Kristine Ligere against Muhammad Ajid (Court of Session)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff sought reduction of a divorce decree granted by the sheriff at The City on 11 March 2024 in undefended proceedings. [Para 13][Para 32] She did not seek to remain married or to obtain child-related orders; her case was that the decree rested on inaccurate facts and should be quashed so that financial provision issues could be litigated. [Para 13] The action proceeded to proof, where the court heard evidence from the Plaintiff, her daughter, the Defendant, the Defendant’s brother, and a solicitor’s affidavit adopted by joint minute. [Para 14][Para 18] The parties married on 26 September 2013 and have one child, Child M. [Para 20] After the marriage broke down, the Defendant’s solicitor wrote to the Plaintiff in April and June 2023 with a draft minute of agreement addressing separation date, care of Child M, aliment, and financial disclosure, but the Plaintiff did not timely respond or obtain her own solicitor. [Para 21][Para 23] The Defendant later raised an undefended divorce action averring separation on 4 October 2021, and decree followed after no notice of intention to defend was lodged. [Para 24][Para 32] The present reduction action was signeted on 11 February 2025. [Para 32]

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the divorce decree ought to have been granted, including whether the parties had been separated for two years, whether the child-care information before the sheriff was accurate, and whether the Plaintiff had a colourable financial claim. [Para 43]
2. Whether the Plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for not entering the divorce proceedings. [Para 87][Para 98]
3. Whether, taken as a whole, the circumstances justified reduction of the decree. [Para 99][Para 102]

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The sheriff was given incorrect information about Child M’s care arrangements, and if the true position had been known the sheriff would have had to consider section 12 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 more fully. [Para 64]
• The Defendant’s evidence about Child M was not credible, and the Plaintiff’s evidence that she had most of the care should be preferred. [Para 63]
• The Defendant and his solicitor acted opportunistically by obtaining decree while the Plaintiff was still seeking an extension and while financial disclosure remained outstanding; counsel relied on Hafthorsdotir v Eyvindsson. [Para 91][Para 93]
• The Plaintiff also relied on alleged misinformation about the Defendant’s finances and on evidence said to show abusive and bullying conduct. [Para 92]

Defendant's Arguments

• The material before the sheriff was consistent with a broadly shared-care arrangement, and even if the Plaintiff’s version were accepted, the outcome would not have changed. [Para 65]
• The Defendant’s solicitor was entitled, and professionally obliged, to minute for decree; there was no duty to disclose the Plaintiff’s request for more time, and Hafthorsdotir was distinguishable. [Para 94][Para 97]
• The Plaintiff knew of the proceedings and the deadline but failed to defend because she could not find a solicitor; even so, her excuse could only carry limited weight. [Para 88][Para 98]

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first held that the agreed statement of law was not binding and that the real question was whether the whole circumstances justified reduction, with the Jandoo-style factors serving as relevant considerations. [Para 39][Para 40][Para 41]

On separation, the court found that 4 October 2021 was a defensible and, on the evidence, correct date, and that there was no basis for saying the sheriff had been misled on the merits of the divorce. [Para 53][Para 54][Para 56]

On Child M, the court accepted that false child-related information could matter in principle, but held that the affidavits did not mislead the sheriff into granting decree and that a broadly 50:50 arrangement was likely the de facto position. [Para 68][Para 71][Para 72]

On financial provision, the court found no basis for saying the Plaintiff had even a colourable claim, no evidence of significant undisclosed matrimonial property, and no realistic prospect that recalling the decree would uncover anything material. [Para 74][Para 83][Para 85][Para 102][Para 106]

On the failure to defend, the court accepted that the Plaintiff had language, illness, and solicitor-finding difficulties, but held that this explanation was only partial and did not outweigh the weakness of the substantive case for reduction. [Para 88][Para 89][Para 98][Para 103]

Balancing all factors, the court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to reduce the decree merely to give the Plaintiff more time to investigate speculative financial recovery. [Para 100][Para 106]

Holding and Implications

ABSOLVITOR GRANTED. The court sustained the Defendant’s second and third pleas-in-law, repelled the Plaintiff’s pleas, and granted decree of absolvitor in favour of the Defendant; it also found no expenses due to or by either party. [Para 106] The practical effect was that the divorce decree stood, and the Plaintiff did not obtain a rehearing on financial provision. [Para 106] No new precedent was set beyond the court’s application of existing principles. [Para 40][Para 41]