LAU, R (On the Application Of) v The Family Court at Croydon

Factual and Procedural Background

This was an application for permission to appeal against a High Court order dismissing the Applicant’s renewed application for permission to seek judicial review and certifying it as totally without merit. The Court of Appeal was concerned only with whether any proposed appeal ground was arguable with a real prospect of success, not with the merits or proportionality of orders made in the underlying family proceedings. [1]

The proceedings arose from private-law child-arrangements proceedings concerning the Applicant’s nine-year-old daughter. The Applicant’s application for contact was filed in January 2024; direct contact was suspended in March 2024, and a final order in November 2024 prohibited direct contact and imposed a section 91(14) Children Act 1989 permission requirement for further contact applications. That requirement expired on 25 May 2026. [2][3]

Permission to appeal against the final order and against a later order dismissing an interim-contact application was refused, with both applications certified totally without merit. A subsequent attempt to set aside those orders was not entertained, and the Applicant was directed that any such application had to be made in the Family Court and, while the section 91(14) order remained in force, required permission. [4][5]

The Applicant lodged an application to set aside the earlier family orders in January 2026. He then brought judicial review proceedings complaining that the application had not been issued or progressed. The High Court refused permission to proceed with judicial review. By the time of the appeal, the section 91(14) requirement had expired and subsequent applications had been addressed through further court directions. [6][7][8][9]

The Applicant appeared in person; the Respondent did not appear and was not represented. [10]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether any proposed ground of appeal against refusal of permission to seek judicial review was arguable with a real prospect of success. [1]
2. Whether the alleged administrative failure to issue or progress the Applicant’s application engaged a public-law duty or justified judicial review. [11][12]
3. Whether the High Court Judge sufficiently addressed the pleaded judicial-review grounds and the Applicant’s submissions. [13][14]
4. Whether the Applicant’s attempt to set aside final family orders amounted to an impermissible collateral attack or abuse of process. [15][16]

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant’s Arguments

• The Applicant argued that HMCTS had created an unexplained procedural impasse by failing to issue or place his application before a judge, thereby obstructing access to justice and engaging Articles 6 and 8 ECHR. [17]
• He maintained that no judge had considered whether permission was required under section 91(14), and that administrative staff had no power to prevent the application being placed before a judge. [18][19]
• He argued that delay was causing irretrievable prejudice to his relationship with his child and that a flight risk made urgent consideration necessary. [20][21]
• His proposed appeal grounds alleged, among other matters, that the Judge had failed to address his submissions, used the wrong bundle, raised the permission threshold, ignored relevant authorities, acted with apparent bias, failed to give reasons, and entered the Family Court’s jurisdiction. [22][23]

Respondent’s Position

The Respondent did not appear or make detailed submissions. [10]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confirmed that the permission threshold required a proposed appeal ground to be arguable with a real prospect of success. The High Court Judge was not required to address every submission in a lengthy skeleton argument, provided that he engaged with the substance of the pleaded judicial-review grounds and gave sufficient reasons. [1][13]

The January application was, in substance, an application to set aside earlier family orders, not an application for permission under section 91(14). Because that order remained in force, no substantive contact application could be made without prior permission. The only permissible application at that time was an application for permission, which had not been made. [7][26][27]

A Circuit Judge had nevertheless considered the application and indicated that the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside another Circuit Judge’s order except in the circumstances specified by FPR 27.5. The Court held that there was no obligation to issue or progress proceedings that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain, and administrative staff were entitled to act on that judicial direction. [28][29]

The Court rejected the argument that the High Court Judge had misunderstood the complaint. The judgment showed that he understood it to concern administrative inactivity by HMCTS, rather than a judicial decision. [30][31][32]

The Court held that the pleaded grounds substantially reduced to an allegation that the application had not been placed before a judge within a reasonable time. By 16 January 2026, however, the application had been considered by a Circuit Judge and a reason for not entertaining it had been communicated. The delay was less than four months and did not come close to circumstances warranting Administrative Court intervention. [11][12][33][34]

The attempted challenge to final family orders was also impermissible. Those orders had been made at attended hearings, appeals had been refused, and the Applicant could not use an application to set aside as a further appeal or collateral attack. Matters previously raised, or which could have been raised on appeal, were liable to constitute an abuse of process. [35][15][16]

The Court rejected the remaining complaints. The Judge had sufficiently addressed the submissions, had not wrongly elevated the permission threshold, had not displayed apparent bias, had not considered impermissible materials, and had not usurped the role of the Family Court or the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Separate reasons for the totally-without-merit certification were unnecessary because that conclusion followed from the finding that the claim was completely unarguable. [14][36][25][37][38][8]

The expiry of the section 91(14) order and subsequent events meant that the judicial-review claim had been overtaken by events. The only live issue concerned directing the issue of the January 2026 application, so no useful purpose would be served by granting permission even if the grounds had been arguable. [8][39][40]

Holding and Implications

Permission to appeal was refused as totally without merit. None of the proposed grounds was remotely arguable. The Applicant’s informal disclosure application was dismissed, and no civil restraint order was made; that question was left for the Family Court. [40]

The direct effect was that the refusal of permission to proceed with judicial review remained undisturbed, and the Court made no order compelling HMCTS or any judge to issue, list, or allocate an application. Complaints about mandatory relief against HMCTS had to be brought in the Administrative Court, subject to permission. [41]

No broader implication or new precedent was identified in the opinion.