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Haycock v R.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant pleaded guilty in 2006 to controlling prostitution for gain and two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The Appellant was acquitted of two further counts on which the prosecution offered no evidence. [1]
The sentencing court imposed an imprisonment for public protection (“IPP”) sentence on the controlling-prostitution count, with a minimum term of 30 months, and concurrent three-year custodial sentences for the assaults. [2]
In 2026, the Appellant applied for leave to appeal against sentence and for an extension of approximately twenty years in the time for doing so. The applications were referred to the full court, were not opposed, and were granted. [3][4]
The Court of Appeal identified that the IPP sentence had been imposed unlawfully because none of the offences was legally capable of attracting an IPP sentence. [5][6]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Appellant should receive an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence despite the delay of almost twenty years. [3][4]
- Whether the IPP sentence imposed in 2006 was lawful. [5][6][7]
- What sentence should be substituted for the unlawful IPP sentence. [8][9][10][11]
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Position
- The applications were not resisted. [4]
- The Respondent correctly acknowledged that the IPP sentence was unlawful. [7]
Appellant’s Position
- The Appellant’s representatives stated that he had been told at the time of sentence that there were no grounds for appeal and had not subsequently considered seeking leave to appeal. [12]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v McCook [2014] EWCA Crim 734 | Guidance concerning contact with former legal representatives when pursuing a delayed criminal appeal. | The Appellant’s current legal team followed the guidance by contacting former representatives before preparing the appeal. [13] |
| R v Pymont | Identified as another case involving an IPP sentence where no appeal had previously been brought. | The Court referred to it as illustrating the systemic problem concerning unappealed IPP and DPP sentences. [14] |
| R v Davis and other cases [2026] EWCA Crim 743 | Identified as a decision involving referrals of cases in which no appeal had previously been brought. | The Court relied on the referrals in that decision to illustrate that some cases were being identified, while noting that the Court could not identify unappealed cases by its own mechanisms. [14][15] |
| AG's Ref No 43 of 2009 (Craig Joseph Bennett); R v Wilkinson [2009] EWCA Crim 1925; [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 100 | The relationship between IPP or DPP sentences and discretionary life sentences. | The Court cited the decision when cautioning that some cases might have justified a discretionary life sentence and that not every IPP or DPP appeal would succeed. [16] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first granted leave and the extension of time because the appeal concerned an unlawful sentence, the applications were unopposed, and the circumstances justified consideration despite the very substantial delay. [3][4][7]
Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as it stood in 2006, an IPP could be imposed only for a “serious offence”. That required both a specified violent or sexual offence and an offence punishable by life imprisonment or by a determinate sentence of at least ten years. [5]
The controlling-prostitution offence was a specified sexual offence but carried a maximum sentence of seven years. The assault offences were specified violent offences but carried maximum sentences of five years. Consequently, none qualified as a “serious offence”, and the sentencing court had no power to impose an IPP sentence. [6]
The Court accepted that the offending was extremely serious and aggravated by the Appellant’s previous convictions. It therefore concluded that a lengthy custodial sentence was inevitable. The appropriate custodial term for the principal count was five years, reflecting the term the sentencing judge had indicated would have been imposed absent the IPP sentence. [8]
The Court nevertheless concluded that, on the information available, the sentencing judge was entitled to find that the Appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm through further specified offences. At the relevant time, that finding required an extended sentence under section 227(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. [9][10]
The appropriate extension period was two years, producing the maximum permissible seven-year term for the principal offence. The concurrent assault sentences were left undisturbed because they were not appealed, the principal sentence had taken account of all the offending, and altering those sentences would not have affected the total sentence. [17]
The Court also identified a systemic limitation: it had no means of identifying IPP or DPP sentences that had never been challenged by an application for leave to appeal. It considered that an urgent system was needed to identify such cases and make affected prisoners aware of available advice, while warning that not every appeal would succeed. [15][18][16]
Holding and Implications
The appeal was allowed. The IPP sentence on the principal count was quashed and replaced with an extended seven-year sentence comprising five years’ custody and a two-year extension period. The concurrent sentences for the two assault counts remained in place. [7][17][11]
Because of time already served, the substituted sentence resulted in the Appellant’s release from the sentence and termination of the licence. [11]
The judgment further highlighted the need for a mechanism to identify unappealed IPP and DPP cases, but cautioned that the decision did not mean that all such sentences were unlawful or that every appeal would succeed. [14][18][16]
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