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Haslam, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of fraudulent trading concerning Company A, of which Appellant was sole director. The offending occurred between November 2020 and November 2022, while the company was insolvent and continued accepting advance payments from customers despite being unable to complete the contracted work. Company A was subsequently wound up with insufficient funds to repay creditors. [1][2][3]
There were eight complainants, several of whom suffered substantial financial, emotional, and psychological consequences after paying for incomplete or defective building work and materials that were not supplied. The opinion contains no information about the eighth complainant. [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]
Appellant was sentenced by the Crown Court to 28 months’ immediate imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful application to vary the sentence under the slip rule, Appellant appealed against sentence. [1][13][14][15][16][17]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentence of immediate imprisonment was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, including whether it should have been suspended. [18][19][20]
- Whether the sentencing judge’s earlier indications that Appellant would not receive immediate custody created an expectation and resulting unfairness requiring appellate relief. [18][21][22]
- Whether the judge was entitled to change his view after fully considering the impact of the offending on the victims. [23][24]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The sentence was manifestly excessive or alternatively wrong in principle. [18]
- Strong personal mitigation and the criteria in the sentencing guideline supported suspension, including Appellant’s realistic prospect of rehabilitation, low risk of reoffending, good character, and the harmful effect of imprisonment on Appellant’s ill wife. [18][20]
- The judge’s earlier clear indication that Appellant would not receive immediate custody created unfairness when the judge later imposed imprisonment. [18][21]
The Crown’s Arguments
- The judge’s earlier comments were informal, unsolicited, and outside the Goodyear procedure; they were therefore not binding. [23]
- At the earlier hearings, the judge lacked the full details of the victims’ impact. Once the full picture was available, the judge was entitled to change his mind. [23]
- The decision not to suspend was an exercise of sentencing discretion with which the Court of Appeal should not interfere. [23]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Gillam 2 Cr App R (S) 267 | A sentencing indication may create an expectation, and departure from it may cause injustice. | The Court relied on the principle that a sentencing expectation can require corrective action. [25][26][27][28] |
| R v CD [2018] EWCA Crim 571 | Where a judge indicates that custody will not be immediate, a later custodial sentence may create a legitimate sense of injustice; the Court may suspend the sentence. | The case was considered analogous because the indication followed the guilty plea, and it illustrated the Court’s discretion to address unfairness. [29][30][19][31] |
| AG’s Ref (R v AB, CD, EF and GH) [2021] EWCA Crim 1959, [2022] 2 Cr App R (S) 17 | Sentence indications connected with inducing guilty pleas are governed by Goodyear and cannot otherwise lawfully be given. | The Court distinguished this line of authority because Appellant’s guilty plea was not induced by the judge’s indication. [32][33][34][19][35] |
| R v Turner [1970] 2 QB 321 | A judge may indicate whether a sentence will or will not take a particular form, regardless of whether the accused pleads guilty or not guilty. | The authority was cited as the continuing basis for certain sentence indications, distinct from the stricter Goodyear procedure. [36] |
| R v Keeling | The Court may use a more generous reduction in sentence to remedy unfairness caused by a sentence exceeding an earlier indication. | The Court applied this approach by suspending Appellant’s 28-month sentence and attaching requirements. [37][38][31][39] |
| Goodyear | Strict conditions apply where a judge indicates the maximum sentence that would be imposed if a guilty plea were entered. | The Court held that those strict conditions did not apply because Appellant’s plea was not entered in reliance on the indication. [23][19][35] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court accepted that the sentencing judge had been entitled to discuss sentence in Appellant’s presence because the indication was not used to induce a guilty plea. The strict Goodyear requirements therefore did not apply. [19][35]
However, the judge had expressed firm views at two earlier hearings that Appellant would not receive immediate custody. Although the judge had reserved some room for manoeuvre by stating that he needed to hear the victim evidence and conduct a full sentencing exercise, the overall message created a substantial expectation lasting approximately three months. [24][22]
The judge later reconsidered the case after hearing evidence, receiving submissions, and reflecting on the high impact of the offending. The Court held that he was entitled to change his mind, particularly because the offending’s seriousness and harm justified moving from category B2 to category B1. The immediate custodial sentence was therefore not manifestly excessive and was properly open to the judge. [14][40][24]
Nevertheless, the change created a sense of injustice because the sentence did not match the expectation generated by the earlier indications. The Court considered the case borderline between suspension and immediate custody, with both outcomes properly available. To do justice in the unusual circumstances, it decided to remedy the unfairness by suspending the sentence and imposing rehabilitative and unpaid-work requirements. [41][42][39]
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court quashed the 28-month sentence of immediate imprisonment and substituted a 28-month custodial term suspended for two years. The order required 10 days of rehabilitation activity and 160 hours of unpaid work. Breach or further offending could result in more onerous consequences or activation of some or all of the custodial term. [43][44]
The direct effect was that Appellant avoided immediate imprisonment but remained subject to the suspended custodial term and specified requirements. The opinion does not state that a new precedent was set.
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