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Jones, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, aged 23 at sentencing and of previous good character, pleaded guilty to three offences of making and one offence of distributing indecent photographs of a child. One distribution charge was amended before sentence. [1]
The Crown Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 24 months, together with a rehabilitation requirement and a 10-year sexual harm prevention order (SHPO). [2][3]
The offending involved category A, B and C images, including moving images, and occurred when the Appellant was aged between 17 and 19. There was a delay of more than three years between arrest and charge. [4][5][6]
The Appellant appealed against sentence with permission. [7]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the custodial sentences were manifestly excessive, particularly in light of the Appellant’s age when the offences were committed, the delay before charge, his mitigation and rehabilitation. [8][9]
- Whether the sentences should have been concurrent rather than consecutive. [10][9]
- Whether a community order was an appropriate alternative to custody. [11][12][13]
- Whether the SHPO was necessary and, if so, whether its 10-year duration was excessive. [14][15][16]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The sentences were manifestly excessive because insufficient weight had been given to the Appellant’s youth, including the principle that turning 18 is not a sentencing “cliff edge.” [8]
- Insufficient weight had been given to the unjustifiably long delay between arrest and charge. [8]
- The court had not properly applied the guideline provisions allowing a community order where there was a sufficient prospect of rehabilitation. [17][11]
- The Appellant’s significant rehabilitative work supported a community order. [18][11]
- The SHPO was unnecessary because the Appellant had abstained from further offending, or alternatively its 10-year duration was excessive. [14]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Hamilton [2022] EWCA Crim 127 | The circumstances in which a SHPO may be unnecessary where there has been no further offending, maturation and a low assessed risk. | The Court distinguished the case because the Appellant had reoffended, the later offending escalated, and the risk assessment differed. [19][20][21] |
| R v Eniola Balogun [2018] EWCA Crim 2933 | Turning 18 does not create a sharp divide in sentencing approach. | The precedent supported the Appellant’s submission that his youth required meaningful consideration. [8] |
| R v Ghafoor [2002] EWCA Crim 1857 | The starting point is the sentence likely to have been imposed when the offence was committed. | The Court applied this principle when assessing offending committed while the Appellant was a child. [22] |
| R v Ahmed Nazir [2023] EWCA Crim 281 | The Children guideline remains relevant when sentencing an adult for an offence committed as a child, and the starting point is the sentence likely to have been imposed shortly after the offence. | The Court found that the sentencing judge had not adequately explained the application of the Children guideline or the reduction for youth. [22][23][24] |
| R v Smith [2024] EWCA Crim 1183 | Where offending begins during childhood and continues for years, later offending should account for earlier offending, with concurrent sentences for earlier offences. | The Court concluded that the sentences should have been concurrent and that the sentence for the later offending should reflect the overall offending behaviour. [25][10][9] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that the sentencing judge had not sufficiently explained how the Children guideline applied to offences committed when the Appellant was 17, or how youth affected sentencing for offending committed at 18 or 19. [26][24]
The distribution offence was committed when the Appellant was 17. If sentenced at that time, the Court considered that he would probably have been dealt with in the Youth Court and, given his guilty plea and good character, would likely have received a referral order. That disposal was no longer available at the time of sentence, and the offence formed part of wider offending. [27]
The offending underlying the other charges spanned childhood and young adulthood. Applying Ahmed Nazir and R v Smith, the Court considered that the sentence for the later offending should take account of the earlier offending and that the sentences should run concurrently. [28][10]
The 40-month delay between arrest and charge was not necessarily unjustifiable merely because it resulted from a backlog in examining devices. Nevertheless, it was a considerable period for a young person to remain in limbo and should have been reflected in sentence. [29]
The Court recognised the seriousness of the offending, including the number and categories of images, moving images, the duration of the offending and the distress shown by some children. These factors justified a substantial increase from the relevant starting point. [30][31]
The custody threshold was properly passed. However, the sentences were manifestly excessive because they insufficiently reflected the Appellant’s age, the delay, the causes of his offending and his substantial rehabilitative work. [9]
The Court rejected the submission that a community order should replace custody. A suspended custodial sentence was permissible in principle and reflected the rehabilitative work, but the custodial terms themselves required reduction. [12][32]
The Court upheld the need for an SHPO because the offending had coincided with deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health, he had continued offending after earlier police involvement, and the pre-sentence report regarded restrictions and monitoring of internet activity as protective. However, the 10-year period was longer than necessary. [33][34]
Holding and Implications
The appeal was allowed in part. The overall sentence was reduced from 24 months’ imprisonment suspended for 24 months to 16 months’ imprisonment suspended for 24 months. The sentence for the distribution offence was reduced to four months, and the relevant sentences were made concurrent. [31][35]
The SHPO remained in force but its duration was reduced from 10 years to five years. Other ancillary and notification provisions remained unaltered. [34][36][37]
The Appellant was awarded his privately funded costs from Central Funds. [38][39]
The decision directly reduced the Appellant’s sentence and the duration of the SHPO; no broader implication beyond the application of established sentencing principles is stated.
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