provides in relevant part:

Copies of any reports prepared under this division shall be furnished to the court, to the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, to the prosecutor, and to the offender or the offender's counsel for use under this division. The court, and the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, shall consider any report prepared pursuant to this division.

The Supreme Court found that this procedure enhances the search for the truth and does not render the proceedings unfair. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970); Frazier v. Mitchell, 188 F. Supp.2d, 798, 838 (N.D. Ohio, 2001). The Sixth Circuit has also rejected this claim without discussion. Cooey v. Coyle, 289 F.3d 289 F.3d 882, 925-26 ( 2002). In Keene v. Mitchell, 2004 WL 3325797 * 76 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2004), aff'd, 525 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 1047 (2009) and Jamison, 100 F. Supp.2d at 763-64, the courts denied relief on this issue reasoning that a defendant is not required to request a pre-sentence investigation report or a mental examination. Also, R.C. 2929.024 allows a trial court to provide funds to an indigent defendant for investigative services, experts, and other necessary services to prepare a defense. Since an indigent defendant is not required to utilize R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), this procedure is not unconstitutional.

(g) Ohio Criminal Rule 11(3)(c) Encourages Guilty Pleas

Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C)(3) allows a judge, in the interest of justice, to dismiss capital specifications if the defendant pleads guilty or no contest. The specifications are not automatically dismissed. If the judge does not dismiss the specifications, the rule requires three judges to determine if the offense was aggravated murder and, if so, they must determine the presence or absence of the specified aggravating circumstances, if any, compared to any mitigating factors and impose sentence accordingly. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that automatically dismissed the capital specifications when a defendant pled guilty or waived a jury. The death penalty could be imposed if recommended by a jury, but the statute did not include a procedure for imposing the death penalty on a defendant who waived a jury or pled guilty. However, the Supreme Court has never decided that a statute allowing a defendant to avoid the possibility of a death sentence with a guilty plea was invalid. Benge, 312 F. Supp.2d at 1033-34; Frazier, 188 F.Supp. at 839, Jamison, 100 F. Supp.2d at 763. There is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas. Benge, 312 F. Supp.2d at 1034 (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978)). Under Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C)(3), a defendant who pleads guilty to an indictment containing a death penalty specification can still receive the death penalty. Id. The Sixth Circuit has rejected the same argument. See Cooey, 289 F.3d at 924-25; Byrd, 209 F.3d at 539.

(h) No Guidelines to Balance Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

It appears that Cunningham is arguing that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional because it forbids the sentencer to return a life sentence unless the aggravating circumstances fail to outweigh the mitigating factors. This argument was rejected in Buell, 274 F.3d at 368. The sentencer is required to have information sufficient to enable it to consider the character and individual circumstances of a defendant prior to imposition of the death penalty. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 (1987); Buell, 274 F.3d at 368. Further, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is constitutional if it is imposed only after a determination that the aggravated circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors present in the particular case, or after a determination that there are no mitigating circumstances. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990). Buell held that Ohio's death penalty statute complies with both Sumner and Blystone. Id. 274 F.3d at 368; Williams, 380 F.3d at 964-65; Hartman, 333 F. Supp.2d at 676-77; Benge, 312 F.3d at 1034-35.

Furthermore, "the Eighth Amendment does not require states to adopt specific standards for instructing juries on mitigating circumstances." Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 274 (1998). Thus, the absence of any standard to balance the weight of mitigating circumstances with aggravating circumstances is inconsequential. Dickerson, 336 F. Sup.2d at 791; Hartman, 333 F. Supp.2d at 675; Madrigal, 276 F. Supp.2d at 744.

(i) Jury Not Required to Identify Mitigating Factors Found and Why They Outweigh Aggravating Circumstances When Recommending Life

(j) Absence of Consideration of Passion, Prejudice or Other Arbitrariness During Proportionality Review

The Supreme Court has held to be constitutional a statute that did not enunciate specific factors to consider or a specific method of balancing the competing considerations. Buell, 274 F.3d at 368 (citing 487 U.S. at 172-73); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983). It follow that if there is no statute enunciating specific factors to consider, jurors do not have to explain their reasons for recommending a life sentence. As long as a death penalty is imposed after a determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors present in the particular crime committed by the particular defendant, or that there are no mitigating factors, the sentence is constitutional. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305; Buell, 274 F.3d at 368; Wiles, 2005 WL 1181859 at * 42.

(k) Proportionality Review

This issue was discussed and rejected in the tenth ground for relief.

(l) Existence of Passion, Prejudice or Other Arbitrary Factor that the Jury Might Have Considered Cannot be Reviewed

Cunningham complains that the Ohio death penalty statute, R.C. 2929.05, does not specifically require an inquiry and findings as to the possible influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Such inquiry is allegedly necessary according to the state and federal constitutions.

A jury may consider mercy but Ohio law does not mandate that a trial court give a mercy instruction. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 415-16 (6th Cir. 1999). Sympathy and mercy are not relevant sentencing criteria. Jones v. Bradshaw, 489 F. Supp.2nd 786, 818 (N.D. Ohio, 7007).

(m) Ohio Law Fails to Require the Jury to Decide Appropriateness of the Death Penalty

The Ohio Supreme Court is required to review the trial court's decision and also independently determine whether the sentence is proportionate, non-excessive, and appropriate in accordance with the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors. This requirement gives the sentencing authority sufficient information to enable it to consider the character and individual circumstances of the defendant. The court in Buell, 274 F.3d at 368-69, found that this procedure sufficiently detects who deserves the death penalty. Benge, 312 F.Supp.2d at 1035-36; Jamison, 100 F. Supp.2d at 765-66. The state is not required to prove that death is the only appropriate sentence. The Constitution requires only that the "statutory scheme channel the sentencer's discretion and allow the sentencer to consider mitigating evidence." Hartman, 333 F.Supp.2d at 677 ( citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 (1982)). Ohio's death penalty scheme satisfies these constitutional requirements.

(n) Conscious Desire to Kill

The Constitution does not require a premeditated and conscious desire to kill before a death sentence can be imposed. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158; Cowans v. Bagley, 624 F. Supp.2nd 709, 823 (S.D. Ohio, 2008).

(o) Proof Beyond All Doubt

In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the Supreme Court found that the standard required to convict a criminal defendant is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Wiles, 2005 WL 1181859 at *34, 43. Also, the Sixth Circuit has upheld Ohio's definition of reasonable doubt against constitutional attack in various contexts. See Buell, 274 F.3d at 366; Thomas, 704 F.2d at 869; Hartman, 333 F. Supp.2d at 677; Davie, 291 F. Supp.2d at 620.

(p) Ohio Statutes Fail to Narrow Class of Persons Eligible for the Death Penalty

In order to be considered constitutional, a capital sentencing scheme must "generally narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988); Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; Jackson v. Anderson, 141 F. Supp.2d 811, 849 (N. D. Ohio, 2001). In Ohio, the jury must find at least one aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be imposed. R.C. 2929.03. By satisfying this requirement, the jury narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878; Jackson, 141 F. Supp.2d at 849. The narrowing function can be performed by the jury at either the sentencing phase or guilt phase of the trial. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 245; Jamison, 100 F. Supp.2d at 762. Unless the aggravating circumstance is vague or otherwise impedes the requirement that sentencing determinations be individualized, a state can select any substantive criteria it wants to decide who is eligible for the death penalty. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).

(q) Ohio's Death Penalty Scheme Treats Felony-Murders More Harshly Than Premeditated Murders.

Based on Tison, 481 U.S. at 157, which held that the imposition of the death penalty on felony murders is not unconstitutional, the Court finds that there is no merit to this claim, the adjudication of which did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Hartman, 333 F.Supp.2d at 678; Keene, 2004 WL 3325797 at * 77; See Frazier, 188 F. Supp.2d at 842 (treatment of death penalty murders more harshly than premeditated murders not unconstitutional because R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) sufficiently narrows the class of homicides).

(r) State Not Required to Prove Absence of Mitigation

The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 650 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, (2002) (overruling Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty). A state law which places the burden of proving mitigating factors on the defendant is not per se unconstitutional as long as a state's methods of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the state's burden to prove every element of the offense charged, or to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances. A defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The state still has the burden to show the existence of aggravating circumstances that outweigh the existence of any mitigating factors. Wiles, 2005 WL 1181859 at * 43; Madrigal, 276 F. Supp.2d at 780.

(s) Definition of Mitigating Factors Creates an Unreliable Death Sentence By Creating Non-statutory Aggravating Circumstances

Consideration of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance by a jury or court, even if contrary to state law, does not violate the Constitution. Smith, 348 F.3d at 210 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956-58 (1983)). "[T]he Federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review." Slagle, 457 F.3d at 521 (quoting Clemons 494 U.S. at 741).

(t) Nature and Circumstances of Mitigating Factor Is Improperly Used as a Non-statutory Aggravating Circumstance

Any reference to the nature and circumstances of the offense may be proper since "[u]nder R.C. 2929.03(F), a trial court or three-judge panel may rely upon and cite the nature and circumstances of the offense as reasons supporting its finding that the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors." Smith 348 F.3d at 209-10. Carter v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2334853 at *42 (S. D. Ohio, Aug. 10, 2006). In fact, Ohio law requires the court to do so. State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95 (1987). The Sixth Circuit quoted Stumpf in Slagle, 457 F.3d at 519-520. "[I]t would be illogical to require a three-judge panel to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense in making its decisions whether the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors, yet to forbid that panel from relying upon and citing such nature and circumstances as reasons for its decision." Id. 32 Ohio St.3d at 99.

(u) Ohio Statutes Violate International Law

There is no indication that international law influences rulings under the federal Constitution regarding the death penalty. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 391 (1989), the dissent relied partly on the decisions of respected organizations. But the majority, although not expressly stating, appeared to reject the dissent's reliance on international law holding that the execution of juveniles was constitutional and that "no modern societal concerns" forbids the imposition of the death penalty on individuals as young as sixteen. Buell, 274 F.3d at 375; Madrigal, 276 F. Supp.2d at 809-10. See Jamison, 100 F. Supp.2d at 766-67 (international law does not preclude the State of Ohio from establishing and carrying out a capital punishment scheme). Since about 90 countries still maintain the death penalty, no international law exists that supports the prohibition of the death penalty. Id. The countries that have abolished the death penalty have done so for moral, political, or other reasons than out of a sense of legal obligation. Buell, 274 F.3d at 373. Abolition of the death penalty is not a customary norm of international law. Id. Any reaction by the United States to a violation of law is a domestic question belonging to the executive or legislative branches.

VII. Certificate of Appealability Analysis

The Court now must determine whether to grant a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") for any of Cunningham's claims. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that neither a blanket grant nor a blanket denial of a COA is an appropriate means by which to conclude a capital habeas case as it "undermine[s] the gate keeping function of certificates of appealability, which ideally should separate the constitutional claims that merit the close attention of counsel and this court from those claims that have little or no viability." Porterfield v. Bell, 258 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001) (remanding motion for certificate of appealability for district court's analysis of claims). Thus, in concluding this Opinion, this Court now must consider whether to grant a COA as to any of the claims Cunningham presented in his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

That statute states in relevant part:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from —
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court . . .
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. § 2253. This language is identical to the requirements set forth in the pre-AEDPA statutes, requiring the habeas petitioner to obtain a Certificate of Probable Cause. The sole difference between the pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA statutes is that the petitioner must now demonstrate he was denied a constitutional right, rather than the federal right that was required prior to the AEDPA's enactment.

The United States Supreme Court interpreted the significance of the revision between the pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA versions of that statute in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). In that case, the Court held that § 2253 was a codification of the standard it set forth in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), but for the substitution of the word "constitutional" for "federal" in the statute. Id. at 483. Thus, the Court determined

"[t]o obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were "`adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"
Id. at 483-04 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4).

The Court went on to distinguish the analysis a habeas court must perform depending upon its finding concerning the defaulted status of the claim. If the claim is not procedurally defaulted, then a habeas court need only determine whether reasonable jurists would find the district court's decision "debatable or wrong." Id. at 484. A more complicated analysis is required, however, when assessing whether to grant a COA for a claim the district court has determined is procedurally defaulted. In those instances, the Court opined, a COA should only issue if "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. (emphasis supplied).

After taking the above standard into consideration, the Court finds as follows.

The Court will not issue a COA for Grounds 1(a)(ii), 2(b), (c), (d), (e), 3(b) and 8(b). These claims were never raised at any point in Cunningham's appeals and are unexhausted. Accordingly, they are unequivocally procedurally defaulted.

The Court will not issue a COA for Grounds 1(b), 8(c), 9(c) and 14 because they were raised in an Application to Reopen under Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule XI(6) which is similar to an Application for Reopening under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B) or Murnahan. These rules apply to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, an issue not involved in these claims. Further, the claim must be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later raised in federal court. Accordingly, they are unequivocally procedurally defaulted.

Also undisputed is the defaulted status of Grounds 3(a), 6(a), (b), (e), 8(a), and 12(a) and (b) because Cunningham failed to object. Therefore, a COA will not issue as to those claims.

The Court will not issue a COA for Ground 4 because the state court opinion clearly and expressly states that this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, it is unequivocally procedurally defaulted.

Reasonable jurists would not debate the Court's findings on Ground 1(a)(i), because defense counsel knew during voir dire that Mikesell worked at the Allen County Children's Services, she said that she could be fair and impartial, she followed the evidence closely, and no one connected with the Allen County Children's Services ever spoke to her about Cunningham. Further, she denied making this statement to the investigator who raised it during post-conviction proceedings.

The Court will not issue a COA for Ground 1(c) (ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to conduct voir dire) because although most jurors were somewhat familiar with the case, all of them promised that they could decide the case based on the merits, counsel knew that one of the jurors worked for the Allen County Children's Services, and she was asked whether she had any information concerning the case. No prejudice has been shown as this juror did not learn about the information in her alleged statements until after the trial began. No jurist of reason would debate these findings.

Reasonable jurists would not debate the Court's finding on Ground 2(a) (denied opportunity to life question jurors) because the jurors were informed by the court about mitigating factors, if any, and asked if they could weigh them against aggravating circumstances. Defense counsel are not entitled to address every mitigating factor they believe might be established during trial.

The Court will not issue a COA for Ground 3(c) (counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's erroneous implementation of Ohio Crim. R 16(B)(1)(g)) because pretrial statements that were never adopted by witnesses are not subject to in camera inspection and failure to elaborate does not amount to inconsistencies. Further, power to grant a writ of habeas corpus only extends to errors in the application of federal law. No jurist of reason would debate these findings.

No COA will issue for Ground 5 (failure to hire a ballistics expert to prove Cunningham was not the actual killer). No jurist of reason would debate the Court's finding that Cunningham participated in the robbery and was seen firing a gun. The amount and type of bullets found was not conclusive as to whether or not Cunningham fired a weapon.

The Court will not issue a COA for Ground 6(c) (prosecutor's characterization of the murders as the "most cold-blooded inhuman murder anyone could imagine") because, even if it was improper, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the outcome of the trial would have been different without it. Also, no COA will issue for Sub-Claim (d) (prosecutor's comment that Cunningham's statement to the jury was unsworn) because in Ohio, prosecutorial comment on the lack of cross-examination on an defendant's unsworn statement is acceptable. No jurist of reason would debate these findings.

No COA will issue for Sub-Claims (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Ground 7 (ineffective assistance of counsel during the mitigation phase of the trial). The evidence contained in the record of the Allen County Children's Services was presented to the jury by Cunningham's sister, mother, and a forensic psychologist. Records that were ordered by the court to be produced included records of Allen County Children's Services, Allen County Juvenile Court, Family Resource Center, Department of Corrections, hospitals, and doctors. Any testimony from a collateral expert would have been cumulative and unnecessary. Failure to present evidence that Cunningham failed to pass a Voice Stress Analyzer test cannot be used to cast residual doubt as to guilt as residual doubt is not a mitigating factor under Ohio law. Closing arguments may have been brief but the evidence Cunningham wanted heard was repeated a few minutes earlier and counsel made a strategic decision to avoid repetition. No jurist of reason would debate the Court's conclusions regarding these claims.

Reasonable jurists also would not debate the Court's finding that Ground 8(d) (reasonable doubt jury instruction unconstitutional) because the Sixth Circuit has ruled that Ohio's definition of reasonable doubt does not violate due process.

The Court will not issue a COA for Sub-Claim (a) of Ground 9 (trial court failed to conform its sentencing opinion to the requirements of R.C. 2929.03) because any error was cured when the Ohio Supreme reweighed the trial court's sentencing decision. No jurist of reason would debate this finding. The Court will not grant a COA for Sub-Claim (b) (Cunningham not given opportunity to argue residual doubt during the penalty phase of the trial) because in Ohio, residual doubt cannot be considered a mitigating factor as it is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be given the death penalty. This finding is unequivocal.

No COA will issue for Ground 10 (Cunningham's death sentence is inappropriate, arbitrary, and capricious) because proportionality review is not required. Further, the Sixth Circuit has held that Ohio has appropriately limited proportionality review to previous cases wherein the death penalty had been imposed. No jurist of reason would debate this finding.

Reasonable jurists also would not debate the Court's findings regarding Ground 11(a) and (b) (trial unfair because of publicity and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to submit newspaper clippings to the court with a motion to change venue) because the court properly voir dired the jurors and each of them promised to decide the case based on the evidence, and the trial court was aware of the publicity.

No COA will issue for Ground 12(c) (ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to many photographs) because the court found the photographs to be probative, and nothing in the record showed doubt as to guilt if the jurors had not seen them. No jurist of reason would debate this finding.

The Court will not issue a COA for claims set forth in Grounds 13 (unconstitutionality of the death penalty) and 14 (cumulative error). These claims occur almost pro forma in capital habeas petitions but are routinely denied. Reasonable jurists would agree with this finding.

VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is denied. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith as to all grounds for relief, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 12/7/10