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McCandlish Farmhouse Confectionery Ltd against Michael Malone and another (Court of Session)
Anonymized Legal Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Pursuers alleged that the Defenders infringed two registered trade marks relating to “Chelsea Whoppers” and committed passing off by producing and selling a similar confectionery product. They sought substantial damages, interdict, delivery up, seizure and related remedies. [1][2][3][4][5]
The court refused interim interdict after finding that the evidence did not clearly establish confusion, that the product name might be generic, and that the marks might be susceptible to revocation. [6][7][8]
The First Defender later radically changed the product’s packaging and undertook not to deal in confectionery goods using “Chelsea” or “Whopper”. The Second Defender denied meaningful involvement in the business. [9][10][11][12]
The court refused decree in absence and summary decree, fixed a proof on loss and damage, and declined to extend the procedural timetable or postpone the proof because the Pursuers had not produced supporting evidence for their substantial damages claim. [13][14][15][16][17]
Following proof, the court concluded that the Pursuers had failed to establish passing off or loss caused by infringement, although it found infringement of one registered word mark up to the date of the First Defender’s undertaking. [18][19][20][21][22]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defenders had committed passing off by using the “Chelsea Whoppers” name and associated get-up. [23][19]
- Whether the Defenders had infringed the Pursuers’ two registered trade marks. [24][21]
- Whether the Pursuers had proved recoverable damages arising from any established infringement. [25][22]
- Whether the Pursuers had title to sue for infringement during the period before registration of the marks in their names. [26][27]
- Whether prescription affected any damages claim. [28][29]
- Whether the Second Defender had used an infringing sign in the course of trade. [30][31]
- How expenses should be allocated between the parties. [32][33]
Arguments of the Parties
Pursuers’ Arguments
- The Pursuers contended that the Defenders had infringed the registered marks and caused loss through diverted sales, brand dilution, reputational damage, and rebranding costs. [5][34]
- They argued that the marks had been assigned to the First Pursuer before the death of the original proprietor, giving them a continuous right to claim damages from 2006 onwards. [35][36]
- They submitted that representations about earlier litigation had prevented them from discovering their rights and that section 6(4) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 postponed prescription until 2025. [37][38]
- They relied on the Defenders’ sales, the alleged increase in their own sales after the First Defender’s undertaking, and the absence of financial information from the Defenders as grounds for an award of damages. [39][40]
Defenders’ Arguments
- The First Defender maintained that he had produced the confectionery since 2002, that “Chelsea Whoppers” was a generic description, and that he had acquired reputation and goodwill in his own product. [41][42]
- He contended that an earlier court action had permitted him to continue producing and selling the product, and that he had changed the product’s name and branding during the present proceedings. [42][43][44]
- The Second Defender argued that she had no role in the confectionery business beyond creating a basic Facebook page and answering one telephone call. [6][45]
- The Defenders made no submissions at the final hearing. [46]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 159, [2004] RPC 40 | Proportionate and robust case management in intellectual property litigation. | The court relied on the principle when fixing and enforcing a streamlined timetable for the damages proof. [47][48] |
| Lifestyle Equities CV v Amazon UK Services Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 552, [2023] Bus LR 1010 | Case management in intellectual property proceedings. | The decision was cited alongside Reed Executive in support of careful control of the trial process. [48] |
| Neutrogena Corp v Golden Ltd (t/a Garnier) [1996] RPC 473 | Where confusion is marginal, absence of evidence supporting actual deception may be decisive. | The court applied this approach in rejecting the passing-off claim. [49] |
| Aarons & Co Ltd v Fraser 1934 SC 137; 1934 SLT 125 | Damages require proof of actual loss; nominal damages are not generally available for iniuria sine damno. | The court relied on the principle in refusing damages where the Pursuers had not proved loss. [25] |
| Wilkie v Brown 2003 SC 573 | Damnum is an essential element of a valid claim for damages. | The decision supported the rejection of a damages award absent proof of loss. [25] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The court found that the evidence did not establish substantive goodwill in the First Pursuer’s product. Evidence from family members and associates was insufficient, and there was no satisfactory independent evidence that consumers preferred the product or sought it out by reason of its branding. [50]
There was also no direct evidence of consumer or retailer confusion. Although actual confusion is not always necessary, the court considered the alleged similarities marginal and treated the absence of supporting evidence as decisive in the circumstances. [51][49]
The passing-off claim therefore failed because neither goodwill nor likely confusion had been established. [19]
For the first registered mark, the court held that the former packaging did not meet the required standard of similarity for infringement, particularly in light of the distinctive historical and generic associations of the “Chelsea Whopper” name. [20]
For the second registered word mark, the court found sufficient similarity between the registered words and the First Defender’s former wording. It declared that infringement occurred from the mark’s effective registration date until 1 May 2026. [21]
No permanent interdict was necessary because the First Defender had undertaken to stop using the relevant words, leaving no reasonable basis to apprehend continuing infringement. [52]
The damages claim failed because the Pursuers did not prove brand dilution, reputational damage, rebranding costs, lost royalties, or lost sales. In particular, there was no reliable evidence showing what proportion of the First Defender’s customers had been confused or what sales would otherwise have been made by the Pursuers. [53][54][55][22]
The financial documents relied upon were limited, largely created by the Pursuers, not verified by the accountant who identified them, and incapable of supplying a non-speculative multiplicand for lost sales. [56][57][58][22]
The court held that an unregistered assignee could potentially sue, but the Pursuers had failed to prove the alleged 2020 assignment because the underlying contract was not produced. Any remedy was therefore restricted to the period after their registration as proprietors on 27 March 2026. [26][27]
The prescription argument was rejected. The court found no proved misrepresentation causing relevant error and held that the facts concerning the earlier action could have been discovered through reasonable diligence from 2010 onwards. [59][60][29]
The Second Defender was found not to have participated in the business or used an infringing sign in the course of trade. The action against her was therefore unjustified. [30][31]
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court declared that the First Defender’s former use of “Chelsea Whoppers” infringed the second registered trade mark, but granted no damages or permanent interdict. The Defenders were absolved from the remaining conclusions. [61][62]
The First Pursuer was made liable for the Second Defender’s expenses on an agent and client, client-paying basis, while no expenses were awarded between the Pursuers and the First Defender. [63][33][62]
The direct consequence was a limited declarator of past infringement, with no monetary recovery and no continuing restraint because of the undertaking. The opinion identifies no broader implication or new precedent beyond applying existing principles to the evidence. [52][22][62]
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