Ady, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This was a prosecution appeal concerning a terminating ruling under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Crown Court had stayed four counts of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to section 76(1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, within an indictment containing fourteen counts. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal after the prosecution complied with the statutory procedural requirements. [1][2]

The Respondent and the Complainant had been in an intimate relationship for several years. The Respondent had previously been convicted of assault and controlling or coercive behaviour against the Complainant, receiving a custodial sentence and a restraining order. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to breaches of that order and later received a suspended sentence and a further restraining order. [3][4]

The current indictment alleged controlling and coercive conduct both before and after the Respondent’s remand in custody in 2023. The alleged conduct included violence or threats, control over appearance, food, friendships and spending, monitoring, humiliation, excessive communications, and threats to disclose sexual recordings. [5][6]

The prosecution charged two pairs of counts covering the two periods and the two alternative methods by which “serious effect” could be established under section 76(4). The Crown Court considered that the indictment exposed the Respondent to being convicted twice for the same offending and stayed all four counts when the prosecution declined either to elect between the counts or combine each pair. [7][8][9][10][11][12]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 76(1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates one offence or separate offences corresponding to the two methods of establishing “serious effect” under section 76(4). [13][14][15][16]
2. Whether the prosecution could properly advance multiple counts covering different periods or different aspects of the alleged controlling and coercive behaviour. [17][18][19]
3. Whether the Crown Court was entitled to stay the four counts as defective or oppressive. [11][12][20][21]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The Appellant accepted that section 76(1) creates one offence and that section 76(4) provides two ways of proving the “serious effect” element. [22][23]
• It nevertheless submitted that four counts were preferable because they separated different aspects of the alleged behaviour, assisted the jury, and gave the sentencing court greater precision. [24][25]
• The Appellant argued that none of the counts was defective, that the Respondent suffered no prejudice, and that the principle of totality would prevent excessive punishment if more than one conviction resulted. [25]

Respondent’s Arguments

• The Respondent submitted that section 76(1) creates a single offence intended to be considered as a whole, rather than compartmentalised according to the two methods of proving serious effect. [26]
• The Respondent argued that dividing the behaviour could prejudice the prosecution’s ability to prove serious effect, create unnecessary cross-admissibility issues, and suggest an unintended hierarchy between types of conduct. [26][27]
• The Respondent maintained that multiple convictions could arise from conduct capable of being charged in one count, and acknowledged that the principles of autrefois convict and abuse of process did not necessarily apply. [28][29]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court held that the statutory wording establishes one offence under section 76(1), with four essential elements. The requirement that the behaviour have a serious effect may be satisfied in either of the two ways specified in section 76(4), but those alternatives do not create separate offences. [13][36]

The Court accepted that multiple counts may be permissible where the alleged offending occurred during genuinely separate periods. It also considered that two counts covering the same period could theoretically be permissible where they concerned different, non-duplicative behaviour satisfying different statutory routes. [17][18][19]

Nevertheless, the Court stated that the normal and preferable approach is a single count encompassing all alleged controlling and coercive behaviour. This enables the jury to consider all the behaviour when deciding whether it had a serious effect and avoids unnecessary complexity concerning jury directions and cross-admissibility. [32][37]

The availability of a potential defence for conduct falling within section 76(4)(b), and the possibility of a Brown-type direction in rare cases, did not generally require separate counts. In unusual cases, separate counts might assist the jury, provided they concerned different aspects of behaviour and did not create unfairness. [33][38]

The Court concluded that, although a single count would normally have been preferable in this case, the four counts were not defective. The Crown Court could have permitted amendment of the indictment rather than staying all the counts, and the stay deprived the Complainant of the possibility of obtaining redress through a conviction. [39][20]

Holding and Implications

The appeal was allowed: the stay of the counts was reversed, the stay was lifted, and proceedings for the relevant offence or offences were ordered to resume in the Crown Court. [21]

The decision confirms that section 76(1) creates one offence, although multiple counts may be permissible where they relate to separate periods or genuinely different, non-duplicative conduct. The Court indicated that a single count will normally be the appropriate form of charge for the totality of the alleged controlling and coercive behaviour. [36][17][32][33]