Grace & Ors, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court of Appeal heard four appeals against sentence following convictions in the Crown Court for two counts each of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs, namely cocaine and diamorphine. Appellants A, B and C received six years’ imprisonment, while Appellant D received three years and six months. [1][2]

The conspiracies operated through dedicated drug telephone lines between February 2017 and March 2018. Messages advertised drugs, customers placed orders, and street dealers completed transactions. The operation was organised by a principal conspirator, assisted by others including the four appellants. [3][4]

The sentencing judge classified the appellants’ roles separately, considered the applicable drug-supply and youth sentencing guidelines, and made reductions for age, mitigation and personal circumstances. [5][6][7][8][9][10]

Permission to appeal was granted in each case. The appeals challenged the sentences as manifestly excessive. [11][12]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed on the four appellants were manifestly excessive or reached following an error of principle. [13]
2. Whether the sentencing judge properly assessed each appellant’s role, duration of involvement, personal mitigation and age. [14][15][16][17]
3. Whether the sentencing judge was entitled to impose custody on Appellant C despite a pre-sentence report referring to possible non-custodial options. [18][19][20]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant A’s Arguments

• The 11-year starting point was manifestly excessive, and the sentence remained excessive after the reduction for age. [14]
• The sentencing judge failed to differentiate Appellant A from Appellant B and failed adequately to account for mitigation. [21][22]
• The quantity of drugs was below the relevant Category 2 threshold, and Appellant A’s involvement lasted only slightly over three months. [23][24]

Appellant C’s Arguments

• The sentencing judge wrongly treated Appellant C as having a significant role rather than a lesser role. [15]
• The judge failed sufficiently to consider Appellant C’s age, limited involvement, lack of evidence of significant financial advantage, and limited communications. [15]
• The judge failed to consider non-custodial sentences and did not properly apply the youth sentencing guideline or the pre-sentence report. [18][19]

Appellant B’s Arguments

• The 11-year starting point was too high because Appellant B was involved for approximately five months rather than throughout the conspiracy. [16][25]
• The quantity of drugs did not justify the starting point, which was said to correspond to more serious guideline categories. [16]
• Appellant B’s operational role and awareness of the conspiracy’s scale should have been assessed alongside his limited period of involvement. [25]

Appellant D’s Arguments

• The sentencing judge wrongly found Category 2 harm and should have treated Appellant D as at the lower end of a significant role. [26][17]
• The eight-year starting point, reduced to six years for mitigation, was too high given Appellant D’s limited involvement. [17]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court recognised that an individual’s role and period of participation must be considered within the whole conspiracy. However, participation also assists the wider criminal enterprise, and awareness of its scale increases culpability. [27][28]

The Court emphasised that the trial judge had heard the detailed evidence and was uniquely placed to assess the relative culpability of the conspirators. The appellate court would therefore not interfere merely because it might assess role, parity or mitigation differently. [29][31][36]

The sentencing judge had considered the pre-sentence reports, supporting letters and individual circumstances. He was not required to itemise every mitigating factor or provide a mathematical calculation of each reduction. [37][38]

As to Appellant A, the Court held that the judge was entitled to treat the appellant and Appellant B alike. Appellant A’s involvement lasted more than three months, and the judge was entitled to conclude that their overall culpability justified equal treatment. The youth discount and mitigation had also been properly considered. [39][40]

As to Appellant B, the Court held that the argument based on five months’ involvement overlooked the nature of conspiracy offending, the fact that five months was substantial, and the sentencing judge’s assessment of the appellant’s role. [41][42]

As to Appellant C, custody was inevitable given the nature of the offending, despite the possibility of non-custodial measures mentioned in the pre-sentence report. Such a report did not bind the sentencing court. [20]

As to Appellant D, the Court distinguished the case because of the appellant’s schizophrenia, vulnerability to exploitation, inability to manage financial affairs, early withdrawal from the conspiracy and threats received. The six-year sentence was therefore manifestly excessive. [43][44][45]

Holding and Implications

Appeals of Appellants A, B and C dismissed. Their sentences were not manifestly excessive and involved no error of principle. [13]

Appeal of Appellant D allowed. The six-year sentence was quashed and replaced with four years and six months’ imprisonment. [46]

The direct effect was that only Appellant D’s sentence was reduced; the other three sentences remained unchanged. The opinion discusses no broader implications beyond applying established sentencing principles to the individual appeals.