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McGreal v Courts Service Staff and Ors (No 3)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Courts Service applied for a Litigation Restriction Order (“LRO”) preventing the Plaintiff from commencing further proceedings against it or its servants and agents without leave of the High Court. It also sought an injunction restraining threats or attempts to arrest, false imprisonment, or trespass against those persons. [1][2][3]
The application followed earlier proceedings concerning court fees, repeated interlocutory applications, alleged abuse of process, threats against court officials and legal representatives, and an attempted arrest of a solicitor during a Court of Appeal hearing. The earlier proceedings had been struck out as an abuse of process. [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]
The Courts Service was joined as a notice party on 24 June 2026. Affidavits and written submissions were filed by both sides. [12][13]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court should make an LRO restricting the Plaintiff from instituting further proceedings against the Courts Service or its servants and agents without prior leave. [1][14][15]
- Whether the Court should restrain the Plaintiff from threatening or attempting to arrest, falsely imprison, or commit trespass against employees, servants, agents, or legal representatives of the Courts Service. [2][16][17]
- Whether the proposed restrictions were necessary and proportionate, having regard to the Plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to the courts. [18][19][20][15]
Arguments of the Parties
The Courts Service’s Arguments
- The Courts Service argued that the Plaintiff’s repeated proceedings, applications, correspondence, threats, and allegations justified an LRO. [5][6][7][21][22]
- It submitted that the Plaintiff’s conduct created a substantial risk to employees and legal representatives and interfered with the administration of justice. [23][24][22][25]
- It maintained that it was the proper party to seek relief because it employed the relevant staff and was responsible for their actions through vicarious liability. [26][27]
Plaintiff’s Arguments
- The Plaintiff disputed the validity of appearances and repeatedly challenged the Defendants’ legal representation. [28][29][30][31]
- He relied on section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 to justify purported citizens’ arrests. [32][33][34][35]
- He argued that the injunction was insufficiently limited because it applied throughout the jurisdiction and concerned persons whose employment by the Courts Service might not be known to him. [36][35][37][38]
- He argued that false imprisonment and trespass to the person were wrongs against individuals, not a corporate body, and that any application should be brought by an identified individual. [39][40]
- He offered undertakings not to arrest certain persons, subject to qualifications and restrictions. [41][42]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M v. M [2026] IESC 2 | The Court may make an Isaac Wunder order of its own motion to protect the finality of litigation and the proper use of court resources; such an order must be necessary and proportionate. | The Court relied on these principles in concluding that an LRO was appropriate, necessary, and proportionate. [14][43][44][20][15] |
| Houston v Doyle [2020] IECA 289 | The public interest in finality and the proper use of limited court resources supports the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction. | It was cited within the Supreme Court’s explanation of the Court’s jurisdiction to make an LRO. [43] |
| McMahon v. VW Law & Co LLP [2007] IEHC 51 | Identified features that may justify a Litigation Restriction Order, including persistent vexatious proceedings, re-litigation of decided issues, improper purpose, proceedings against lawyers, and non-payment of costs. | The Court held that all the identified criteria were fulfilled in this case. [45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54] |
| Riordan v. Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 I.R. 463 | Provided the features relevant to imposing or maintaining a restriction on vexatious litigation. | Its principles were adopted through the summary quoted in McMahon. [45][46] |
| Kearney v. Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 92 | Isaac Wunder orders are exceptional, must be used sparingly, must respect access to the courts, and require consideration of litigation history, allegations, future proceedings, costs, proportionality, and necessity. | The Court considered these principles and found that the Plaintiff’s conduct and allegations justified an LRO. [55][18][56][57][58][59][60][19][61][62][63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70][15][71][72] |
| Towey v. The Government of Ireland [2022] IEHC 559 | Outrageous allegations against judges and legal representatives may weigh heavily in favour of a litigation restriction order because effective legal representation is central to the rule of law and administration of justice. | The Court relied on this reasoning in assessing the Plaintiff’s repeated allegations against Defendants and legal representatives. [73][74][75][76][77] |
| Szabo v. Esat Digifone Ltd. [1998] 2 ILRM 102 | A permanent quia timet injunction requires a proven substantial risk of danger. | The Court held that the Plaintiff’s persistent threats and actual attempted arrest satisfied that threshold. [78][79][80] |
| McGreal v Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration & ors [2025] IEHC 597 | Concerned an unsuccessful habeas corpus application relating to an unidentified category of persons. | The Court distinguished that decision from the present injunction because the Plaintiff here could know, or ascertain by reasonable inquiry, whether a person was connected with the Courts Service. [38] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction to make an LRO under its inherent jurisdiction, including on its own motion. The jurisdiction protects the finality of litigation and scarce court resources, but must be exercised consistently with the constitutional right of access to the courts. [14][43][81][55][19][20]
The Court identified persistent and abusive conduct, including repeated attempts to re-litigate decided matters, numerous unsuccessful applications and appeals, attacks on legal representation, threatening correspondence, and allegations of criminality against officials, lawyers, and judges. [28][29][82][83][84][85][21][22]
The Court considered the Courts Service’s particular position. It must interact with persons seeking to issue and pursue proceedings and cannot avoid contact with the Plaintiff in order to reduce litigation risk. The Court therefore treated that institutional position as a factor supporting an LRO. [86][87][88][89][90]
As to the arrest injunction, the Court found an escalating course of conduct: repeated threats, criminal-summons activity, and an attempted arrest of a solicitor in court. Applying the “proven substantial risk of danger” test, it concluded that injunctive relief was justified. [25][17][78][79]
The Court rejected reliance on section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997. It held that the statutory circumstances did not apply to the Plaintiff’s allegations concerning procedural steps and court representation, and that any genuine criminal concern should be reported to the Gardaí. [35][91]
The Court also rejected the arguments concerning corporate standing, uncertainty, and the breadth of the injunction. It held that the Courts Service had a sufficient interest to seek protection for its employees and agents, and that the Plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that any person he sought to arrest was not connected with the Courts Service. [39][40][37][38]
The Court preferred a formal injunction to the Plaintiff’s qualified undertakings because a clear order was needed where breach could lead to attachment and committal. [41][42][92]
The Court additionally expressed concern about threatening social-media posts and AI-generated images purporting to depict court proceedings. It stated that such material could undermine the integrity of proceedings and public confidence in the administration of justice, but reserved final decisions on proposed takedown orders until the Plaintiff had been heard. [93][94][95][96][97][98][99]
Holding and Implications
LRO AND INJUNCTION GRANTED. The Plaintiff was restrained from commencing further proceedings against the Courts Service, its servants, agents, or legal representatives without leave of the President of the High Court or a nominated High Court judge. Proceedings commenced without leave were to be treated as void and of no effect, with no requirement for the Courts Service to enter appearances or take steps. [100][101][102]
The Plaintiff was also restrained from threatening, attempting, or purporting to arrest, falsely imprison, or commit trespass against any employee, servant, agent, or legal representative of the Courts Service. [103]
The order preserved the possibility of a genuine future claim, provided the required leave was obtained, while preventing malicious or vexatious proceedings and further arrest-related conduct. [104][105]
The opinion does not state that a new precedent was set.
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