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Qureshi & Anor, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
Applicant A initially pleaded not guilty to two counts of possessing Class A controlled drugs with intent. Applicant B was later arraigned and pleaded guilty to possession with intent to supply cocaine and being concerned in the supply of diamorphine. [1]
The offences arose after police pursued a vehicle and subsequently stopped another vehicle containing both applicants. Drugs, cash, and mobile phones were recovered, and messages indicated Applicant B’s involvement in the street supply of diamorphine. [2][3]
Both applicants were sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 months’ imprisonment. Their applications for leave to appeal against sentence were referred to the Full Court. [4]
The applicants had been arrested and released under investigation more than three years before being charged. The prosecution accepted that the delay was unreasonable and unjustified. [5][6]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Applicant A’s sentence was excessive in light of delay, personal mitigation, and a previous custodial sentence. [7]
- Whether Applicant B’s sentence properly reflected the totality principle in light of an earlier sentence for similar offending. [8]
- Whether either sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. [9][10]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant A’s Arguments
- Applicant A argued that his sentence should be reduced to reflect time spent in custody for an earlier offence and his attempts at rehabilitation between release and sentencing. [7]
Applicant B’s Arguments
- Applicant B argued that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient effect to totality because of the sentence imposed in earlier proceedings. [8]
- It was submitted that, had all matters been sentenced together, Applicant B would probably not have received a consecutive sentence of 30 months. [8]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Barrett [2025] EWCA Crim 840 | Unreasonable delay may justify sentence reduction where it has a detrimental effect, such as genuine psychological or physical harm or putting an offender’s life on hold. | The Court used this principle to assess the effect of the delay on mitigation. [11][12] |
| R v Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453 | Significant delay between investigation and charge will often justify some sentence reduction, although normally less than 25 per cent. | The Court considered the reduction applied to Applicant A generous in light of this principle. [13][14][15] |
| R v Wilson (Billy-Joe) [2026] EWCA Crim 427 | Delay may provide significant mitigation where it enables rehabilitation and lasting change, even without the usual detrimental effects identified in Barrett. | The Court considered the broader mitigating consequences that delay may produce. [16][17] |
| R v Green (Michael) [2019] EWCA Crim 196 | When sentencing after an earlier sentence for similar offending, relevant factors include timing, similarity, overlap, and whether consecutive sentences would offend totality. | The Court applied this approach to Applicant B’s earlier sentence and substituted a lower sentence. [18][19] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The sentencing judge correctly categorised the offences and identified a starting point of four and a half years. A 25 per cent reduction was applied for the guilty pleas, followed by a further reduction for delay and other mitigation. [20][21]
The Court observed that reductions for mitigation should ordinarily be made before the guilty-plea reduction. Correct application of that sequence would have produced a sentence of 33 months rather than 30 months. [21]
As to Applicant A, the Court held that the 30-month sentence was not manifestly excessive. The reduction for delay was already generous, and no further reduction was justified for the earlier custodial sentence because it arose from a later breach of a suspended sentence order and had already been partly mitigated by only partial activation. [9][22]
The Court also declined to replace Applicant A’s immediate custodial sentence with a community order, finding that the sentencing judge had not erred in principle. [10]
As to Applicant B, the Court found that the offences were the first in the relevant sequence, were committed when he was 18 and of good character, and should have been sentenced with the later similar offences. The unexplained failure to charge the matters earlier or bring them to the attention of the later sentencing judge created a significant totality issue. [23]
The Court concluded that, had all matters been dealt with together, Applicant B would either have received a concurrent sentence or a consecutive sentence shorter than 30 months, although the later sentencing judge might also have increased the sentence after learning of the subsequent offending. [24]
Holding and Implications
Applicant A’s application failed. Leave to appeal was refused because the 30-month sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. [10]
Applicant B’s appeal succeeded in part. Leave was granted, the 30-month sentences were quashed, and concurrent sentences of 18 months’ imprisonment on each count were substituted. [25][26]
The direct consequence was a reduced sentence for Applicant B, while Applicant A’s sentence remained unchanged. The opinion applied existing principles concerning delay and totality and did not state that it created a new precedent. [9][10][25]
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