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Walton & Anor v R.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 23 June 2026, Appellant A and Appellant B pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Manchester to misconduct in public office. They were sentenced on 7 August 2026 to 16 months’ immediate custody and 13 months’ immediate custody respectively, and appealed against sentence. [1]
Both appellants were prison officers who formed romantic relationships with prisoners and communicated using illicit mobile phones. Appellant A also communicated with another prisoner and failed to disclose the illicit phones. The conduct involved frequent communications, receipt of money, matching jewellery and continued contact after the appellants left the prison service. [2][3][4][5][6][7]
The Crown was not represented at the appeal hearing. [8]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Appellant A’s sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. [9][10]
- Whether Appellant B’s sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment, and the sentencing judge’s starting point of 22 months, were manifestly excessive. [11]
- Whether either sentence should have been suspended. [12][11]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant A’s Arguments
- The starting point should have been 20 months rather than 26 months, because the authorities relied upon by the sentencing judge involved more serious offending. [9]
- Greater weight should have been given to good character, personal mitigation, remorse, age and delay; after mitigation and full credit for plea, the sentence should have been 12 months. [10]
- The sentence should have been suspended, particularly in light of good character and personal mitigation. [12]
Appellant B’s Arguments
- The overall sentence of 13 months was manifestly excessive and the 22-month starting point failed sufficiently to reflect the authorities. [11]
- The offending was less serious because there was no sexual contact, no conveyance of prohibited articles, a relatively short period of contact and no evidence of grooming for further breaches. [11]
- The reduction for personal mitigation was insufficient, having regard to caring responsibilities, positive good character, poor mental health and later employment. [11]
- The sentence should have been suspended; alternatively, the statutory presumption concerning sentences of 12 months or less was relied upon. [11]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hibbs [2022] EWCA Crim 1927 | Sentencing for misconduct involving improper contact with a prisoner, including deterrence and suspension. | The court distinguished the case because the present offending involved prison officers, longer and more extensive relationships, collaboration, payments and illicit phones. [13][14] |
| Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim 1468 | A fact-specific sentencing decision involving a prison officer and misconduct connected with a prisoner’s phone use. | The court held that it laid down no general principles and provided limited assistance because sentencing is fact specific. [15] |
| Waddington [2015] EWCA Crim 367 | The strong deterrent function of sentencing in cases of this kind. | The court relied on the deterrent principle when assessing the seriousness of the offending and the need for immediate custody. [16][17] |
| McDade and Reynolds [2010] EWCA Crim 249 | The particular threat posed by corrupt prison officers to prison security, order and the integrity of other staff. | The quoted principle supported the conclusion that corruption by prison officers causes serious institutional harm. [18][19][20][21] |
| Winkless and Novas [2026] EWCA Crim 904 | Sentencing for extensive misconduct involving relationships, prohibited articles and disclosure of confidential information. | The court considered the case materially different because it involved grooming, sexual conduct and the conveyance of phones and drugs, and therefore provided no assistance. [22][23] |
| Morgan [2026] EWCA Crim 886 | Cited by Appellant A in support of the contention that the sentence was excessive. | The court did not separately analyse or apply the case. [9] |
| Price [2023] EWCA Crim 1060 | A sentencing judge is not necessarily required to suspend a sentence merely because relevant factors point towards suspension. | The court held that the sentencing judge was entitled not to suspend either sentence. [24][25] |
| Ratcliffe [2024] EWCA Crim 1498; [2025] 1 Cr App R(S) 45 | Sentencing movements are not a mathematical exercise and need not be precisely calibrated. | The court used the principle when assessing whether the final sentences were manifestly excessive. [26] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The court emphasised that the existing authorities were fact specific and provided neither a general starting point nor a sentencing range for this type of offending. It therefore applied the statutory sentencing purposes of punishment, deterrence, crime reduction and public protection, together with assessment of culpability and harm. [27][28][29]
The court agreed that culpability and harm were high. Both appellants had received specific anti-corruption training, acted without grooming, fear or threats, pursued committed romantic relationships, breached their professional trust, promoted the use of illicit phones, failed to report them, maintained high-volume communications, acted together and received money connected with the relationships. [30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42]
The need to punish and deter others justified substantial sentences. The court held that the 22-month starting point for Appellant B was not too high. The 26-month starting point for Appellant A was also not too high because it covered an additional offence, longer contacts and her more significant role in initiating the relationships. [43][44][45]
The court accepted that both appellants had significant mitigation, but stated that good or positive character is common among prison officers and is ordinarily reflected in the starting point. It also rejected reliance on delay because the investigation was not unreasonable and no detrimental effect from the passage of time had been demonstrated. [46][47][48][49]
In deciding whether the sentences were manifestly excessive, the court assessed the offending as a whole, including seriousness, mitigation and guilty-plea credit. This was not a mathematical exercise. [26]
The court upheld the sentencing judge’s approach to suspension. The relevant guideline factors had been considered, but the judge was not required to suspend the sentences, particularly given the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence. Offending of this kind was highly unlikely to result in anything other than immediate custody. [24][25][50]
Holding and Implications
The appeals were dismissed. The sentences of 16 months’ imprisonment for Appellant A and 13 months’ imprisonment for Appellant B remained in force, and both sentences remained immediate custodial sentences. [26][51][50][52]
The decision directly confirms the sentences imposed on the appellants. The court stated that it was not providing general sentencing guidance, and no new general precedent was set. [27]
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