Al-Hassan & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This was an appeal in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) against sentences imposed by the Crown Court following convictions for jointly committed sexual assault against a particularly vulnerable 15-year-old complainant. Appellant A was also convicted of breaching a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. [1][2][3]

The offending occurred in central London in July 2024. The complainant had run away from home, was experiencing serious mental-health difficulties, and had taken an overdose. The appellants sexually touched her, attempted to make her consume alcohol, smoke, and ingest a pill, and took her around the area before police intervened after she mouthed “Help me”. [4][5][6][7][8]

Appellant A received an extended determinate sentence of 10 years, comprising seven years’ custody and a three-year extended licence period, together with a concurrent three-year sentence for the breach offence. Appellant B received six years’ imprisonment. Sexual Harm Prevention Orders were imposed on both. [9]

The appeals were brought with leave against sentence. The appellants challenged the categorisation of the sexual assault under the applicable sentencing guideline and argued that the resulting sentences were manifestly excessive. [10]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge correctly categorised the sexual assault as a Category 1A offence, based on abduction and severe psychological harm. [11][12][13]
2. Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive, including whether aggravating factors had been double-counted. [11][14][15][16]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The offence should have been categorised as Category 2A rather than Category 1A, producing a lower starting point and sentencing range. [12][13]
• There was no abduction because the complainant appeared to walk voluntarily, had opportunities to seek help, used a mobile phone, and at times directed the appellants. [17][18]
• The complainant’s severe psychological harm principally arose from pre-existing mental-health difficulties and the subsequent criminal process, rather than from the sexual assault itself. [19][20][21][22]
• Appellant A argued that seven years’ custody was excessive even within Category 1A. Appellant B argued that the two-year uplift was excessive and that the complainant’s vulnerability had been counted both as harm and as an aggravating factor. [14][15][16]

Crown's Arguments

• Whether abduction was established was a question of fact and degree. The complainant had been taken, controlled, coerced, and detained, as demonstrated by her evidence and her mouthing “Help me” to police. [23][24]
• The sentencing judge was entitled to assess the complainant’s continuing condition using the updated evidence of the overall impact of the offence. [25]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court held that the trial judge was particularly well placed to assess whether the complainant had been abducted because he had presided over the trial, seen the evidence, and observed the complainant’s examination. [30]

The complainant’s evidence showed that the appellants grabbed and dragged her, physically controlled her, attempted to make her ingest substances, and sought to take her to accommodation for several nights. Her conduct in mouthing “Help me” to police was especially significant. [31][32][33][34][35][36]

Applying the approach reflected in R v Joinal, the Court concluded that abduction did not require violence or physical restraint in every case. The judge was entitled to find that the complainant was not freely accompanying the appellants, and the abduction harm factor was therefore established. [26][37][38][29]

The Court also upheld the finding of severe psychological harm. Although the complainant was already psychologically fragile, the assault and its aftermath significantly worsened her condition. The Court rejected the argument that harm caused during the police interview and trial had to be separated from harm caused by the offence. [39][40]

The Court relied on section 63(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2020, which required consideration of harm the offence caused, intended to cause, or might foreseeably have caused. It therefore upheld the Category 1A classification and the four-year guideline starting point. [41]

The Court considered that multiple culpability and harm factors independently justified an uplift within the guideline range. For Appellant A, the uplift and sentence reflected the aggravating features, the breach offence, and previous similar sexual offending; the extended sentence was also necessary for public protection. [42][43]

For Appellant B, the Court considered that the joint nature of the offence and his initial physical approach to the complainant justified the six-year sentence. It rejected the double-counting argument because vulnerability concerned harm, whereas targeting a vulnerable person concerned culpability. [44][45][46]

Holding and Implications

Both appeals were dismissed. The Court held that the sexual assault was properly categorised as Category 1A and that neither sentence was manifestly excessive. [47][48][49]

The sentences and associated protective orders therefore remained in force. The opinion does not identify any broader implication beyond upholding the sentences in these appeals.