Hossain, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

Section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applied because the case involved a person under 18 within the victim’s family; publication of information capable of identifying that person was prohibited until the person reaches 18. [1]

The Appellant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter in the Crown Court on 25 November 2025 and sentenced on 28 November 2025 to nine years’ imprisonment. He appealed against sentence with permission. [2][3]

The offence arose after the Appellant was left alone caring for his two-month-old son. The child sustained catastrophic injuries from forceful shaking, suffered cardiac arrest and severe oxygen deprivation, and died after life support was withdrawn. [4][5][6][7]

The Appellant initially denied knowing how the injuries occurred, but during the trial accepted that he had shaken the child while maintaining that he was not guilty of manslaughter. The jury rejected that position. [8][9]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge adopted an excessively high starting point and imposed a sentence that was manifestly excessive. [10]
2. Whether the offence should have been placed in category C, or at the very bottom of category B, under the unlawful act manslaughter sentencing guidelines. [11]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The sentencing judge had adopted too high a starting point in light of the Appellant’s culpability, making the sentence manifestly excessive. [10]
• Because most cases involving non-accidental head injury to children fall within category B, there was a risk of excessive sentencing. Features of this case allegedly supported category C or, alternatively, the bottom of the category B range. [11]

Crown’s Position

• The Crown submitted that the offence fell within category B because the unlawful act carried a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm that was or ought to have been obvious to the offender. [12][13]

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The sentencing judge treated the offence as category B under the applicable sentencing guidelines. That category carried a 12-year starting point and a range of eight to sixteen years’ imprisonment. [12][13]

The judge placed the offence in the lower half of the category range because a short period of shaking could cause fatal injuries to a very young and fragile child. The child’s vulnerability and the Appellant’s abuse of parental trust were treated as aggravating features, but were also reflected in the category assessment. [14][13]

The judge considered the Appellant’s good character, employment history, the effect of imprisonment on his family, his grief, the absence of premeditation, and his contacting emergency services after recognising the seriousness of the injury. [15]

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the frequency with which such cases fall within category B justified departing from the guidelines. The high-culpability classification reflected the fragility of infants and the potentially catastrophic consequences of even relatively modest force. [16]

The court held that there was no basis for excluding cases involving the shaking of children from category B. The sentencing judge had appropriately selected a point below the category starting point and made adjustments for the force used and the available mitigation. [17]

The court was not satisfied that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. [18]

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed. The nine-year sentence was upheld because it was neither manifestly excessive nor contrary to principle. [18]

The direct effect was that the Appellant’s sentence remained in force. The opinion does not identify broader implications or establish a new precedent.