Nowak v Pricewaterhousecoopers and Anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2006, the Appellant entered an employment contract with Company A. Company A dismissed the Appellant in 2009 after repeated failures to pass professional examinations. The Appellant brought an unfair-dismissal claim before the Employment Appeals Tribunal, which found that the dismissal was unfair and awarded €7,500. [1][2]

On appeal, the Circuit Court upheld the finding of unfair dismissal and increased the award to €34,000. The Appellant then lodged a High Court appeal concerning, principally, the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the legal status of the examinations. [3][4]

Company A applied to strike out or stay the appeal under Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The Appellant did not attend the hearing, although he had been notified of it, and the High Court struck out the notice of appeal and the appeal on 24 February 2017. [5][6]

The Appellant did not appeal that order. He issued the present application on 23 January 2026 seeking to set it aside, alleging procedural irregularity and fraud. [7][8][9]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to revisit and set aside its final order striking out the Appellant’s appeal. [10][11]
2. Whether the strike-out proceedings involved fraud or a fundamental breach of fair procedures. [12][13]
3. Whether the Appellant’s delay of approximately nine years barred the relief sought. [14][15]
4. Whether Company A’s motion was procedurally or jurisdictionally invalid under Order 19, rule 28, and whether the High Court nevertheless had inherent jurisdiction to strike out the appeal. [16][17][18]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The exceptional jurisdiction to set aside a final order applied because the earlier proceedings allegedly involved a fundamental breach of fair procedures. [19][20]
• The Appellant argued that he had no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal because the High Court’s decision on an appeal from the Circuit Court was final and conclusive. [21][22]
• He contended that an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court would have been unavailable or invalid because determinations were not signed by all members of the deciding court. [22]
• He argued that Company A could not rely on Order 19, rule 28 because the rule applied only to pleadings in plenary proceedings and that a notice of appeal was not a pleading. [16][23]

Respondents' Arguments

• The exceptional jurisdiction to revisit a final order was not engaged. [24]
• The application was an impermissible attempt to appeal the original strike-out order and was an abuse of process. [24]
• There was no evidence of fraud, and the Appellant had not explained his failure to attend the hearing, appeal the order, or seek relief sooner. [24]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted that a jurisdiction to revisit final orders exists, but emphasised that it is wholly exceptional and that finality in litigation carries substantial weight. Reopening is potentially justified only where a fundamental constitutional breach makes the decision a nullity, rather than merely an erroneous decision, and where the affected party was not responsible for the circumstances. [10][11]

The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that he lacked an available appellate remedy. Although section 39 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 described the High Court’s decision as final and conclusive, the constitutional arrangements introduced by the Thirty-third Amendment provided a right to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from High Court decisions. The alleged requirement that all members of the Supreme Court deciding an application for leave must sign the determination had no basis. [33]

Even assuming that reopening jurisdiction existed, the Court found no basis to exercise it. The Appellant identified no fraud and produced no evidence supporting his allegation. [12]

The Court also found no breach of fair procedures. The Appellant had notice of the motion and its hearing, had an opportunity to attend and make his arguments, and deliberately chose not to attend. The High Court judge had also read the Appellant’s written letters before making the strike-out order. [26][13]

The nine-year delay independently defeated the application. The Appellant had known of his objections before the strike-out order was made, had not appealed it, and provided no adequate explanation for waiting until 2026. The Court held that no interest of justice would be served by reviving the proceedings after related litigation had failed. [14][15]

The Court considered the procedural challenge to Order 19, rule 28 unnecessary to determine because the reopening jurisdiction was not engaged. It nevertheless observed that a notice of appeal is the originating document for a Circuit Court appeal and that the definition of “pleading” in Order 125, rule 1 is not exclusive. [23][34][17][30]

In any event, the motion had also invoked the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The Court held that the High Court must possess power to control its own processes and could strike out an appeal that disclosed no arguable ground or raised matters outside the court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional infirmity in either the motion or the original order. [18][35]

Holding and Implications

The application to set aside the final strike-out order was refused. [36][37]

The respondents were presumptively entitled to the costs of the motion, subject to any application by the Appellant for a different costs order within the stated period. [38]

The decision leaves the original strike-out order final and does not establish any new precedent; it applies existing principles concerning finality, exceptional reopening jurisdiction, fair procedures, delay, and inherent judicial jurisdiction. [10][15][35]