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Green, R. v

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Jul 15, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 27 March 2024, the Defendant attacked Victim A and Victim B at an underground station with a knife, inflicting multiple stab wounds on both men; he then grabbed Victim C in a lift before leaving the station with the weapon. [Para 43][Para 44][Para 46] The Defendant was later convicted by a jury of two counts of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, one count of possession of a bladed article in a public place, and one count of assault by beating, and was acquitted of alternative counts of attempted murder and sexual assault. [Para 36] He was sentenced to an extended determinate sentence of 16 years, consisting of 11 years’ custody and five years’ extended licence, with no separate penalty for the bladed-article offence and a concurrent three-month sentence for the assault. [Para 37] The Applicant then sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentences as unduly lenient, and leave was granted on the basis that the judge had wrongly categorised harm on the wounding counts. [Para 40]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the injuries suffered by Victim A and Victim B were properly classified as category 1 harm under the Sentencing Council guideline for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. [Para 86][Para 95][Para 98][Para 103][Para 111]
  2. Whether intended and foreseeable harm, including the seriousness of the knife attacks and the acquittal on attempted murder, affected the harm assessment under section 63 of the Sentencing Act 2020. [Para 113][Para 114][Para 122][Para 138][Para 150][Para 179][Para 181]
  3. Whether the original sentence of 11 years’ custody with a five-year extended licence was unduly lenient, and what sentence properly reflected totality. [Para 116][Para 124][Para 182][Para 185][Para 186][Para 194]

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Applicant said this was a terrifying, unprovoked episode of gratuitous violence, and that the judge wrongly placed both wounding offences in harm category 2 rather than category 1. [Para 111][Para 112]
  • He argued that the injuries to both Victim A and Victim B were life-threatening or particularly grave, or at least that the injuries the Defendant intended to cause were exceptionally serious for section 63 purposes. [Para 113][Para 114]
  • He further submitted that the court should increase the sentence to reflect the fact that there were two attacks, and that a proper total sentence would have been about 18 years’ custody with a five-year extended licence. [Para 115][Para 116]

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant submitted that the sentencing judge had conducted a careful exercise after presiding over the trial, and that appellate interference should be slow. [Para 119][Para 120]
  • He argued that there was no evidence the injuries were actually life-threatening, only that they might have become so, which kept the cases in category 2. [Para 121]
  • He said it was wrong to increase harm on the basis of an intention to cause life-threatening injury when he had been acquitted of attempted murder. [Para 122]
  • He also contended that the judge had already made the appropriate uplift for two attacks and had properly considered totality. [Para 123]
  • In any event, he argued that even if harm were raised to category 1, the 11-year custodial term would still fall within the relevant range and was not unduly lenient. [Para 124]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v O'Bryan [2021] EWCA Crim 1472; [2022] 1 Cr App R(S) 53 Interpreted the guideline on harm; category 1 is reserved for exceptional seriousness and “life-threatening” does not cover every wound that might lead to death. [Para 154][Para 155] The court relied on it as the starting point for construing the guideline and then distinguished later authorities on the facts before it. [Para 154][Para 155][Para 156]
R v McGowan [2023] EWCA Crim 247 Endorsed the approach in R v O'Bryan. [Para 156] The court treated it as confirming the earlier interpretive guidance on category 1 harm. [Para 156]
R v Dixon [2023] EWCA Crim 280; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 31 Held that category 1 harm requires injuries actually caused to be particularly grave or life-threatening; risk alone is insufficient. [Para 157] The court contrasted Victim A’s injuries with Dixon, holding that the medical evidence here showed actual life-threatening injury rather than a mere risk. [Para 170][Para 171]
R v Kelly [2024] EWCA Crim 1177 Confirmed that foreseeable life-threatening risk goes to culpability rather than automatically making harm category 1. [Para 159] The court noted the distinction but explained that, under the current guideline, intended or foreseeable harm is considered within the harm assessment. [Para 179][Para 180]
Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (R v Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 Section 36 references are brought to avoid gross error and unduly lenient sentencing. [Para 161] The court reminded itself that appellate intervention requires a sentence to be not merely lenient but unduly lenient, and that the threshold is high. [Para 161]
R v Mohammed Arfan [2022] EWCA Crim 1416 Sentencing is an art, not a science, and leniency alone is not enough. [Para 161] The court used it to reinforce restraint before interfering with a sentence. [Para 161]
R v X, Y and Z [2026] EWCA Crim 845 Identified only rare cases in which reference proceedings might justify additional mitigation. [Para 190] The court rejected the Defendant’s reliance on any such allowance, saying this was not one of those rare cases. [Para 190]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reminding itself that section 36 references exist to correct gross error and preserve confidence in sentencing, but that the hurdle for intervention is high. [Para 161]

As to Victim A, the court focused on the medical evidence showing haemopneumothorax and pneumothorax, with a consultant concluding that without immediate intervention the injuries could have led to respiratory failure and death. [Para 169][Para 170] It held that this was sufficient to make the injuries life-threatening, because the relevant question was the seriousness of the injuries actually suffered, not a hypothetical chain of contingent events. [Para 171] The court also rejected the judge’s reliance on Victim A’s later physical recovery, holding that later improvement did not alter the fact that the original injuries were life-threatening. [Para 173]

As to Victim B, the court accepted the expert evidence that the injuries were extremely serious but not actually life-threatening, and that life-threatening harm had been avoided by chance. [Para 175][Para 176] It agreed that there was no proper basis for going behind that professional conclusion on actual harm. [Para 177][Para 178]

The court then considered intended and foreseeable harm under section 63 and the current guideline. [Para 179] It held that, when Victim B’s actual injuries, the risk of greater harm, and the intended and foreseeable harm were considered together, category 1 was also appropriate for that count, notwithstanding the acquittal on attempted murder. [Para 180][Para 181]

Because both wounding counts should have been treated as category 1A offences, the original 11-year custodial term was materially too low, especially when totality for two section 18 offences and the assault on Victim C was taken into account. [Para 182][Para 183][Para 184][Para 185] The court accepted the judge’s aggravating and mitigating findings, but concluded that the minimum sentence reflecting totality was 18 years’ custody. [Para 189][Para 190][Para 191][Para 193][Para 194]

Holding and Implications

The reference was allowed in part: the sentences on the two wounding counts were quashed and replaced with extended sentences of 23 years each, comprising 18 years’ custody and five years’ extended licence, while the concurrent sentence for the assault on Victim C was left unchanged. [Para 195] The practical effect was a substantial increase in the custodial term, and the opinion applied existing sentencing authorities to the facts rather than announcing a new rule. [Para 194][Para 195]