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Wright and Anor v An Coimisiun Pleanala
Factual and Procedural Background
The proceedings concerned an application for judicial review of the Respondent’s decision granting retention permission for farm buildings, a silage base and an effluent tank at a rural development site. The Applicants lived next to the site; the Notice Party was the landowner and developer. [1][2][3]
The local authority granted permission in August 2024. The Applicants appealed, and following an inspection and report, the Respondent granted permission on 13 June 2025 subject to 16 conditions. [4][5][6][7]
The Applicants commenced judicial review proceedings on 1 August 2025. Leave was granted, an amended statement of grounds was filed, and the matter was heard on 30 September 2026. The Notice Party did not participate at the hearing. [8][9][10][11][12]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Respondent’s grant of retention permission was legally invalid because enforcement measures existed in respect of the development. [13][14]
- Whether the Respondent unlawfully failed to address statutory separation-distance requirements, planning guidance, environmental and climate issues, constitutional rights, or the Applicants’ submissions. [15][16][17][18][19][20]
- Whether the decision was affected by inadequate inspection, impartiality, irrationality, unreasonableness, procedural unfairness, or unparticularised errors. [21][22][23][24]
- Whether the decision unlawfully failed to address the alleged removal of a shared boundary hedge and whether the imposed boundary condition provided full rectification. [25][26][27]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants’ Arguments
- The development adversely affected residential amenities, including visual amenity, noise, privacy, light, drainage, health and proximity. [28][29][30]
- The Respondent could not lawfully grant retention permission while enforcement measures concerning the unauthorised development remained unresolved. [31][32][33]
- The development contravened a 100-metre separation requirement and relevant planning guidance. [34][35][15][16]
- The decision-maker failed to act impartially, failed to consider constitutional property and privacy rights, and relied improperly on the Climate Action Plan 2025. [36][37][29][17]
- The inspector lacked adequate access and did not properly consider the Applicants’ appeal. [38][39][40]
- The boundary hedge had been removed without agreement, and the replacement condition did not ensure restoration of a comparable boundary. [41][25][26]
Respondent’s Arguments
- The Applicants introduced an unpleaded EIA complaint and several other complaints for the first time in the proceedings. [42][43][44][45]
- The pleadings largely described factual grievances and did not identify properly formulated legal grounds. [46][47]
- The Applicants’ complaints principally challenged the merits and weight given to evidence rather than establishing legal error. [48][49][50][51]
Notice Party’s Position
- The Notice Party did not participate at the hearing and later disputed the Applicants’ account of events. The Court therefore made no adverse factual findings against him and relied on the decision-maker’s description of the circumstances. [11][52][53]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 | Draft judgment procedures do not create an entitlement to elaborate procedures. | The Court used the case to explain the limited purpose of responses to a draft judgment. [54] |
| O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 | Fair procedures need not replicate a criminal trial. | The principle supported the Court’s directions concerning draft judgments. [55][56] |
| Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58 | Restrictions on publication of draft judgments serve the administration of justice. | The case supported the confidentiality direction. [56] |
| Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 | Confidentiality of draft judgments. | Cited in support of the draft-judgment confidentiality requirements. [56] |
| R. (Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 181 | Confidentiality of draft judgments. | Cited as supporting authority for the confidentiality direction. [56] |
| Public Institution for Social Security v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and others [2022] EWCA Civ 368 | Confidentiality of draft judgments. | Cited as supporting authority for the confidentiality direction. [56] |
| Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 | Confidentiality of draft judgments. | Cited as supporting authority for the confidentiality direction. [56] |
| C.O'S. & Anor v. Doyle & Others [2013] IESC 60 | Latitude may be given to litigants in person to avoid disadvantage from lack of legal knowledge. | Supported the Court’s approach to the Applicants’ pleadings. [57] |
| Talbot v. Hermitage Golf Club [2014] IESC 57 | Latitude for litigants in person. | Cited as part of the governing principles. [57] |
| Flynn v. Desmond [2015] IECA 34 | Latitude for litigants in person. | Cited as part of the governing principles. [57] |
| Kelly v. An Bord Pleanála & National Transport Agency [2024] IEHC 364 | Latitude for litigants in person. | Cited as part of the governing principles. [57] |
| Croghan v. Collins [2024] IEHC 607 | Latitude for litigants in person. | Cited as part of the governing principles. [57] |
| O'Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32 | A court may reformulate a litigant-in-person’s point within the contours of the case actually made, but may not perform radical surgery. | The Court allowed reasonable latitude but did not alter the legal tests. [58][59] |
| Meath County Council v Murray [2018] 1 IR 189 | Planning enforcement seeks legislative compliance and orderly development. | The authority was relied on in the Applicants’ submissions; the Court’s analysis distinguished enforcement from the question whether retention permission could be granted. [60][14] |
| In re MacCionnaith [2026] NIKB 55 | Substance is more important than labelling a matter as constitutional or ECHR rights. | The Court held that the inspector had considered the substance of the Applicants’ rights. [61] |
| Doorly v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 6 | A condition prepared by a qualified person may nevertheless produce unacceptable arrangements. | The case illustrated why the boundary condition did not guarantee a comparable replacement hedge. [62] |
| Duffy v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IEHC 322 | Unauthorised development does not automatically prevent permission; illegality must not be facilitated or perpetuated, or must be fully rectified or adequately compensated. | The Court applied this framework but held that the present boundary condition did not provide full rectification. [63][64][65] |
| Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála [2009] IEHC 38 | Authority concerning the permissibility of planning decisions involving prior unauthorised development. | The Court cautioned against treating the case as the sole applicable standard and preferred the broader synthesis stated in Duffy. [64] |
| Hession v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IEHC 355 | Unauthorised development does not legally preclude permission where the permission is not dependent on or facilitative of it. | The Court used this principle in distinguishing cases where illegality is perpetuated. [66][65] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court treated several pleaded matters as contextual rather than legal grounds. It held that the EIA complaint was unpleaded and that some grievances were insufficiently formulated, but the failure to isolate core grounds was not fatal because reasonable latitude could be afforded to litigants in person. [67][59]
The existence of warning letters or enforcement notices did not prevent a lawful grant of retention permission. Retention permission frequently concerns previously unauthorised development, and enforcement and permission are legally distinct processes. [13][14]
The Applicants’ reliance on exempted-development separation requirements and planning guidance failed because rules governing exemption do not imply that permission or retention permission must be refused where the exemption conditions are unmet. The relevant guidance concerned exempted development and added nothing material. [15][68][16][69]
The complaints concerning access, impartiality, climate policy, greenhouse gases, constitutional rights, consideration of submissions, irrationality and facial errors were rejected. The Court considered that these complaints either challenged the merits or weight assigned by the decision-maker, lacked sufficient particulars, or failed to demonstrate material legal error. [70][71][72][73][74][61][75][76][24]
The Court distinguished the general issue of unauthorised development from the specific issue of the removed boundary hedge. A grant of permission is not automatically unlawful merely because it relieves a developer from consequences of an earlier wrong. However, a permission may be unlawful where it perpetuates an illegality without full rectification or an adequate compensating measure. [77][64][65]
The inspector accepted that the eastern boundary hedge had been removed, that there had been no agreement concerning replacement planting, and that the removal affected the Applicants. However, the inspector considered only future boundary treatment and did not assess whether the proposed condition would restore a boundary comparable to the removed party hedge. [78][79]
Condition 2 required a future scheme of hedging, trees and fencing, but left significant choice as to the resulting boundary. It therefore did not guarantee full rectification. The Court upheld the second element of Ground 15 because the decision failed to address this objectively central issue. [26][62][27]
Holding and Implications
Certiorari granted. The Court ordered that the Respondent’s decision of 13 June 2025 be removed for the purpose of being quashed. [80][81]
The Applicants were awarded expenses against the Respondent, subject to any written application and with disputed costs to be determined by legal costs adjudication. [82][83]
The direct consequence was the quashing of the planning decision. The decision turned on the failure to address whether the replacement boundary would fully rectify the removed party hedge; no broader consequence beyond that ruling was stated. [27][81]
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