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EI v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant, a woman from Georgia, sought international protection based on a history of domestic violence. The Tribunal accepted her credibility, found a well-founded fear of persecution connected to membership of a particular social group, but concluded that effective and enduring state protection was available in Georgia. It therefore affirmed recommendations refusing refugee and subsidiary protection declarations. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
The Applicant sought judicial review and an order of certiorari. Leave was granted, but the application was filed approximately 13 days outside the statutory 28-day period. [10][11][12][13][14]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal properly applied the statutory presumption arising from past persecution and correctly assessed effective state protection when determining whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. [15][16][17]
- Whether the Tribunal acted inconsistently or failed to give reasons by not addressing other Tribunal decisions concerning state protection for victims of domestic violence in Georgia. [18][19]
- Whether the Tribunal irrationally preferred certain country-of-origin information without addressing allegedly conflicting material. [19][20][21]
- Whether the Applicant had shown good and sufficient reason for extending the time to seek judicial review. [13][22]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Tribunal failed to apply the statutory presumption concerning past persecution to the availability of effective state protection. [15][16]
- The Tribunal should have considered recent decisions involving Georgian victims of domestic violence and given cogent reasons for departing from them. [23][24][25]
- The Tribunal failed to address allegedly conflicting country-of-origin information, including Tkhelidze v Georgia. [21][26][27]
- The Applicant relied on the effective-remedy requirements of the Procedures Directive, interpreted in light of Article 47 of the Charter. [28][29]
- The delay resulted from changes in legal representation and preparation of the proceedings. [14]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B.A. v IPAT [2020] IEHC 59 | Rejection of the argument concerning the statutory presumption and effective state protection. | The Court noted that the argument had already been rejected in High Court authority. [17] |
| T.A. v IPO [2023] IEHC 390 | Same principle. | Cited as part of the established High Court authorities rejecting the Applicant's first two grounds. [17] |
| N.G. v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535 | Same principle. | Cited as part of the same line of authority. [17] |
| Z.M. v IPAT [2023] IEHC 637 | Same principle. | The Court relied on the Court of Appeal decision in the joined appeals and rejected the first two grounds. [17][30][31] |
| Abdulla [2010] ECR I-01493 | Individual circumstances must be considered when assessing effective state protection. | The Tribunal's approach was consistent with that principle. [17][32] |
| OA ECLI:EU:C:2021:36 | Authority relied on by the Applicant concerning effective state protection. | The Court said the Applicant's reading of the relevant dicta was over-broad. [17] |
| ZM and NG [2025] IECA 208 | Binding Court of Appeal authority rejecting the Applicant's first two grounds. | The Court held that it was bound by this decision. [30][31] |
| Z.M. v IPAT [2026] IESCDET 10 | Refusal of leave to appeal. | The pending appeal application had been refused, reinforcing the Court of Appeal position. [33] |
| B, C, D and E v IPAT and the Minister for Justice [2019] IEHC 763 | Four-part test for effective state protection. | The test was applied to the Tribunal's assessment: reasonable preventive steps, an effective legal system, effective and enduring protection, and access to protection. [34][35][36][37][38][39][7] |
| DVTS v Minister for Justice [2007] IEHC 451 | Improper “cherry-picking” of material. | The Court noted that the Applicant had selected decisions supporting her case rather than presenting a balanced collection. [40][41] |
| R.C. (Algeria) v IPAT [2018] IEHC 694 | Stare decisis does not generally apply to Tribunal decisions, subject to same-transaction cases. | The Court adopted this principle and rejected a broad consistency obligation. [42][43][44][45] |
| TNF v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2005] IEHC 423 | A Tribunal decision is neither evidence in another case nor binding authority for future cases. | The Court used it to distinguish binding precedent from the desirable goal of consistency. [46][47] |
| PPA v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2007] 1 ILRM 288 | Fair procedures may require mechanisms promoting consistency concerning objective country conditions. | The Court accepted that consistency may promote objective fairness but does not bind the Tribunal. [48][49][50] |
| Manzeke v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] Imm AR 524 | Importance of considering the general situation in the relevant country. | Cited in explaining why consistency is desirable in country-condition assessments. [51][52][53] |
| COI v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 2 ILRM 471 | Similar cases do not automatically require identical outcomes; consistency remains important. | The Court relied on it to reject the Applicant's broad proposed duty. [54][55][56][57] |
| Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562; [2004] INLR 92 | Inconsistency in evaluating the same country situation may undermine legal certainty. | The Court treated consistency as a goal, not a condition of validity in every case. [55][58][59] |
| JN v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2008] IEHC 214 | Consistency is desirable in the asylum system. | Cited as support for considering relevant linked cases, without creating a general binding rule. [60][61][62] |
| MH v IPAT & Anor [2023] IEHC 372 | Endorsement of the analysis in RC (Algeria). | The Court relied on it in rejecting the proposed extended qualification to stare decisis. [63] |
| LA v IPAT [2026] IEHC 49 | Different outcomes may be justified by material differences between individual cases. | The Court cited it to emphasise that decisions speak for themselves where personal circumstances differ. [63] |
| S v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 539 | Country guidance and factual consistency in asylum adjudication. | The Court discussed it as an English example, while noting that any comparable Irish scheme is a matter for the legislature. [64][65][66][67][68][69] |
| Tourbarov v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal ECLI:EU:C:2019:626 | Effective judicial remedy following a full and ex nunc examination. | The Court held that it did not require the Tribunal to identify all similar decisions of its own motion. [29][70][71][72][73] |
| HID and BA v Refugee Applications Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2013:45 | Characteristics required for effective judicial protection. | Cited in confirming the Tribunal's capacity to provide an effective remedy. [71] |
| X v IPAT & Ors ECLI:EU:C:2023:524 | Effective judicial protection in the Irish system. | Cited alongside HID and BA. [71] |
| Tkhelidze v Georgia, App no 33056/17 | State duties under Article 2 of the ECHR in responding to known domestic-violence threats. | The Court distinguished the case and held that reliance on more up-to-date country information was not irrational. [74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81] |
| GK v IPAT & Ors [2022] IEHC 204 | Legal representatives' conduct ordinarily cannot justify extending a statutory time limit. | The Court accepted that the explanation for delay was insufficient. [82] |
| Thomson v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31 | The extension-of-time discretion is broader than a strict test based only on the explanation for delay. | The Court considered the broader discretionary factors. [83] |
| P (Zimbabwe) v IPAT & Ors [2025] IEHC 403 | Use of the relevant extension-of-time factors. | Cited as instructive on exercising the analogous discretion. [83] |
| Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109 | Non-exhaustive factors relevant to extending time. | The Court considered those factors and extended time principally because the delay was relatively short. [83][84] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court rejected the first two grounds at the outset because the Court of Appeal had already rejected the same legal argument in ZM and NG, and the Supreme Court had refused leave to appeal. [30][33][31]
The Court held that effective state protection requires an objective assessment of both the general country situation and the Applicant's personal circumstances. Consistency between similar cases is desirable, but objectivity in the individual case is essential. [85][86][69][87]
The Tribunal was not bound by other Tribunal decisions. The Applicant had not shown that the five comparator cases involved identical country information and personal circumstances or formed part of the same transaction. The alleged inconsistency ground therefore failed. [88][89][90]
The Court rejected the argument based on Tourbarov. The Tribunal had authority to conduct a full and ex nunc examination and substitute its own decision; its failure to identify comparable decisions on its own motion was not equivalent to the failure addressed in Tourbarov. [91][70][71][72][73]
The Tribunal had identified and quoted relevant material from the UN Women publication and the United States Department of State report. The Court held that using more up-to-date country information to assess conditions in 2024 and 2025 was not an irrational unexplained preference over conflicting contemporaneous material. [92][93][27][79][80][81]
The delay was caused by the Applicant's legal representatives and did not itself constitute good and sufficient reason. Nevertheless, considering the broader discretion and principally the relatively short period of delay, the Court extended time. [82][83][84]
Holding and Implications
Judicial review refused. The Court refused all substantive relief, including the request to quash the Tribunal's decision, but granted an extension of time for bringing the application. [94]
The direct effect was that the Tribunal's refusal of refugee and subsidiary protection declarations remained undisturbed. The judgment did not impose a general duty on the Tribunal to identify and explain departures from all similar decisions; it reaffirmed that consistency is desirable, while objective assessment of each application is essential. [87][28][90]
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