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NIX v. HEDDEN
Factual and Procedural Background
This case arose from an action brought on February 4, 1887, by the plaintiff against the collector of the port of New York to recover duties paid under protest on tomatoes imported from the West Indies in the spring of 1886. The collector assessed duties under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, classifying tomatoes under "vegetables" subject to a ten percent ad valorem duty. The plaintiff contended that tomatoes should be classified as "fruits," which were exempt under the free list of the same act. At trial, dictionaries and testimony from two long-time fruit and vegetable sellers were introduced to define the terms "fruit" and "vegetables." The court directed a verdict for the defendant, which the plaintiff appealed by writ of error.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether tomatoes are to be classified as "vegetables" or as "fruit" within the meaning of the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Tomatoes should be considered "fruit" under the Tariff Act because they fit the dictionary definitions of fruit as the seed-bearing part of plants.
- Expert witnesses suggested that the terms "fruit" and "vegetables" have consistent meanings in trade and commerce, and dictionaries define tomato as a fruit.
Respondent's Arguments
- Tomatoes should be classified as "vegetables" for tariff purposes, as they are commonly treated as vegetables in commerce and by consumers.
- Evidence from dictionaries and trade usage supports the classification of tomatoes alongside vegetables such as peas, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 | Judicial notice of ordinary meanings of words and use of dictionaries as aids to understanding. | Supported the court's approach to determining the ordinary meaning of "fruit" and "vegetables" without treating dictionaries as evidence. |
| Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 216 | Same as above regarding judicial notice and dictionary use. | Reinforced the principle that ordinary meanings, not specialized trade meanings, govern interpretation. |
| Nelson v. Cushing, 2 Cush. 519, 532-533 | Judicial notice of language and dictionaries as interpretive aids. | Applied to confirm ordinary meaning controls in tariff classification. |
| Page v. Fawcet, 1 Leon. 242 | Use of dictionaries and ordinary language in legal interpretation. | Supported court's methodology in interpreting tariff terms. |
| Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414 | Classification of beans as vegetables rather than seeds in commerce despite botanical definitions. | Analogized to the present case to show that botanical definitions do not control commercial classification. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court identified the sole issue as whether tomatoes should be classified as "vegetables" or "fruit" under the Tariff Act of 1883. The court noted that the witnesses testified that the terms "fruit" and "vegetables" did not have any special trade meaning differing from dictionary definitions, and that these meanings were consistent as of the statute's enactment. The court emphasized that the words must be given their ordinary meaning, of which the court takes judicial notice. Dictionaries were admitted not as evidence but as aids to understanding. Although botanically tomatoes are fruits, the court held that in common speech and commerce, tomatoes are vegetables. This is based on the common culinary usage where tomatoes, like peas, beans, and cucumbers, are served as vegetables rather than as dessert fruits. The court relied on precedent that botanical classifications do not control commercial or legal classifications for tariff purposes, citing Robertson v. Salomon regarding beans. Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's verdict.
Holding and Implications
Judgment affirmed.
The court held that tomatoes are to be classified as "vegetables" within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883 and thus subject to duty. The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the duty assessment against the plaintiff. No new precedent beyond the specific tariff classification was established, but the ruling clarifies that common, ordinary meanings govern tariff interpretations rather than botanical definitions.
The court takes judicial notice of the ordinary meaning of all words in our tongue; and dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Tomatoes are "vegetables" and not "fruit," within the meaning of the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, c. 121.
THIS was an action, brought February 4, 1887, against the collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties, paid under protest, on tomatoes imported by the plaintiff from the West Indies in the spring of 1886, which the collector assessed under "Schedule G. — Provisions," of the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, imposing a duty on "Vegetables, in their natural state, or in salt or brine, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ten per centum ad valorem"; and which the plaintiffs contended came within the clause in the free list of the same act, "Fruits, green, ripe or dried, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act." 22 Stat. 504, 519.
At the trial, the plaintiff's counsel, after reading in evidence definitions of the words "fruit" and "vegetables" from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary and the Imperial Dictionary, called two witnesses, who had been for thirty years in the business of selling fruit and vegetables, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read."
One of the witnesses answered as follows: "Well, it does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables; it takes a portion of them. I think the words `fruit' and `vegetable' have the same meaning in trade to-day that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term `fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term `vegetable,' as `cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words `and the like.'"
The other witness testified: "I don't think the term `fruit' or the term `vegetables' had, in March, 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country, different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries."
The plaintiff's counsel then read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word "tomato."
The defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words "pea," "egg plant," "cucumber," "squash" and "pepper."
The plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's and Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of "potato," "turnip," "parsnip," "cauliflower," "cabbage," "carrot" and "bean."
No other evidence was offered by either party. The court, upon the defendant's motion, directed a verdict for him, which was returned, and judgment rendered thereon. 39 F. 109. The plaintiffs duly excepted to the instruction, and sued out this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question in this case is whether tomatoes, considered as provisions, are to be classed as "vegetables" or as "fruit," within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883.
The only witnesses called at the trial testified that neither "vegetables" nor "fruit" had any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from that given in the dictionaries; and that they had the same meaning in trade to-day that they had in March, 1883.
The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word "fruit" as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are "fruit," as distinguished from "vegetables," in common speech, or within the meaning of the Tariff Act.
There being no evidence that the words "fruit" and "vegetables" have acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42; Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 216; Nelson v. Cushing, 2 Cush. 519, 532, 533; Page v. Fawcet, 1 Leon. 242; Taylor on Evidence, (8th ed.) §§ 16, 21.
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables, which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with or after the soup, fish or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.
The attempt to class tomatoes with fruit is not unlike a recent attempt to class beans as seeds, of which Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for this court, said: "We do not see why they should be classified as seeds, any more than walnuts should be so classified. Both are seeds in the language of botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common parlance. On the other hand, in speaking generally of provisions, beans may well be included under the term `vegetables.' As an article of food on our tables, whether baked or boiled, or forming the basis of soup, they are used as a vegetable, as well when ripe as when green. This is the principal use to which they are put. Beyond the common knowledge which we have on this subject, very little evidence is necessary, or can be produced." Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414.
Judgment affirmed.
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