Summary of Opinion — Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York

Factual and Procedural Background

The action arose from a boundary dispute between adjoining residential properties that had formerly been under common ownership. After the plaintiffs purchased their lot in 2000, they erected a stockade fence that encroached onto the lot of the predecessor in title of the defendants Joseph and Mary Carroll. In 2006 the plaintiffs removed the fence at the predecessor's request so that a sale to the Carrolls could proceed. The plaintiffs later rebuilt the fence (the date is disputed). In January 2013 the Carrolls transferred title of their lot to themselves and K. McGrath Builders, Inc. In May 2013 the plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, among other relief, (1) a judgment that they were owners by adverse possession of a disputed strip along their southern boundary that encroached on the defendants' lot, (2) damages for trespass, (3) a declaration that they held an express easement over land owned by the defendants and an injunction against interference with that easement, and (4) entry of a notice of pendency. The defendants counterclaimed, inter alia, for trespass.

At the Supreme Court level the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cancelling the notice of pendency and to sever the counterclaims; the plaintiffs cross-moved to dismiss the second counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). The Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants' motion dismissing the complaint and cancelling the notice of pendency, granted the plaintiffs' CPLR 3211(a)(7) cross motion to dismiss the counterclaims, and denied as academic the defendants' severance request. The plaintiffs did not seek a stay under CPLR 5519(c); title to the defendants' lot was transferred to a third-party purchaser in August 2014. On appeal, the plaintiffs appealed limited parts of the order and the defendants cross-appealed limited parts.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the plaintiffs acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse possession under the governing law, including the 2008 amendments to RPAPL article 5.
2. Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cancelling the notice of pendency.
3. Whether the plaintiffs have an express easement over the defendants' land and, if so, whether that easement was extinguished by its terms.
4. Whether the defendants' second counterclaim for trespass should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) or severed and retained for separate adjudication.
5. Whether the plaintiffs' challenge that the defendants' summary judgment motion was premature should succeed based on alleged discovery needs.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs (appellants-respondents)

• Sought a declaration of ownership of the disputed parcel by adverse possession and damages for trespass.
• Asserted an express easement over the defendants' land and sought to enjoin interference with that easement.
• Argued that the defendants' summary judgment motion was premature because discovery might reveal facts essential to opposing the motion.
• Moved to dismiss the defendants' second counterclaim for trespass under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Defendants (respondents-appellants)

• Moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and cancelling the notice of pendency, asserting that the plaintiffs did not meet the elements of adverse possession, including that their possession did not vest before the 2008 RPAPL amendments.
• Asserted that the claimed express easement was conditional and extinguished by the terms of a 1978 “[Corrected] Declaration Affecting Title” when an encroachment was removed.
• Counterclaimed for trespass and contended the plaintiffs exceeded the scope of any easement (e.g., by building the stockade fence) and therefore could be liable for trespass damages.
• Sought severance of the second counterclaim as appropriate given the defendants' positions on trespass damages.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps aligned to each cause of action and the procedural motions.

1. Adverse possession / first cause of action:
   • The court applied the 2008 amendments to RPAPL article 5 to the adverse possession claim.
   • The defendants established prima facie that the plaintiffs' purported adverse possession did not vest prior to the statute's enactment, citing authorities to that effect.
   • The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue: they had not possessed the disputed parcel for 10 years when the statute was enacted, and they offered no evidence to support tacking by a predecessor in title (citing Brand v. Prince and supporting cases regarding the requirement that a predecessor intend and actually turn over possession of the undescribed part).
   • Separately, the defendants established prima facie that the plaintiffs' use was not adverse for the statutory period because possession was not continuous, exclusive, open and notorious, under a claim of right, and actual for 10 years (citing RPAPL 501 provisions). The plaintiffs' removal of the fence at the predecessor's request showed non-adversity and undermined a claim of continuous adverse possession.
   • The plaintiffs also failed to raise a triable issue that the encroachments were not de minimis and thus permissive/non-adverse (citing RPAPL 543[1] and cases on de minimis encroachments).
2. Trespass / second cause of action:
   • The court identified the essential elements of trespass (intentional entry onto another's land without justification) and concluded that because the plaintiffs had not adversely possessed the disputed parcel for the required statutory period, the defendants could not be liable for trespass on their own property.
   • Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' trespass claim as a matter of law.
3. Express easement / third cause of action:
   • The defendants tendered unrebutted evidence of a conditional easement contained in a 1978 declaration that expressly provided the right to maintain encroachments would cease if the owner removed an encroachment. The record showed one encroachment had been removed by the plaintiffs' predecessor.
   • The court found that, as a matter of law, the conditional easement was extinguished by its own terms (citing South Buffalo Dev. and Norse Realty Group).
   • However, because the third cause of action sought declaratory relief in part, the Supreme Court should not have dismissed it outright. The Appellate Division remitted the matter for entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs do not have an express easement over the lot formerly owned by the defendants.
4. Defendants' second counterclaim and severance:
   • The court concluded the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs' CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss the defendants' second counterclaim for trespass. Even where an easement existed, the defendants alleged the scope had been exceeded by building the stockade fence, which would allow an action for trespass and damages (citing Gates and related cases).
   • Therefore, the defendants could seek damages for trespass and the Supreme Court should not have denied, as academic, the defendants' motion to sever the second counterclaim. The Appellate Division reversed that portion and granted severance.
5. Prematurity of summary judgment:
   • The Supreme Court properly rejected plaintiffs' contention that the defendants' summary judgment motion was premature because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate how discovery would reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge or control (citing Interboro Ins. Co. and Cajas–Romero).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appellate Division affirmed the order insofar as appealed from, reversed insofar as cross-appealed, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the second counterclaim, granted that branch of the defendants' motion to sever the second counterclaim, remitted the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County for further proceedings including entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs do not have an express easement over the lot formerly owned by the defendants, and awarded one bill of costs to the defendants.

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' adverse possession and trespass claims against the defendants were dismissed; the plaintiffs do not hold an express easement as to the defendants' former lot (the matter is remitted for entry of that declaratory judgment); the defendants may pursue their severed second counterclaim for trespass and seek damages for alleged trespass arising from exceeding any easement's scope.
• The court applied existing statutory law (including the 2008 RPAPL amendments) and settled case law on adverse possession, tacking, de minimis encroachments, trespass elements, conditional easements, and summary judgment prematurity. The opinion directs further proceedings consistent with those applications but does not announce or characterize a new legal rule or broader precedent beyond application of existing authorities.