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Harris v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
Summary of Opinion — Horace Harris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-174-JAG (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2017)
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2005 Horace Harris executed a Deed of Trust on property at 6655 St. Pauls Road to secure a Note for $388,297 with Washington Mutual Bank FA ("WaMu"); only a co-signer, Keith Coleman, signed the Note. WaMu formed the WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-PR-1 Trust in 2006. After the FDIC took over WaMu in 2008, JPMorgan Chase, as attorney-in-fact for the FDIC, executed an August 5, 2013 Assignment assigning the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo as trustee for the WaMu Trust. Harris defaulted, Wells Fargo appointed a substitute trustee, and Wells Fargo purchased the property at a January 2014 foreclosure sale with a credit bid of $388,297. Harris, proceeding pro se, filed this suit alleging seven counts contesting the foreclosure and seeking declaratory relief and damages; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court granted the motion and dismissed Harris's amended complaint with prejudice, concluding that res judicata bars Harris's claims because they arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence litigated in a prior 2014 suit Harris and Coleman brought against Chase that Judge Spencer dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Harris's claims are barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) under Virginia law because they arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as a prior final judgment.
- Whether, if res judicata does not bar the action, Harris's amended complaint states any claims upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (Horace Harris) Arguments
- Harris contests the foreclosure's validity and seeks a declaratory judgment that the sale was void ab initio and at least $1.4 million in damages.
- Harris alleges WaMu (or its successors) cannot prove the Note was sold to the WaMu Trust (a "show me the note" theory).
- Harris claims he never received notice of default or acceleration prior to the foreclosure, as required by his mortgage.
Defendant's (Wells Fargo) Arguments
- Wells Fargo moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- Wells Fargo asserted res judicata as a defense, arguing Harris's claims arise from the same conduct/transaction/occurrence as Harris's 2014 suit against Chase, which was dismissed on the merits, and that privity exists between Chase and Wells Fargo.
- Alternatively, Wells Fargo argued Harris's claims fail on the merits (e.g., securitization does not relieve obligations, "show me the note" theories fail under Virginia law, plaintiff lacks standing to challenge assignments, Virginia does not recognize certain claimed causes of action, and IIED/NIED cannot be shown because Wells Fargo acted within its legal rights).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) | Pleading standard: plausibility requirement under Rule 8(a)(2). | Used to state the standard for assessing a 12(b)(6) motion—plausibility of pleaded facts. |
| Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 (2007) | Pleading standard: supports Iqbal's plausibility standard. | Quoted in defining facial plausibility of claims at the motion to dismiss stage. |
| Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) | Acceptance of allegations as true and drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiff. | Cited for the proposition that courts must accept allegations as true when considering a complaint. |
| Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) | Support for drawing inferences in favor of plaintiff at pleading stage. | Referenced along with Nemet for pleading-stage standards. |
| Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2016) | Permits judicial notice of public records and consideration of integral, authentic documents on a motion to dismiss. | Justified taking judicial notice of the prior 2014 litigation and related public records. |
| Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) | Pro se complaints to be construed liberally. | Supported leniency in construing Harris's pro se pleadings while noting limitations. |
| Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) | Courts need not discern unexpressed intent of pro se plaintiffs or conjure issues. | Used to limit how far the court will infer claims on behalf of the pro se plaintiff. |
| Q Int'l Courier Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2006) | Choice of law: preclusive effect of a prior action determined by the law of the state where the prior district court sat. | Supported applying Virginia res judicata law to the prior judgment. |
| Raley v. Haider, 286 Va. 164, 170, 747 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2013) | Text and scope of Virginia's res judicata rule (Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6). | Provided the statutory language and framework for Virginia res judicata analysis. |
| Houmadi v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, No. 1:14-CV-997-CMH, 2014 WL 5092624, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014) | Application of Virginia res judicata elements in the district court. | Cited for the three-element formulation of Virginia res judicata and proof by preponderance. |
| Smoak, 441 F.3d at 219 | Party asserting res judicata must prove preclusion by a preponderance of the evidence. | Referenced as the burden of proof for res judicata defense. |
| Nabaya v. Stark, No. 3:13CV218-HEH, 2013 WL 2484661, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2013) | Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits for res judicata; and courts may take notice of prior proceedings when no disputed fact issue exists. | Supported the Court's view that Judge Spencer's 12(b)(6) dismissal was a final judgment on the merits and justified taking notice of the prior case. |
| Carter v. Brooks, 77 Va. Cir. 363 (2009) | Demurrer/Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal constitutes a decision on the merits if dismissal language makes order final. | Used to show state and federal law treat such dismissals as merits decisions for res judicata purposes. |
| Parrish v. Journigan, 875 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1989) | When an order dismisses without indicating with/without prejudice, dismissal is deemed with prejudice. | Applied to conclude Judge Spencer's dismissal was final and with prejudice. |
| Martin-Bangura v. Virginia Dep't of Mental Health, 640 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738 (E.D. Va. 2009) | Virginia amendment broadened scope of res judicata to bar claims arising from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. | Supported the proposition that claims arising from the same set of circumstances are barred even if legal theories differ. |
| Chisholm v. Epps, No. 3:16-CV-00078-GCM, 2016 WL 3452751, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 21, 2016) | Pro se status does not overcome preclusive effect of prior judgments. | Used to reject the notion that Harris's pro se status permits relitigation of previously adjudicated claims. |
| Haider, 286 Va. at 172, 747 S.E.2d at 816 | Privity determination is case-by-case; touchstone is identity of interests and representation. | Applied in assessing privity between Chase and Wells Fargo. |
| Buzzell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:13-CV-668, 2014 WL 3767118, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2014) | When a servicer acts on behalf of a lender/mortgagee to collect payments, privity will often exist for successive suits arising from same transaction. | Supported finding privity between Chase (servicer/prior defendant) and Wells Fargo. |
| Webb v. EquiFirst Corp., No. 7:15-CV-00413, 2016 WL 1274618, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2016) | Securitization does not relieve mortgagor's obligations; supports rejection of claims tied solely to securitization. | Used to reject claims that securitization affected Harris's obligations on the Note. |
| Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (W.D. Va. 2011) | Support for rejection of "show me the note" standing theories under Virginia law. | Applied to reject Harris's challenge to defendants' standing based on lack of a wet signature/chain evidence. |
| Harrison v. US Bank Nat. Ass'n, No. 3:12-CV-00224, 2012 WL 2366163, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2012) | Virginia does not recognize breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in real estate contracts. | Used to dismiss Count II (breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). |
| Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 512 Fed. App'x 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) | Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge assignments if not a party or intended beneficiary of those assignments. | Applied to dismiss conversion claims attacking validity of assignments (Counts III and IV). |
| Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 203, 624 S.E.2d 24, 33 (2006) | IIED requires outrageous and intolerable conduct; acting within legal rights is not outrageous. | Applied to dismiss IIED/NIED claims (Count VI) because Wells Fargo acted within its legal rights. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first analyzed whether Virginia res judicata bars Harris's claims. Applying Virginia law (per Q Int'l Courier v. Smoak), the Court identified three required elements: (1) the second action arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the first; (2) the prior action was decided on the merits by a final judgment; and (3) the parties are the same or in privity. The Court concluded each element was satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence:
- Same occurrence: All current claims stem from the same chain of assignments of the Deed of Trust and foreclosure proceedings litigated in Harris's 2014 suit against Chase; the amended Virginia statute's broad scope captures claims arising from the same conduct even if the legal theories differ.
- Final judgment on the merits: The 2014 dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a decision on the merits under federal and Virginia law; because Judge Spencer's order did not state whether dismissal was with or without prejudice, it is deemed with prejudice (Parrish), constituting a final judgment for res judicata.
- Privity: The Court found privity between Chase (the prior defendant/servicer) and Wells Fargo (trustee) based on identity of interests and the typical relationship between servicer and lender, making it appropriate to apply res judicata to bar successive suits arising from the same transaction.
Because res judicata barred the suit, the Court dismissed the complaint. The Court further explained that, even absent res judicata, Harris's complaint would fail on the merits: securitization does not relieve obligations; "show me the note" theories fail under Virginia law; Virginia does not recognize the claimed covenant-based cause of action in real estate contracts; plaintiff lacked standing to challenge assignments; IIED/NIED fail because defendant acted within its legal rights; and the Court saw no Virginia authority recognizing wrongful acceleration as a distinct cause of action. The Court noted an internal inconsistency between Harris's current allegation of not receiving a default notice and his 2014 allegation admitting receipt of a default notice.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Holding: The Court granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss and dismissed Horace Harris's amended complaint with prejudice on res judicata grounds.
Implications: The dismissal bars Harris from relitigating these claims against Wells Fargo (or parties in privity) because they arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the prior final judgment. The opinion does not announce a new legal rule; it applies Virginia res judicata principles and existing precedents to the facts of this case, producing the direct effect of final dismissal with prejudice of Harris's claims.
John A. Gibney, Jr. United States District Judge
OPINION
The pro se plaintiff, Horace Harris, brings this wrongful foreclosure case against the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association ("Wells Fargo"). Harris contests the foreclosure of his home and alleges seven counts including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, wrongful acceleration, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Harris seeks a declaratory judgment invalidating the foreclosure as well as damages of at least 1.4 million dollars. Wells Fargo moved to dismiss Harris's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court grants the motion to dismiss. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars Harris's claims because they arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as a previous case Harris filed challenging the foreclosure of his home.
I. BACKGROUNDIn 2005, Harris took out a mortgage with Washington Mutual Bank FA ("WaMu") by executing a Deed of Trust on 6655 St. Pauls Road ("the Property"). The Deed of Trust secured a Note for $388,297. Harris, his wife, and Keith Coleman signed the Deed of Trust; however, only Coleman signed the Note. In 2006, WaMu formed the WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-PR-1 Trust ("the WaMu Trust"). Harris says that WaMu cannot prove that it ever sold the Note to the WaMu Trust. In 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") took over WaMu. On August 5, 2013, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association ("Chase"), as attorney in fact for the FDIC, executed a Notice of Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust ("the Assignment"), assigning the Deed of Trust on the Property to Wells Fargo as trustee for the WaMu Trust. The Assignment shows Chase as the servicer of the Note. Harris then defaulted on the mortgage, and Wells Fargo appointed a substitute trustee to foreclose on the property. Wells Fargo bought the property at the foreclosure sale in January 2014, with a credit bid of $388,297. Harris claims that he never received notice of default or an acceleration warning before the foreclosure, as required by his mortgage.
The complaint states that the "defendants appear to claim that the Harris mortgage was sold to the Trust but there is no valid evidence of this." The plaintiff, however, fails to allege any facts to even suggest that WaMu did not sell the Note to the Trust, and the Court need not resolve the plaintiff's "show me the note" theory, as discussed below.
From the same set of facts, Harris and Mr. Coleman, who is not a party here, sued Chase in this Court in 2014 (the "2014 Litigation"). Harris and Coleman alleged that Chase lacked authority to foreclose on the Property and alleged breach of contract, fraud, and trespass. Harris and Coleman claimed that (1) they had never entered into a contract with Chase and had not accepted any loan from Chase; and (2) Chase's failure to provide a "wet signature" copy of any assignment of the Note negated Chase's claim to the Note. Notably, the complaint in the 2014 Litigation specifically alleged that "plaintiffs admit receiving a default notice. Plaintiffs are without knowledge as to whether the default notice is lawful." Judge Spencer dismissed Harris's claims on a 12(b)(6) motion. On May 11, 2016, Harris filed his amended complaint in this case, again challenging the validity of the Assignment.
Keith Coleman and Horace Harris v. Chase Bank, Jamie Dimon, d/b/a President/CEO, No. 3:14-cv-00101-JRS (E.D. Va. June 5, 2014).
II. STANDARDA plaintiff's complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Where, as here, a defendant brings a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must analyze the plaintiff's complaint to determine whether it states sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 (2007)). When considering the complaint itself, courts must accept all allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle that a court must accept all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In certain circumstances, a court may look beyond the complaint itself and (1) take judicial notice of public records, such as state court records, and (2) consider documents submitted by the movant if the documents are integral to the complaint and indisputably authentic. Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2016).
In cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, or without an attorney, courts do not expect the plaintiff to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision expected from lawyers. Accordingly, courts construe pro se complaints liberally. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) Courts do not, however, need to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff or conjure up issues on the plaintiff's behalf. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006); Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1276.
III. DISCUSSIONHarris brings seven counts in his complaint: Count I: breach of contract; Count II: breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Count III: conversion; Count IV: conversion of an instrument; Count V: wrongful acceleration; Count VI: negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress ("NIED" or "IIED"); and Count VII: declaratory judgment the sale was void ab initio. As stated below, res judicata bars these claims and, even if res judicata did not bar them, Harris's complaint fails to state a claim for all counts except counts one and five for breach of contract.
A. Res Judicata Bars the Plaintiff's SuitRes judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the plaintiff's asserted claims. The Court applies Virginia's res judicata laws. See Q Int'l Courier Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he preclusive effect, if any, of the first action on the second action should have been decided under the res judicata law of the state of Virginia—the law of the state where the federal district court sat in the first action.") (citation omitted). Under Virginia law amended in 2006:
A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be forever barred from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior lawsuit . . . .
Raley v. Haider, 286 Va. 164, 170, 747 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2013) (citing Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6). A "party" includes "all named parties and those in privity." Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6.
See also Haider, 286 Va. at 170, 747 S.E.2d at 815 ("A party to the present suit, to be barred by the doctrine [of res judicata], must have been a party to the prior litigation, or represented by another so identified in interest with him that he represents the same legal right.") (citation omitted).
Virginia's amended res judicata statute bars an action that (1) arises from that same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior suit, (2) has been previously decided on the merits by a final judgment, and (3) contains the same parties or parties in privity to those from the prior suit. See Houmadi v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, No. 1:14-CV-997-CMH, 2014 WL 5092624, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014). "The party asserting res judicata as a defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a claim is precluded by a prior judgment." Id. (citing Smoak, 441 F.3d at 219). Here, Harris's claims satisfy all of the requirements of res judicata by a preponderance of the evidence.
i. This Case Arises from the Same Occurrence as the 2014 Litigation
"When entertaining a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, a court may take notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of fact." Nabaya v. Stark, No. 3:13CV218-HEH, 2013. Wells Fargo's res judicata defense here does not rely on any disputed facts between the two cases and this Court therefore takes notice of the 2014 Litigation. --------
Harris's claims arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as in the 2014 Litigation. In 2006, the Virginia legislature intentionally broadened the scope of claims barred by res judicata, amending the law to bar those claims arising out of "the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the previously litigated claim, rather than merely those with 'the same cause of action asserted in the former proceeding.'" Martin-Bangura v. Virginia Dep't of Mental Health, 640 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738 (E.D. Va. 2009). Further, "while some leniency can be afforded to Plaintiff because the first suit was filed pro se, Plaintiff's previous pro se status is not sufficient to overcome the precluding effect of the Court's judgment on her three previous Complaints." Chisholm v. Epps, No. 3:16-CV-00078-GCM, 2016 WL 3452751, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 21, 2016).
The plaintiff brought the 2014 Litigation against Chase challenging Chase's legal right to foreclose on the Property. At that time, WaMu had already assigned the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo. All of Harris's current claims existed at the time of the 2014 Litigation, and both cases arose from the same set of circumstances—the chain of assignments of the Deed of Trust from WaMu to Wells Fargo and the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, Harris could have brought these claims in the previous suit, satisfying the first element of res judicata.
ii. Judge Spencer Decided the 2014 Litigation on the MeritsThis Court entered a final judgment on the merits in the 2014. First, under federal law and Virginia law, an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (called a demurrer under state law) constitutes a decision on the merits. See Nabaya v. Stark, No. 3:13CV218-HEH, 2013 WL 2484661, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2013) ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 'judgment on the merits' for the purposes of res judicata."); Carter v. Brooks, 77 Va. Cir. 363 (2009) (explaining that "[a] decision of an issue of law on a demurrer is a decision on the merits and constitutes res adjudicata [sic] as to any other proceedings where the same parties and the same issues are involved" so long as the decision contains "dismissal language making the order final") (citation omitted). Second, an order such as Judge Spencer's which does not say whether it dismisses a claim with or without prejudice dismisses a case with prejudice. Parrish v. Journigan, 875 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1989) ("As the order dismissing Parrish's suit did not indicate whether dismissal was with or without prejudice, the dismissal is deemed to be with prejudice.") Judge Spencer, therefore, entered a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of res judicata.
iii. Privity Exists Between Chase and Wells FargoHarris's allegations satisfy the final element of res judicata because Wells Fargo and Chase are in privity. Under Virginia law, "[t]here is no single fixed definition of privity for purposes of res judicata. Whether privity exists is determined on a case by case examination of the relationship and interests of the parties." Haider, 286 Va. at 172, 747 S.E.2d at 816. "The touchstone of privity for purposes of res judicata is that a party's interest is so identical with another that representation by one party is representation of the other's legal right." Id. When a mortgage servicer such as Chase acts on behalf of a lender or mortgagee to effect collection of payments, "it will be a rare case in which those two parties are not perfectly identical with respect to successive suits arising out of the same transaction." Buzzell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:13-CV-668, 2014 WL 3767118, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2014) (citations omitted).
In Harris's two cases attacking the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, privity exists between Chase, the servicer of the Loan and the prior defendant in the 2014 Litigation, and WaMu, the trustee of the Trust which owns the Deed of Trust. WaMu therefore meets its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that res judicata bars the plaintiff's claims.
B. The Complaint Otherwise Fails to State Claims upon which Relief can be GrantedEven if res judicata did not bar Harris's claims, his complaint still fails to state a claim. First, as a preliminary matter, for any claims related to the securitization of Harris's mortgage, such securitization did not alleviate his obligations on the Note. Webb v. EquiFirst Corp., No. 7:15-CV-00413, 2016 WL 1274618, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2016) (collecting cases). Next, any "show me the note" claim contesting a defendants' standing to foreclose fails under Virginia law. Id. at *7 (citing Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (W.D. Va. 2011)). Moving to Harris's numbered Counts, under Count two, Virginia does not recognize claims for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in real estate contracts. Harrison v. US Bank Nat. Ass'n, No. 3:12-CV-00224, 2012 WL 2366163, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2012). Next, under counts three and four for conversion and conversion of an instrument, Harris attacks the validity of assignments of the Deed of Trust. Harris, however, lacks standing to challenge these assignments because he does not allege that he was a party or intended beneficiary of those assignments. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 512 Fed. App'x 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2013). Count six for IIED and NIED also fails because Wells Fargo acted within its legal rights, which is not outrageous and intolerable conduct as required under the law. Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 203, 624 S.E.2d 24, 33 (2006).
Harris's complaint argues that he never received a notice of default, leading to his breach of contract and wrongful acceleration claims in counts one and five, but, as discussed above, the law required Harris to bring that claim in his prior case. Further, the Court has doubts that these claims could survive the defendant's motion to dismiss. First, Harris alleged in the 2014 Litigation that he had received a notice of default, which conflicts with the allegation here. Next, the Court has found no precedent in Virginia law recognizing a wrongful acceleration claim.
IV. CONCLUSIONRes judicata bars Harris's claims, and the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss and dismisses Harris's amended complaint with prejudice.
An appropriate Final Order shall issue.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and to the pro se plaintiff via U.S. mail. Date: March 3, 2017
Richmond, VA
/s/ _________
John A. Gibney, Jr.
United States District Judge
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