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CKT & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v Twyford Church of England Academies Trust & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
These appeals concerned School A’s faith-based admission arrangements. Of 190 places, 150 were foundation Christian places. Applicants could receive up to 20 points for regular Christian worship, with an additional point where the family’s main place of worship was a Church of England church. In the relevant year, applicants generally needed 21 points to obtain a place. [1][2][3][4]
The Appellants, who attended an Eritrean Orthodox church, obtained 20 points but not the additional Church of England point and were refused a place. An appeal to the admissions panel was unsuccessful. The Appellant also objected to materially similar future arrangements before the Office of the Schools Adjudicator, which dismissed the objection. [2][5][6][7]
The High Court dismissed the judicial-review claims. It found that the criterion placed non-white or non-English persons at a particular disadvantage, but was a proportionate means of preserving School A’s Anglican character and ethos. It also found that Company A had complied with its public sector equality duty. [8][9]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 to the Equality Act 2010 excluded indirect race-discrimination claims arising from faith-based admission criteria. [10][11]
- Whether the Appellants proved that the additional-point criterion placed them and persons sharing their race or ethnicity at a particular disadvantage. [12][13]
- Whether the Court of Appeal should review the proportionality assessment or conduct its own assessment. [14][15]
- Whether the criterion was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim under section 19(2)(d) of the Equality Act 2010. [16][17]
- Whether Company A complied with its duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. [18][19]
- Whether section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 affected the availability of a remedy. [20][21]
- Whether the Office of the Schools Adjudicator’s determination was unlawful. [22][23]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 exempted only religion-or-belief discrimination, not indirect race discrimination. [24][25]
- The evidence did not justify the conclusion that the criterion placed persons of their race or ethnicity at a particular disadvantage. [13][26]
- The lower court should have considered less intrusive alternatives, including applying the criterion to fewer foundation places. [27][28]
- Company A had not consciously considered the racial effects of the arrangements or complied with section 149. [29][30]
Respondents’ Arguments
- Paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 excluded any indirect-discrimination claim arising from faith-based oversubscription criteria. [31][32]
- The Appellants had not proved the required group disadvantage under section 19(2)(b) and (c). [13]
- The lower court had correctly applied the proportionality test and was entitled to accept Company A’s evidence concerning School A’s Anglican ethos. [33]
- Section 149 required context-sensitive due regard, not a prescribed form of decision-making. [34]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700 | Four-stage proportionality analysis. | The Court accepted the approach and upheld the finding that the criterion was proportionate. [35][36][37] |
| Bakkali v Greater Manchester Buses (South) Ltd (trading as Stagecoach Manchester) [2018] ICR 1481 | Meaning of “so far as relating to”. | The Court preferred the statutory-context interpretation of paragraph 5. [38][11] |
| R (O) (A child) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255 | Statutory interpretation begins with Parliament’s words in context. | The Court applied that approach to paragraph 5 of Schedule 11. [39][40] |
| Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 | Statutory words derive meaning from context. | The principle supported reading paragraph 5 with the wider Equality Act framework. [40] |
| R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 | Citizens should be able to rely on statutory language. | The Court treated the enacted statutory context as primary. [40] |
| R v Montila [2024] UKHL 50; [2004] 1 WLR 3141 | Statutory headings may assist interpretation. | The heading of Part 2 of Schedule 11 reinforced the limited religious-discrimination exception. [41][42][43] |
| Efob v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2021] UKSC 33; [2021] 1 WLR 3863 | A claimant must establish facts from which group disadvantage can be inferred. | The Court held that the available evidence was sufficient here. [13][44] |
| Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Homer [2012] UKSC 15; [2012] 3 All E.R. 1287 | Inferences may be drawn where statistical evidence is limited. | The Court accepted the judge’s inference from evidence comparing church attenders. [26][45] |
| Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30; [2026] AC 607 | Review and fresh-assessment approaches to appellate proportionality review. | The Court adopted the review approach because the case concerned one school and a fact-sensitive decision. [46][15][47] |
| R (R) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] 1 WLR 4079 | Limits on appellate intervention in proportionality review. | It formed part of the guidance considered in Shvidler. [48] |
| R (E) (v Governing Body of JFS and another (United Synagogue and others intervening) [2009] UKSC 15; [2010] 2 AC 728 | Assessment of discrimination and justification in faith-school admissions. | The Court distinguished it because School A’s criterion pursued practising Anglican participation and was supported by evidence. [27][49][50] |
| R (Ward) v Hillingdon London Borough Council (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 457; [2019] PTSR 1738 | Section 149 compliance where the decision-maker had not considered the relevant effects. | The Court distinguished it because Company A had adduced evidence explaining its decision. [51][52] |
| R (Coll) v Secretary of State for Justice (Howard League for Penal Reform intervening) [2017] UKSC 40; [2017] 1 WLR 2093 | Failure to comply with the public sector equality duty. | The Court distinguished it on the basis that Company A had considered and explained its arrangements. [51][52] |
| R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713 | Less intrusive measures must be assessed without substituting judicial preferences for legislative judgment. | The principle informed the proportionality analysis. [53][54] |
| Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR 567 | Distinction between the importance of an objective and balancing its effects. | The distinction was cited in explaining proportionality’s fourth stage. [55] |
| R (Sheakh) v Lambeth London Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 457; [2022] PTSR 1315 | Section 149 requires attention to obvious equality impacts, not every conceivable detail. | The Court applied that context-sensitive approach. [56] |
| Baker v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141; [2009] PTSR 809 | The equality duty is substantive rather than formal. | The Court assessed whether Company A had substantively considered equality matters. [57] |
| Bracking v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345; [2014] Eq LR 60 | Principles concerning the public sector equality duty. | The Court used it subject to the warning that its application is fact-sensitive. [57][58] |
| Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council [2015] UKSC 301; 2015] PTSR 1189 | The weight and extent of the equality duty are fact-sensitive. | The principle supported the context-dependent assessment. [57] |
| Powell v Dacorum Borough Council [20219] EWCA Civ 23; [2019] HLR 21 | Authorities should not treat Bracking as statutory text. | The Court stated that the duty varies with the function and facts. [58] |
| R (End Violence against Women Coalition) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] EWCA Civ 350; [2021] 1 WLR 5829 | Contextual application of section 149 principles. | The Court relied on the need to apply the duty according to the particular function and circumstances. [58] |
| R (Bradbury) v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority [2025] EWCA Civ 489; [2025] 4 WLR 58 | Approach to section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. | The issue did not arise because no breach of section 149 was established. [21] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 concerned discrimination relating to the protected characteristic of religion or belief. It did not exclude indirect race-discrimination claims merely because the challenged criterion was faith-based. The statutory wording, context, headings and legislative history all supported that interpretation. [59][11][43][60]
The Court nevertheless held that Parliament’s decision to permit faith-based schools and faith-based admission criteria was relevant to identifying a legitimate aim and to assessing proportionality. [61][62]
The judge was entitled to infer particular disadvantage. Evidence showed that Anglican congregations had a greater proportion of white or English members than non-Anglican churches, and the criterion advantaged families whose main place of worship was Anglican. Exact statistical quantification was unnecessary in the circumstances. [44][45]
The Court adopted appellate review rather than a fresh proportionality assessment. The case concerned the arrangements of one school, involved essentially factual evaluation, and did not raise a general principle requiring determination by the appellate court. [63][64]
The aim of preserving School A’s Anglican character and ethos was legitimate and sufficiently important. Awarding the additional point to families worshipping at Anglican churches was rationally connected to that aim. The judge was entitled to accept evidence that School A served as a model of Anglican practice for Company A’s other schools. [65][66]
The Court rejected the argument that the judge had to test specific alternatives, such as applying the criterion to only 75% or 80% of foundation places. The judge could consider the school’s distinctive ethos, the evidence supporting Company A’s approach, and the availability of non-faith-based admission arrangements at other schools operated by Company A. [28][67]
Company A had also complied with section 149. It knew that admission arrangements had equality implications, knew of the recommendation for a 50/50 division between foundation and open places, understood the likely impact on other races and faiths, and considered access to other schools as a mitigating factor. [68][69]
Because no section 149 breach was established, the Court did not need to decide the section 31(2A) issue. The challenge to the Office of the Schools Adjudicator also failed because the grounds relied upon by the Appellants were rejected. [21][23]
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED. The Appellants were entitled to bring an indirect race-discrimination claim, and the criterion was found to place them and persons of the same race or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage. However, it was justified as a proportionate means of preserving School A’s Anglican character and ethos, and Company A had complied with section 149. [70]
The refusal of the place and the Office of the Schools Adjudicator’s determination therefore stood. The decision applied existing statutory and proportionality principles to the particular admission arrangements; no broader implication or new precedent was identified in the opinion. [21][70]
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