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G (A Child: Leave To Oppose Adoption)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Mother appealed against the refusal of her application for leave to oppose the adoption of Child. Care proceedings began when Child was approximately 21 months old, and Child was placed in foster care because of concerns about the Mother’s illicit drug and alcohol use, mental health, and abusive relationships. [1][2]
Following a final hearing, the Family Court refused a residential assessment, made a care order and placement order, and concluded that adoption was the only realistic option for Child’s long-term welfare. [3][4] Child was later placed with a prospective adopter, and an adoption application was issued. [5]
The Mother relied on sustained abstinence, rehabilitation, psychotherapy, stable accommodation, the ending of an abusive relationship, a new supportive relationship, and her care of her younger child as changes in circumstances. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]
The Family Court accepted that there had been a relevant change in circumstances but refused leave to oppose adoption, principally because the changes were recent and insufficiently tested and because Child required stability and permanence. [15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]
The Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal and considered the Mother’s challenge to that decision. [27][28][29][30][31]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Mother had established a change in circumstances since the placement order sufficient to engage the statutory test. [32][33]
- Whether, having regard to Child’s lifelong welfare, the Mother had a sufficiently substantial or solid case to justify an opposed adoption hearing. [34][35][36][37][38]
- Whether the Family Court impermissibly treated evidential gaps as reasons to refuse leave at the permission stage rather than allowing them to be addressed through further evidence. [39][40]
Arguments of the Parties
Mother’s Arguments
- The evidence demonstrated prospects of successfully opposing adoption that were more than fanciful, and showed that adoption might no longer be the only available option. [41]
- The Family Court should have granted permission to oppose adoption and allowed the necessity of adoption to be reconsidered at the final hearing. [41]
- Evidential gaps concerning future care arrangements, caring for two children, and the role of the Mother’s partner should have been addressed through further directions and evidence, rather than being used to refuse permission. [39]
Local Authority’s Arguments
- The Family Court’s decision should be upheld because the judge had detailed knowledge of the case and was best placed to assess the relevant issues. [42]
- The evidential gaps were relevant to both the Mother’s prospects of success and Child’s welfare, and even if addressed would not establish a real prospect of resisting adoption. [42]
- Alternatively, the Local Authority sought guidance on assessing the second stage where substantial change had been demonstrated. [43]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146; [2014] 1 WLR 563 | The governing approach to applications for leave to oppose adoption: a two-stage process, solid prospects of success, paramount consideration of the child’s lifelong welfare, and a broad assessment of all relevant circumstances. | The Court held that the Family Court applied an overly demanding test and failed to conduct the required broad and practical welfare assessment. [44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57] |
| Re P (Adoption: Leave Provisions) [2007] EWCA Civ 616; [2007] 1 WLR 2556; [2007] 2 FLR 1069 | The test for leave should not be set so high that it becomes unachievable. | The principle supported the conclusion that the Family Court had imposed an excessively stringent test. [44][52][54] |
| M v Warwickshire County Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1084; [2008] 1 WLR 991; [2008] 1 FLR 1093 | A prior authority broadly endorsed by Re B-S in relation to applications for leave to oppose adoption. | The Court identified it as part of the established statutory framework. [44] |
| R (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 673; [2026] WLR(D) 320; [2026] 2 FLR 557 | A later decision following the principles in Re B-S. | The Court referred to it as the most recent decision in the line of authority. [44][58] |
| Re M (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2023] EWCA Civ 404; [2023] 4 WLR 36; [2023] 2 FLR 840 | The prospects of success are important but are not a standalone or exclusive test; the central question is whether the adoption plan should be revisited having regard to the child’s lifelong welfare. | The Court used this principle to distinguish an opposed adoption hearing from the ultimate adoption decision. [59][60][35][36][37] |
| Re W (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2020] EWCA Civ 16; [2020] 1 FLR 1125 | The decision should involve a broad and practical welfare balance and should not become a trial of the adoption application on incomplete evidence. | The Court held that the Family Court’s overly detailed assessment risked precisely that impermissible approach. [61][62][53] |
| Re H (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1284; [2016] 2 F.L.R. 1173 | The question is whether the case is a “runner”, not whether it is a “winner”. | The Court applied this distinction in holding that the Mother did not need to show that she was more likely than not to defeat the adoption application. [38] |
| Re B | Adoption is a last resort and is permissible only if nothing else will do; the child’s interests include being raised by parents or wider family unless welfare requirements make that impossible. | The principle formed part of the welfare guidance relevant to deciding whether to reopen the adoption plan. [48] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The statutory framework required the Mother first to demonstrate a change in circumstances since the placement order, and then required the court to decide whether leave should be granted by giving paramount consideration to Child’s lifelong welfare. [32][36]
The Family Court had correctly found that the Mother’s sustained abstinence, engagement with services, therapeutic work, new relationship, accommodation, and care of her younger child constituted a genuine and substantial change. [15][33]
However, the Court of Appeal held that the second-stage assessment required a broad and practical balancing exercise. The question was whether Child’s interests required an opposed adoption hearing, not whether adoption itself was in Child’s interests. [53][37]
The Mother was required to show a solid and substantial case deserving consideration, but not to establish that she would probably succeed. The relevant question was whether her case was a “runner”, rather than a “winner”. [38]
The Family Court had effectively concluded that the Mother’s case would fail because her improvements were recent and insufficiently tested. This imposed a test that was too stringent and close to unachievable. [54]
The Family Court also placed excessive weight on the short-term uncertainty allegedly caused by reopening the adoption plan. There was no evidence that Child would be affected or that the placement would be endangered, and the prospective adopter’s understandable concern should not have been given undue weight. [56]
Conversely, the Family Court had failed to give sufficient weight to the possible long-term benefit to Child of permitting the Mother’s application to be fully considered, including Child’s relationship with the Mother and sibling and Child’s future understanding of why adoption had or had not been necessary. [57]
The evidential gaps concerning the Mother’s partner and rehabilitation arrangements did not justify refusing leave. Some matters required time, while others could be clarified by further professional or expert evidence. [40]
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The Mother was granted leave to oppose the making of an adoption order, and the proceedings were remitted for an early case-management hearing. [63]
The Court of Appeal expressly made no determination about the eventual outcome of the adoption application, which must be decided by the Family Court on all the evidence. [63]
The direct consequence was that the Mother obtained an opportunity to oppose adoption through a contested hearing. The decision did not determine whether Child would ultimately be adopted. [63]
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