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Digwa, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 3 December 2025, the Respondent, aged 22, fatally stabbed an 18-year-old victim with a large Kirpan after a brief encounter in The City. The Respondent subsequently misled the victim, bystanders and police, and arranged for the weapon and the victim’s phone to be removed or retained. [1][2][3][4][5][6]
The Respondent was convicted of murder and possession of a bladed article. He received a life sentence with a minimum term of 21 years, less time spent on remand, together with a concurrent two-year sentence for possession of the bladed article. [7][8]
The Attorney General sought leave to refer the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as unduly lenient. The Respondent separately sought leave to appeal against sentence as manifestly excessive. [9][10]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Respondent’s 21-year minimum term was manifestly excessive. [11][10]
- Whether the sentence was unduly lenient and fell outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. [11][12][13]
- What minimum term properly reflected the seriousness of the murder, including the use of a large Kirpan, the multiple wounds, the treatment of the victim after the stabbing, and the Respondent’s attempts to obstruct the investigation. [14][15][16]
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney General’s Submissions
- The 15-year starting point was accepted, but the seriousness of the offending lay exceptionally close to the category attracting a 25-year starting point. [17]
- The large, immediately available weapon was used repeatedly against an unarmed stranger, and the Respondent abused the statutory protection associated with religious carriage of a bladed article. [17][18]
- The post-stabbing conduct—including filming, misleading first responders, making a false allegation of racism, and attempting to pervert the course of justice—required a substantially higher minimum term. [18]
Respondent’s Submissions
- The court should approach the religious aspect cautiously because lawful Sikh religious practice should not be treated as inherently criminal or unusually suspect. [19]
- “Exceptionally close” was not a recognised statutory category, and the sentencing judge had already made a substantial uplift for aggravating features. [20][21]
- The judge did not materially err, double-counting occurred, and several matters relied upon as aggravating—such as community impact, vulnerability and alleged dishonour to religion—should not have been treated as aggravating factors. [22][23]
- The Respondent challenged findings that he had lied about racial abuse, that the victim was not the aggressor, and that he had made sustained attempts to pervert the course of justice. [24]
Prosecution Submissions
- The offending involved the deliberate and repeated use of a large dagger against an unarmed man, an intention to kill, substantial additional suffering, concealment of evidence and a false account of self-defence. [25]
- The judge’s findings about the Respondent’s lies were justified, and the sentencing exercise did not impermissibly double-count aggravating features. [25]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Kelly and others [2011] EWCA Crim 1462; [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 56 | Schedule 21 must not be applied inflexibly; the court must achieve a just result and assess the individual facts and seriousness of the offending. | The Court relied on this principle in treating knife use as an aggravating feature requiring proper assessment beyond rigid categorisation. [26][14] |
| R v Last [2005] EWCA Crim 106; [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 64 | Features bringing an offence close to a higher statutory category may still be given appropriate weight when adjusting a lower starting point. | The Court used this approach in evaluating the weapon’s nature and use despite retaining the 15-year starting point. [27] |
| R v M, AM and Kika [2009] EWCA Crim 2544; [2010] 2 Cr App R (S) 19 | The nature and use of a weapon remain relevant where the 15-year starting point applies; carrying a knife creates the risk of sudden lethal use. | The Court treated the large Kirpan’s public carriage, availability and use as materially aggravating. [27][28] |
| Attorney General’s Reference (No. 132 of 2001) (R v Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R (S) 41 | Section 36 references address gross error, public concern and substantial departure from ordinary sentencing norms. | The Court applied the high threshold for finding a sentence unduly lenient. [12] |
| R v Singh and Awfarah [2026] EWCA Crim 870 | Explains the principles governing intervention under section 36. | The Court cited it when identifying the applicable test for undue leniency. [12] |
| R v Mohammed Arfan [2022] EWCA Crim 1416 | Sentencing is an art rather than a science, and leniency is not itself a vice. | The Court emphasised that a sentence must be not merely lenient but unduly lenient before appellate interference is justified. [12] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court treated the two applications separately because the tests for manifest excess and undue leniency were different. [29]
It upheld the 15-year starting point because the sentencing judge was entitled to find that the large Kirpan had not been carried with an intention to commit an offence or to use it as a weapon. The statutory conditions for a 25-year starting point were therefore not established. [30]
Nevertheless, the Court held that the large knife’s nature, public carriage, immediate availability and deliberate use to kill an unarmed man required a very significant uplift. Lawful religious carriage did not reduce the seriousness of the subsequent lethal use. The culpability arising from that use alone warranted at least 23 years before other factors were considered. [31][14][32]
The Court identified further aggravating features: multiple stab wounds, the victim’s substantial mental suffering, deliberate filming and degradation, removal of the murder weapon, and retention of the victim’s phone. [33][34][35][36]
The Court rejected challenges to the findings that the Respondent was the aggressor and had lied about not stabbing the victim. It considered the initial question about whether he was “a bad man” non-hostile, whereas taking the victim’s phone was the first hostile act. [37][38][39]
The Court excluded community impact, the victim’s ordinary disadvantage as an unarmed 18-year-old, and alleged dishonour to religion from the aggravating factors. It also found it unnecessary to decide whether the allegation of racial abuse was false because excluding that issue did not alter the appropriate sentence. [40][41]
Before mitigation, the proper minimum term was at least 27 years. The Respondent’s age, previous good character and lack of premeditation justified a proportionate reduction, producing a minimum term of no less than 25 years. [16][42]
Although that conclusion did not automatically establish undue leniency, the Court held that the 21-year term fell outside the reasonable range because it materially understated both the seriousness of the armed killing and the deliberate cruelty and obstruction that followed. [43][13]
Holding and Implications
The Respondent’s application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused. [43][44]
The Attorney General’s reference was allowed. The 21-year minimum term was quashed and replaced with a 25-year minimum term. After deducting 175 days spent on remand, the operative minimum term was 24 years and 190 days. All other elements of the sentence remained unchanged. [45][46][47][48]
The minimum term is the period to be served before the Parole Board may consider release; it does not guarantee automatic release. [49]
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