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J's Supermarket Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Sep 4, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These were appeals against the dismissal of two judicial review claims challenging the Respondent’s revocation of sponsor licences held by Company A, a retail grocery business, and Company B, a care provider. The underlying claims were dismissed by Judge A and Judge B respectively. [1][2]

Company A’s licence was revoked after a compliance visit identified substantial discrepancies between the skilled roles stated in certificates of sponsorship and the low-skilled duties described by two sponsored workers. The Respondent concluded that the vacancies were not genuine. [3][4][5] Company B’s licence was revoked following concerns about recruitment practices, unusually high staff turnover, unsuitable sponsored workers, and alleged failures concerning two workers. [6][7]

The Court of Appeal considered both appeals together, including the application of procedural fairness principles, the interpretation of the Home Office sponsor guidance, and section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. [1][8]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Respondent lawfully concluded that Company A’s two sponsored roles were not genuine vacancies under Annex C1(z) of the sponsor guidance. [9][10]
  2. Whether Company A was afforded procedural fairness and whether the Respondent adequately considered its evidence and gave rational reasons. [9][10][11]
  3. Whether section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 applied to the challenges concerning both companies. [12][13][14]
  4. Whether the Respondent irrationally concluded that Company B’s vacancy involving Worker K was not genuine. [15][16]
  5. Whether Company B’s recruitment practices constituted a “threat to immigration control” and engaged Annex C2(a)–(b) of the sponsor guidance. [15][17][18]

Arguments of the Parties

Company A’s Arguments

  • The lower court wrongly upheld the finding that two roles were not genuine vacancies because of procedural unfairness, unsupported conclusions about the relationship between the job descriptions and the certificates of sponsorship, failure to consider witness evidence, and inadequate or irrational reasoning. [9][10][11][19]
  • The Respondent had not clearly alleged dishonesty or deliberate wrongdoing, as required by the principles applied in sponsor-licence cases. [10][19]
  • The lower court had wrongly approached section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. [9]

Company B’s Arguments

  • The lower court wrongly applied section 31(2A) to preserve the revocation decision under Annex C2(a)–(b) after rejecting reliance on Annex C1(z). [12][20][21]
  • “Threat to immigration control” required more than a risk of breach of immigration control, particularly given other safeguards in the immigration rules. [22][23]
  • The incidents involving Worker K and Worker F were isolated errors and did not establish a systemic failure in Company B’s procedures. [18][24]
  • The Respondent’s conclusion that Worker K’s role was not genuine did not follow merely from her inability to drive. [16]

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The evidence demonstrated breaches of the sponsor guidance sufficient to justify revocation of both licences, and the lower courts had correctly applied procedural fairness principles and interpreted the guidance. [25][26]
  • Company A had been given clear notice of the discrepancies between the certificates of sponsorship and the workers’ actual duties and had an opportunity to respond. [10]
  • Company B’s recruitment of Worker K into a driving role despite her inability to drive was inconsistent with a genuine vacancy, and section 31(2A) could preserve the decision. [16][27]
  • Company B’s high turnover, recruitment of unsuitable workers, and broader compliance failures rationally demonstrated a threat to immigration control and justified revocation under Annex C2(a)–(b). [23][28][24]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673; [2019] 1 WLR 46 Where dishonesty or reprehensible conduct is suspected, the person must receive clear notice and an opportunity to respond. The Court held that Company A received sufficient notice of the allegation that its roles had been created to facilitate immigration. [8][29][30]
R(Prestwick Care Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 184; [2025] 1 WLR 4761 The procedural fairness principles concerning dishonesty apply to revocation of sponsor licences. The Court distinguished the case because Company A was clearly informed of the Respondent’s concern and had an opportunity to answer it. [8][31][10]
R(Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 115 Procedural fairness is an objective question for the court, not merely a matter of deference to the decision-maker. The Court applied this principle in assessing whether the companies had been given a fair opportunity to respond. [32]
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 Fairness depends on the context and must not be applied mechanically. The Court assessed the adequacy of notice in the circumstances of each company’s case. [32]
Pathan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 1 WLR 4506 Procedural fairness is flexible and context-dependent. The principle supported the Court’s differentiated treatment of the Company A and Company B proceedings. [32]
R(Public and Commercial Services Union) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2017] EWHC 1787 (Admin); [2018] ICR 269 The “highly likely” threshold in section 31(2A) is demanding. The Court treated section 31(2A) as requiring a high degree of confidence that the outcome would not have been substantially different. [14][33]
R(Bradbury) v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority [2025] EWCA Civ 489; [2025] 4 WLR 58 The court must assess the significance of an error to the decision-making process without determining the merits itself. The principle informed the Court’s assessment of whether procedural errors could be disregarded under section 31(2A). [14]
BUJ v Bromley LBC [2026] EWCA Civ 888 Section 31(2A) cannot be used where doing so would require the court to become the decision-maker. The Court nevertheless held that section 31(2A) was properly applied to Company B because the Respondent had independently identified Annex C2(a)–(b) as grounds for revocation. [34]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court held that procedural fairness is assessed objectively and flexibly. Where dishonesty or reprehensible conduct is alleged, clear notice and an opportunity to respond are generally required. [32][35][29]

For Company A, the suspension and revocation letters identified the certificates of sponsorship, contrasted the stated managerial duties with the workers’ reported shop-floor duties, and expressly stated that the roles appeared to have been created to facilitate immigration. This was sufficient notice, even though the Respondent did not use the word “dishonesty”. [10][30]

The Court also found that the Respondent had considered Company A’s witness statements and other materials during reconsideration. The substantial mismatch between the stated roles and actual duties, together with the absence of reliable evidence that the workers performed managerial functions, supported the conclusion that the vacancies were not genuine. [11][36][37][38][39]

The Court therefore rejected Company A’s appeal without needing to determine its separate section 31(2A) ground. [40][41]

As to Company B, the Court agreed that Worker K’s inability to drive demonstrated poor recruitment but did not, by itself, establish that the role did not exist or was not genuine. The Respondent’s reliance on Annex C1(z) in relation to that vacancy was therefore unlawful. [42][43]

However, the Court upheld reliance on section 31(2A) in relation to Annex C2(a)–(b). The Respondent had separately identified those provisions as necessary grounds for revocation, and the evidence of incompetent recruitment, Worker F’s failure of the English-language test, Worker K’s inability to drive, and exceptionally high staff turnover made it highly likely that the licence would have been revoked on those grounds. [44][45][46][34]

The Court further held that “threat to immigration control” bore its ordinary meaning in the guidance. Company B’s recruitment of plainly unsuitable workers and substantially above-average staff turnover rationally supported findings of a threat to immigration control and significant or systemic recruitment failures. [17][22][28]

Holding and Implications

Both appeals were dismissed. The Court also dismissed the grounds advanced in the Respondent’s Notice and cross-appeal concerning Company B. [47][48]

The revocation of both sponsor licences therefore remained effective. The Court’s decision confirms that a vacancy may be non-genuine where the sponsored worker performs materially different, predominantly lower-skilled duties, and that section 31(2A) may preserve a decision on independently sustainable grounds, provided the statutory high threshold is met. [39][46][34] No broader implication beyond the direct effect on the parties was stated, and no new precedent was set.