Wood & Anor v R.

Factual and Procedural Background

Following a trial in the Crown Court, Appellant A and Appellant B were convicted of conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent, violent disorder and murder. They appealed with permission. [1]

The prosecution alleged that, after the deceased robbed Defendant 1 at knifepoint, the appellants and others pursued him, engaged in violent disorder, and later attacked him with weapons, causing fatal head injuries. [2][3][4]

The prosecution relied principally on telephone evidence and witness evidence concerning the attacks; there was no direct evidence against the appellants. [5]

At trial, the judge admitted evidence from a witness about statements allegedly made by Defendant 1 naming the appellants as companions during the fatal attack. The judge also admitted text messages sent by another alleged conspirator as evidence against Appellant B. [6][7][8][9]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge wrongly admitted evidence that Defendant 1 had named the appellants as participants in the fatal attack, and whether the jury directions sufficiently prevented prejudice. [10][11][12]
2. Whether the judge was entitled to leave an alternative route to Appellant A’s conviction based on his allegedly driving others to the scene, despite that route being advanced late in the trial. [13][14][15]
3. Whether text messages sent by another alleged conspirator were admissible against Appellant B under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. [16][17][18]
4. Whether any unsafe murder convictions undermined the convictions on the conspiracy and violent-disorder counts. [19][20]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant A’s Arguments

• The evidence that Defendant 1 had named Appellant A as an attacker was minimally relevant but highly prejudicial, and no jury direction could cure the risk that it would overwhelm the assessment of telephone evidence. [21]
• The alternative “driver” route to conviction was introduced too late. [13]

Appellant B’s Arguments

• The evidence that Defendant 1 had named Appellant B as an attacker should not have been admitted. [22]
• The co-conspirator text messages were not made in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and should not have been used against him. [16]
• The interconnected nature of the counts meant that an unsafe conviction on one count could have affected the others. [19]

Respondent’s Arguments

• The identity of Defendant 1’s companions was relevant to assessing his intention to cause really serious harm, and any prejudice was addressed by the jury direction. [23][24]
• The text messages fell within the established hearsay exception for acts or declarations of a conspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy. [25]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The court held that a judge may leave a legally available route to conviction where evidence could reasonably establish guilt, even if the prosecution had not previously advanced that route. The exception is where the late change causes actual prejudice, such as preventing relevant evidence from being called or cross-examination from being conducted. No such prejudice arose because Appellant A’s case was that he was not present or nearby, which applied equally to the alternative route. [14][15]

The court found that the dispute between Defendant 1 and the witness was limited, while the prejudice arising from naming the appellants was substantial. The proposed relevance of the appellants’ alleged association with Defendant 1 was weak and was not materially relied upon by the trial judge. The disputed evidence should therefore never have been admitted. [36][37][11]

The jury directions did not cure the problem. The appellants’ cases depended heavily on complex telephone and cell-site evidence, and the jury had been invited to use the inadmissible names to assess the witness’s credibility before disregarding them in deciding the appellants’ guilt. The jury’s request to hear the witness again and the judge’s decision to summarise all defendants’ cases together increased the court’s concern that the prejudice could not be excluded from consideration. [12][38][39][40]

The later evidence of Defendant 1 did not retrospectively cure the error. The court could not know whether he would have testified had the disputed evidence not been admitted, and the prosecution had not pursued the statutory route that might have made his earlier inconsistent account evidence generally admissible. [41][42]

The court accepted that the co-conspirator hearsay exception requires the statement to be made by a conspirator, in furtherance of the conspiracy, with other evidence capable of showing that the defendant against whom it is used was also a conspirator. Although those requirements were met as to the status of the sender and the existence of other evidence against Appellant B, the warning messages were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. [17][28][18]

The messages revealed the sender’s knowledge and involvement, but warning family members was not part of carrying out the agreement to locate and injure the deceased. The attack could have been completed without the warnings, and the court declined to extend the hearsay exception beyond its established limits. [35][43]

Because the three counts were interconnected—the conspiracy count encompassed the conduct underlying the violent-disorder and murder counts—the unsafe murder convictions undermined the other adverse verdicts as well. [20]

Holding and Implications

Appeals allowed. The court quashed the appellants’ convictions on all three counts and ordered a retrial. A draft indictment was to be served within 28 days, with rearraignment within two months; the retrial venue and judge were left to be determined by the appropriate Presiding Judge. [44]

The court also made an order prohibiting publication of the judgment and proceedings until the retrial concluded. The source states that both appellants were subsequently acquitted at the retrial, after which the publication order was discharged. [45][46]