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Jugessur, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant appealed, with permission, against a sentence of 40 months’ imprisonment imposed by the Crown Court in The City for nine offences, including dangerous driving and theft. [1]
The offences comprised two motor-vehicle thefts, handling stolen goods, driving while disqualified, driving without insurance, dangerous driving, and criminal damage. [2][3][4][5] The offending involved stealing vehicles and tools, driving while disqualified and uninsured, repeatedly ramming a car driven by the Appellant’s former partner, and damaging her phone and car key. [6][7][8][9]
The sentencing judge imposed consecutive and concurrent custodial terms totalling 40 months and disqualified the Appellant from driving for three years, subject to passing an extended driving test. [10][11][12] The appeal concerned the sentence and the adequacy of the sentencing reasons. [13]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle because insufficient credit was given for the Appellant’s guilty pleas. [13][14]
- Whether the sentencing judge failed properly to apply the totality principle when imposing consecutive sentences. [15]
- Whether the sentencing remarks adequately explained the categorisation, guideline calculations, guilty-plea discounts, totality assessment, and driving disqualification. [16][17][18][19]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The sentence was manifestly excessive and/or wrong in principle because the sentencing judge either gave inadequate credit for guilty pleas or adopted excessive provisional sentences before applying credit. [13]
- The sentencing judge did not identify the applicable offence categories or the percentage discount applied for each guilty plea. [14][20]
- The consecutive sentences for the first theft and handling offence were not adequately explained and were excessive. [14][20]
- A downward adjustment was required to ensure that the aggregate sentence was just and proportionate under the totality principle. [15]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Chin-Charles [2019] EWCA Crim 1140, [2019] 1 WLR 5921 | Sentencing remarks may be brief and to the point. | The Court nevertheless held that statutory requirements required reasons, explanation of guideline compliance, and identification of any guilty-plea discount. [16] |
| R v Beckford [2019] 1 Cr App R (S) 53 | The sentencing court should identify the discounts applied for guilty pleas. | The Court relied on the authority in stating that individual discounts should have been identified. [21] |
| R v Needham [2016] 1 WLR 4449 | The court must explain the discretionary disqualification period, the extension period, and any uplift required because of custody and consecutive sentences. | The Court used the guidance to structure the Appellant’s disqualification period into discretionary and extension components and considered, but did not impose, an uplift. [22][23][24][25] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court found the sentencing exercise unsatisfactory. Although concise sentencing remarks are permissible, the Sentencing Code required the sentencing judge to state the reasons for sentence, explain compliance with sentencing guidelines, and state the guilty-plea discount. [16]
The sentencing remarks did not describe the offences, identify the relevant guideline categories, explain adjustments from guideline starting points, or specify the discounts applied. The statement that the Appellant would receive “full credit” for each plea was contradictory because only one plea was entered at the first stage and the other pleas attracted lesser discounts. [26][27][17]
The Court also held that the sentencing judge should have explained how totality had been addressed. [21] Because the reasons were inadequate, the Court considered it necessary to redo the sentencing exercise, while ensuring that the Appellant was not more severely dealt with overall on appeal. [28][29]
The Court applied one-third credit for the first theft, 25% credit for the handling offence, and 10% credit for the remaining offences. [30]
Dangerous driving was treated as the lead offence. It fell within Category A1, with several high-culpability factors, including deliberate disregard of danger, persistent offending, and an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre. The Appellant’s previous convictions and related driving offences justified increasing the starting point from 18 to 20 months; after the guilty-plea discount, the sentence was 18 months. [31][32][33]
The related driving-while-disqualified offence attracted two months’ custody concurrently, while driving without insurance received no separate penalty. [34] The criminal-damage offence did not warrant custody; its consecutive custodial sentence was therefore manifestly excessive and was replaced with no separate penalty. [35][36]
The first theft warranted a provisional sentence of 15 months before one-third credit, producing 10 months. The related handling offence was reduced to three months concurrent because the original consecutive sentence was excessive, particularly given the close relationship between the offences and the applicable guideline range. [37][38]
The second theft warranted 16 months after the guilty-plea discount, with a consecutive term initially appropriate. The Court then reduced that term to 10 months to ensure that the total sentence was just and proportionate. [39][40]
For disqualification, the Court identified a discretionary period, an obligatory extension equal to half the dangerous-driving custodial sentence, and any appropriate uplift for the effect of consecutive custody. Although the Court would otherwise have imposed four years and seven months, it maintained the total three-year disqualification to avoid increasing the Appellant’s overall punishment on appeal. [24][25]
Holding and Implications
Sentence varied. The Court quashed and replaced the sentences for dangerous driving, both thefts, handling stolen goods, and criminal damage. The total custodial sentence was reduced from 40 months to 38 months; the remaining sentences stood. [41][42][43]
The three-year driving disqualification was maintained, structured as two years and three months’ discretionary disqualification plus a nine-month extension period. [25] The Appellant would serve up to half the custodial term in custody, with the remainder on licence. [44] The direct effect was therefore a modest reduction in imprisonment and continuation of the existing disqualification.
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