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Richardson v R.
Factual and Procedural Background
In November 2020, the Appellant was tried jointly with another defendant for murder at the Crown Court. The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years, reduced by time spent in custody. [1]
The Appellant applied for extensions of time, permission to adduce fresh evidence, and permission to appeal against conviction and sentence. The applications were referred to the full Court of Appeal and heard over three days, during which oral and written evidence was considered. [2][3][4]
The prosecution case was that the Appellant and the co-defendant acted together in a planned robbery. CCTV, eyewitness, telephone, forensic and expert evidence were relied upon. The victim was stabbed and died from the injury. [5][6][7][8][9][10]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an intermediary should have been provided for the Appellant at trial. [11][12]
- Whether psychiatric evidence should have been obtained to explore diminished responsibility. [11][13]
- Whether psychiatric and psychological evidence should have been adduced before the jury concerning the Appellant’s disorders and their effect on his behaviour and decision-making. [14][15]
- Whether the Appellant was properly advised and enabled to decide whether to give evidence. [14][16]
- Whether the minimum sentence was manifestly excessive. [17][18]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Appellant argued that an intermediary was required because of his ADHD, mental-health conditions and communication difficulties, particularly when deciding whether to give evidence. [12]
- It was argued that expert evidence supported a possible defence of diminished responsibility. [19]
- The Appellant submitted that the jury should have heard evidence about his disorders, communication difficulties and their possible effects on intention, perception and decision-making. [20]
- It was submitted that he had not been properly placed in a position to decide whether to give evidence. [21]
- The Appellant argued that the sentencing judge lacked relevant psychiatric and psychological reports and therefore failed to apply the applicable guidance concerning offenders with mental or developmental disorders. [22]
Respondent’s Arguments
- The Respondent submitted that the absence of an intermediary had no impact on the safety of the conviction, since there was no presumption that an intermediary must be appointed and the trial process could be adapted. [23][24]
- The Respondent argued that diminished responsibility could not properly be explored because the Appellant consistently denied involvement in the stabbing and maintained that he did not know the co-defendant had a knife. [25]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| C v Sevenoaks Youth Court [2009] EWHC 3088 (Admin) | The court’s inherent power to direct the appointment of an intermediary. | The precedent was cited within the applicable Practice Direction, which also stated that appointment was not presumed or mandatory. [26] |
| R v Cox [2012] EWCA Crim 549 | There is no presumption that a defendant receives an intermediary; the court should adapt the trial process to communication needs. | The Court applied this principle and held that the Appellant’s needs were adequately addressed through explanations, breaks and trial adjustments. [26][27][28][29] |
| R v Erskine and another [2009] EWCA Crim 1425; [2009] 2 Cr App R 29 | A defendant need not admit participation in a killing before diminished responsibility can be advanced; however, evidence about the defendant’s mental processes and role will ordinarily be necessary. Raising the defence for the first time on appeal may also undermine the trial process absent a reasonable and persuasive explanation. | The Court accepted that no admission was legally required but held that the available evidence did not permit a fair assessment of substantial impairment and provided no sufficient explanation for not advancing the defence at trial. [30][31][32][33] |
| R v Curran [2021] EWCA Crim 1999 | Assessment of diminished responsibility generally requires evidence of the defendant’s mental processes at the relevant time. | The Court relied on the absence of reliable evidence concerning the Appellant’s mental processes before and during the killing. [30][31] |
| R v Sossongo [2021] EWCA Crim 1777 | Expert evidence about conditions such as ADHD may be relevant to criminal liability in appropriate circumstances; the outcome depends on the facts. | The Court held that such evidence could not assist on these facts because the Appellant did not give evidence and provided no relevant account of his thought processes. [20][34][35] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court applied section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Fresh evidence had to be capable of belief, potentially afford a ground for allowing the appeal, be admissible at trial, and have a reasonable explanation for not having been adduced earlier. [36]
The Court found the Appellant an unreliable witness, while accepting the evidence of trial counsel where it was consistent with contemporaneous documents and custody-visit records. It accepted that the proceedings were explained, that the defence statement accurately recorded the Appellant’s instructions, and that he understood the advice not to give evidence. [37][38][39][40]
Although expert evidence supported the potential usefulness of an intermediary, the Court concluded that the Appellant’s communication needs had been addressed by clear explanations, simplified language, repetition, breaks and adjustments to the trial process. The fresh evidence therefore could not assist the appeal. [28][29][41]
In relation to diminished responsibility, the Court accepted that the Appellant had ADHD and had also suffered from depression and anxiety. However, the evidence did not establish that those conditions substantially impaired his responsibility at the time of the killing. The psychiatric evidence was either internally inconsistent or unable to provide a robust opinion on substantial impairment. [33][42]
The Court also held that evidence about the Appellant’s disorders could not assist the jury because he denied involvement in the stabbing, did not give evidence, and supplied no relevant account of his thought processes that expert evidence could explain. [34][35]
The advice not to give evidence was found to be reasonable and proper, having regard to the strength of the prosecution case, the Appellant’s reluctance to identify the co-defendant, and concerns about his credibility and possible cross-examination. The conviction was safe individually and cumulatively. [43][21]
The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge knew of the Appellant’s conditions, and the evidence did not show that they reduced his culpability. The findings that the Appellant had a senior role, had relevant previous convictions and had planned a robbery were open on the evidence. [44]
Holding and Implications
All applications were refused. The Court refused extensions of time, permission to adduce fresh evidence, permission to appeal against conviction, and permission to appeal against sentence. [45]
The Appellant’s murder conviction and minimum sentence therefore remained in force. The opinion did not establish a new precedent; its direct effect was to uphold the existing conviction and sentence. [45]
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