- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Calamari v. Panos
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Susan Calamari, underwent surgery performed by defendant Spyros N. Panos on six occasions between 2008 and 2010. On June 26, 2012, Susan Calamari and her husband, suing derivatively, commenced an action alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent against Panos, Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C. ("Mid Hudson"), and Hudson Valley Center at Saint Francis, LLC ("HVCSF"). In late March 2014, the plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend their complaint to add causes of action against Mid Hudson and HVCSF for negligent hiring and negligent supervision, seeking to have these claims deemed interposed as of the filing date of the original complaint under CPLR 203(f). The plaintiffs and HVCSF reached a stipulation withdrawing the motion as to HVCSF, which consented to the amendment but reserved its statute of limitations defense. Mid Hudson opposed the motion. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' motion as to Mid Hudson, and Mid Hudson appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs' proposed causes of action for negligent hiring and negligent supervision against Mid Hudson could relate back to the original complaint under CPLR 203(f).
- Whether the plaintiffs' negligent hiring and supervision claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
- Whether Mid Hudson was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense due to alleged misrepresentations preventing timely assertion of claims.
- Whether the Supreme Court properly granted leave to amend the complaint to add the negligent hiring and supervision claims against Mid Hudson pursuant to CPLR 3025(b).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C.)
- The negligent hiring and supervision claims did not relate back to the original complaint because the original complaint did not give notice of the factual basis for these new claims.
- The new claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to negligent hiring and supervision causes of action, as the motion to amend was made more than three years after the last alleged incident.
- Mid Hudson argued that it was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense, as any alleged misrepresentations ceased before the commencement of the action in 2012.
Respondents' Arguments (Plaintiffs)
- The plaintiffs contended that the negligent hiring and supervision claims related back to the original complaint under CPLR 203(f) because the original complaint gave sufficient notice.
- They argued that Mid Hudson should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense due to alleged misrepresentations by Mid Hudson employees regarding the plaintiff's medical condition and the procedures performed by Panos, which prevented timely assertion of the claims.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 | Leave to amend pleadings is to be freely given absent prejudice or surprise, unless the amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. | Applied to confirm that leave to amend should be granted unless the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or lacking merit. |
| Stein v. Doukas, 128 A.D.3d 803, 9 N.Y.S.3d 340 | Party seeking leave to amend need not show evidentiary merit; leave is denied only if amendment is palpably insufficient or devoid of merit. | Reaffirmed the standard for granting leave to amend. |
| Katz v. Castlepoint Ins. Co., 121 A.D.3d 948, 995 N.Y.S.2d 131 | Standard for freely granting leave to amend pleadings. | Supported the principle that leave to amend is liberally granted. |
| Jolly v. Russell, 203 A.D.2d 527, 611 N.Y.S.2d 232 | Relation back under CPLR 203(f) requires that the original pleading give notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved under the amended pleading. | Applied to determine that the negligent hiring and supervision claims did not relate back because the original complaint lacked notice of these claims. |
| Velez v. Springer, 102 A.D.2d 823, 476 N.Y.S.2d 374 | Relation back doctrine and notice requirements. | Referenced as a comparative case regarding relation back. |
| Raymond v. Ryken, 98 A.D.3d 1265, 951 N.Y.S.2d 776 | Distinction between causes of action and relation back of claims. | Used to support the conclusion that medical malpractice claims are distinct from negligent hiring and supervision claims. |
| Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176 | Comparison of conduct and dates relevant to claims. | Compared to illustrate differences between claims. |
| Tsimbler v. Fell, 123 A.D.3d 1009, 999 N.Y.S.2d 863 | Comparison of factual allegations relevant to claims. | Used in analysis of claim distinctness. |
| Diana F. v. Velez, 126 A.D.3d 856, 2 N.Y.S.3d 915 | Relation back and notice requirements. | Applied to support that the original complaint did not provide necessary notice. |
| Vastola v. Maer, 48 A.D.2d 561, 370 N.Y.S.2d 955, affd. 39 N.Y.2d 1019 | Amended claims not relating back are deemed interposed at time of amendment and subject to statute of limitations. | Applied to determine that the new claims accrued outside the statute of limitations. |
| Ducillo v. Hudson Val. at St. Francis, LLC, 128 A.D.3d 885, 9 N.Y.S.3d 624 | Equitable estoppel may prevent assertion of statute of limitations defense if misrepresentations prevent timely claim assertion. | Considered but rejected because misrepresentations ceased before commencement of the action. |
| Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713 | Elements of equitable estoppel and due diligence requirement. | Applied to conclude plaintiffs failed to demonstrate due diligence to support estoppel. |
| Country World v. Imperial Frozen Foods Co., 186 A.D.2d 781, 589 N.Y.S.2d 81 | Application of statute of limitations principles. | Referenced in analysis of statute of limitations timing. |
| Zumpano v. Quinn, 6 N.Y.3d 666, 816 N.Y.S.2d 703, 849 N.E.2d 926 | Equitable estoppel and statute of limitations defense. | Applied to reject estoppel claim as a matter of law. |
| Hustedt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jones, Little & Co., 129 A.D.3d 669, 8 N.Y.S.3d 917 | Denial of leave to amend when proposed claims are time-barred and palpably insufficient. | Supported denial of the plaintiffs' motion to amend. |
| Marcum, LLP v. Silva, 117 A.D.3d 917, 986 N.Y.S.2d 508 | Standards for granting leave to amend pleadings. | Referenced in relation to leave to amend standards. |
| Bergman v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 275 A.D.2d 675, 713 N.Y.S.2d 531 | Leave to amend pleadings and statute of limitations considerations. | Referenced in support of the court's ruling. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ proposed negligent hiring and supervision claims could relate back to the original complaint under CPLR 203(f). It concluded that the original complaint, which alleged medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, did not provide Mid Hudson with sufficient notice of the factual basis for the new claims. The negligent hiring and supervision claims were distinct in conduct, timing, and parties involved, and the mere reference to "negligence" in the original complaint was insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement.
Because the claims did not relate back, they were deemed interposed at the time of the motion to amend in March 2014. The statute of limitations for these claims is three years, and the motion was made more than three years after the last alleged incident, rendering the claims time-barred.
The plaintiffs argued for equitable estoppel based on alleged misrepresentations by Mid Hudson employees that prevented timely assertion of the claims. The court found that such misrepresentations ceased by the time the action was commenced in June 2012, so they could not have prevented timely filing of claims arising within three years before that date. Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to allege due diligence in pursuing the claims after the action was commenced, particularly regarding a 21-month delay before moving to amend.
Accordingly, the court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply, and the proposed amended claims were palpably insufficient due to being time-barred. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in granting leave to amend to add these claims against Mid Hudson.
Holding and Implications
The order of the Supreme Court granting leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action for negligent hiring and negligent supervision against Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C., deemed to relate back to the original complaint, is reversed and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion is denied.
The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiffs’ additional claims against Mid Hudson are barred by the statute of limitations and cannot be asserted in this action. The ruling does not establish new precedent but affirms the application of relation back doctrine, statute of limitations, and equitable estoppel principles in the context of medical malpractice litigation.
Westermann, Sheehy, Keenan, Samaan & Aydelott, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Christopher P. Keenan of counsel), for appellant.
Meagher & Meagher, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Christopher B. Meagher and Rachel R. Gruenberg of counsel), for respondents.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ. Opinion
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendant Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Lubell, J.), dated June 24, 2014, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to serve an amended complaint asserting causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision insofar as asserted against it, deeming those causes of action to have been interposed as of the time the original complaint was filed, and deeming the amended complaint served.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to serve an amended complaint asserting causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision insofar as asserted against the defendant Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C., deeming those causes of action to have been interposed as of the time the original complaint was filed, and deeming the amended complaint served is denied.
The defendant Spyros N. Panos allegedly performed surgery on the plaintiff Susan Calamari on six occasions between 2008 and 2010. On June 26, 2012, Susan Calamari (hereinafter the plaintiff), and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action asserting causes of action alleging medical malpractice
and lack of informed consent against Panos, Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C. (hereinafter Mid Hudson), and Hudson Valley Center at Saint Francis, LLC (hereinafter HVCSF). Sometime in late March 2014, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action against Mid Hudson and HVCSF alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision, deeming those causes of action to have been interposed as of the date of the filing of the original complaint, and deeming the amended complaint served ( see CPLR 203[f] ). The plaintiffs and HVCSF entered into a stipulation pursuant to which the plaintiffs withdrew their motion insofar as it related to HVCSF, HVCSF consented to the amendment of the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and HVCSF retained its right to assert that the causes of action alleged in the amended complaint were time-barred insofar as asserted against it. Mid Hudson opposed the motion. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion that pertained to Mid Hudson, and Mid Hudson appeals.
Pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), leave to amend or supplement a pleading is to be “freely given” (CPLR 3025[b] ). “In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” (Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 222, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ; see Stein v. Doukas, 128 A.D.3d 803, 804, 9 N.Y.S.3d 340 ; Katz v. Castlepoint Ins. Co., 121 A.D.3d 948, 950, 995 N.Y.S.2d 131 ). A party seeking leave to amend a pleading need not make an evidentiary showing of merit (see Stein v. Doukas, 128 A.D.3d at 804, 9 N.Y.S.3d 340 ; Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d at 229, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ), and leave to amend will be granted unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt (see Stein v. Doukas, 128 A.D.3d at 804, 9 N.Y.S.3d 340 ).
Pursuant to CPLR 203(f), claims asserted in an amended complaint are “deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading
does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading” (CPLR 203[f] ). Thus, when the nature of a newly asserted cause of action is distinct from the causes of action asserted in the original complaint, and requires different factual allegations as to the underlying conduct than were contained in the original complaint, the new claims will not “relate back” in time to the interposition of the causes of action in the original complaint ( see Jolly v. Russell, 203 A.D.2d 527, 528–529, 611 N.Y.S.2d 232 ; cf.
Velez v. Springer, 102 A.D.2d 823, 824, 476 N.Y.S.2d 374 ). Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the allegations in the original complaint in support of the causes of action alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent gave Mid Hudson notice of the “transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved” with respect to the claims of negligent hiring and supervision (CPLR 203[f] ; cf. Raymond v. Ryken, 98 A.D.3d 1265, 1265, 951 N.Y.S.2d 776 ). The causes of action alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent are distinct not only as to the conduct alleged, but also as to the dates on which the conduct occurred and who engaged in it (compare Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 23, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176, and Tsimbler v. Fell, 123 A.D.3d 1009, 1010, 999 N.Y.S.2d 863, with Diana F. v. Velez, 126 A.D.3d 856, 856, 2 N.Y.S.3d 915 ). The mere reference to “negligence” in the original complaint did not give Mid Hudson notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved with respect to the proposed causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision. Thus, those proposed causes of action could not be deemed to relate back to the interposition of the causes of action in the original complaint (see Jolly v. Russell, 203 A.D.2d at 528–529, 611 N.Y.S.2d 232 ).
The statute of limitations applicable to causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision is three years (see CPLR 214 [5] ). In the absence of “relation back” under CPLR 203(f), the negligent supervision and negligent hiring causes of action are deemed to have been interposed in March 2014, when the plaintiffs made their successful motion for leave to amend the complaint and served the proposed amended complaint with it (see Vastola v. Maer, 48 A.D.2d 561, 565, 370 N.Y.S.2d 955, affd. 39 N.Y.2d 1019, 387 N.Y.S.2d 246, 355 N.E.2d 300 ). The motion was made more than three years after the last date on which the plaintiff allegedly was a patient of Panos. Thus, as Mid Hudson contends, the plaintiffs' proposed additional causes of action accrued outside the three-year statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs argue that Mid Hudson should be estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations because employees of Mid Hudson misrepresented both the procedures that Panos had performed and the plaintiff's medical condition, and thereby prevented them
from timely asserting their causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision ( see Ducillo v. Hudson Val. at St. Francis, LLC, 128 A.D.3d 885, 886, 9 N.Y.S.3d 624 ). The plaintiffs presented an affidavit from the plaintiff alleging these misrepresentations. In light of the fact, however, that the plaintiffs commenced this action on June 26, 2012, it is clear that any such misrepresentations were no longer operative as of at least that date and, thus, did not prevent the plaintiffs from timely asserting causes of action that arose within the three-year period before that date, or June 26, 2009 ( see Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 449–450, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713 ; Country
World v. Imperial Frozen Foods Co., 186 A.D.2d 781, 782, 589 N.Y.S.2d 81 ). Accordingly, as a matter of law, Mid Hudson cannot be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense with respect to any causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision that accrued within three years before the date this action was commenced, and the Supreme Court erred in holding otherwise ( see Zumpano v. Quinn, 6 N.Y.3d 666, 674, 816 N.Y.S.2d 703, 849 N.E.2d 926 ). Further, the plaintiffs have not alleged facts that, if true, would establish that they were duly diligent in asserting their causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision with respect to the period before June 26, 2009. Specifically, the plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would excuse the 21–month delay between the commencement of the action in June 2012, when Mid Hudson's alleged misrepresentations no longer prevented them from asserting their causes of action, and their making of the motion to amend their complaint in March 2014. In light of the plaintiffs' failure to allege the due diligence element of equitable estoppel ( see Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d at 450, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713 ; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 162 A.D.2d 249, 249, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608 ), that doctrine is not applicable to the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision for which the statute of limitations expired while the alleged misrepresentations of Mid Hudson were operative.
In sum, because the plaintiffs' proposed causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision are time-barred, and thus palpably insufficient, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) to amend their complaint (see Hustedt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jones, Little & Co., 129 A.D.3d 669, 8 N.Y.S.3d 917 ; cf. Marcum, LLP v. Silva, 117 A.D.3d 917, 918, 986 N.Y.S.2d 508 ; Bergman v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 275 A.D.2d 675, 676, 713 N.Y.S.2d 531 ).
Alert