- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bridgen v Hancock
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerned a libel claim arising from a tweet posted by the Appellant on 11 January 2023, in which he denounced a tweet by the Respondent as “antisemitic,” and the Respondent sued only in respect of that term. [Para 27][Para 28][Para 34][Para 35] The judge below held that the complained-of statement was defamatory at common law and that the first two conditions of honest opinion were satisfied, but she refused to dispose of the case summarily because she considered the remaining issues under section 3(4) and section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 2013 to require trial. [Para 53][Para 57][Para 62][Para 63] The Appellant then appealed the refusal to grant summary judgment and to strike out the Respondent’s Reply. [Para 62][Para 63]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under section 3(4) of the Defamation Act 2013, an honest person could have held the opinion that the Respondent’s tweet was antisemitic on the basis of the facts relied on. [Para 45][Para 66][Para 88][Para 96]
- Whether third-party reactions, the Doctors’ Letter, or external definitions of antisemitism were relevant to the objective honesty question. [Para 109][Para 111][Para 125][Para 141][Para 156][Para 159]
- Whether, under section 3(5), the Respondent had a viable case that the Appellant did not genuinely hold the opinion expressed, including whether objective unreasonableness, motive, or recklessness could establish dishonesty. [Para 196][Para 199][Para 204][Para 213][Para 237]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant argued that the tweet plainly fell within the statutory defence of honest opinion and that summary judgment should therefore be entered in his favour without trial. [Para 28][Para 62][Para 106]
- He contended that the objective honesty question had to be answered by the court from the tweet’s content and context, not by reference to what other people thought or said. [Para 127][Para 130][Para 137]
- He argued that the Doctors’ Letter and IHRA-based material were irrelevant to the statutory test, that objective unreasonableness could not establish lack of genuine belief, and that the Respondent had no sufficient pleaded case under section 3(5). [Para 139][Para 141][Para 152][Para 159][Para 216][Para 220][Para 225][Para 237]
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent argued that readers would understand the Appellant’s tweet to mean that he was, as a matter of fact, an antisemite. [Para 49][Para 53]
- He maintained that the objective honesty issue needed fuller evidential exploration, including evidence of third-party reactions and the Doctors’ Letter, and that those materials could support the proposition that the opinion was not one an honest person could hold. [Para 109][Para 112][Para 116][Para 140]
- He also contended that the Appellant’s motive, the language of the tweet, the absence of a truth plea, and an alleged wider animus were enough to justify a section 3(5) case and to require the matter to go to trial. [Para 196][Para 199][Para 204][Para 222][Para 232][Para 233]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Riley v Murray [2022] EWCA Civ 1146, [2023] EMLR 3 | The “objective honesty” requirement under section 3(4), and the distinct role of section 3(5) as the dishonesty disqualification. | The court used it to frame both statutory questions and to reject reliance on the defendant’s subjective purposes when assessing objective honesty. [Para 66][Para 139][Para 186] |
| Turner v MGM Pictures Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 449 | The hypothetical commentator may be irrational, stupid, obstinate, or prejudiced and still be “honest.” | The court relied on it to show that honest opinion protects strongly held and even irrational views. [Para 70][Para 191] |
| Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743 | The “crank” may still honestly express an opinion. | Cited to reinforce the breadth of the honest opinion defence. [Para 70] |
| Telnikoff v Matusevich [1992] 2 AC 343 | Protected opinion may be “prejudiced.” | Used to underline that prejudice alone does not defeat honest opinion. [Para 71] |
| Tse Wai Chun Paul v Cheng [2001] EMLR 777 | Objective honesty; pertinence; honesty rather than fairness or moderation. | The court relied heavily on Lord Nicholls’ formulation in explaining both the statutory defence and the dishonesty disqualification. [Para 73][Para 76][Para 178][Para 186] |
| Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 | The critic may “dip his pen in gall” in legitimate criticism. | Used as part of the explanation of the breadth of protected comment. [Para 78] |
| Branson v Bower [2002] QB 737 | Objective honesty is assessed against the pleaded and undisputed facts; summary judgment is possible where no jury could conclude otherwise. | The court contrasted the present case with Branson and relied on it when discussing pleading and proof of dishonesty. [Para 79][Para 82][Para 86][Para 190][Para 126] |
| Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 842 | Reaffirmed the objective honesty approach and described it as “pertinence.” | Cited as Supreme Court authority endorsing the Cheng analysis. [Para 80][Para 185] |
| Sussex v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2023] EWHC 3120 (KB) | A summary of the relevant legal principles on honest opinion and summary disposal. | The judge below relied on it, and the Court of Appeal referred to that reliance when reviewing her approach. [Para 107] |
| Iqbal v Geo TV Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 1566, [2025] KB 357 | Summary determination can reduce chilling effects and litigation cost in defamation cases. | Cited to support deciding the objective honesty issue at this stage rather than deferring it to trial. [Para 143] |
| Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 | Explained the orthodox malice principle in qualified privilege. | Used as a starting point for the distinction between malice and the statutory dishonesty disqualification. [Para 178] |
| Somerville v Hawkins (1851) 10 CB 583 | A plea of malice must raise a probability of malice and be more consistent with its existence than its non-existence. | Cited in explaining the heightened pleading and proof standard for dishonesty/malice allegations. [Para 191] |
| Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 449 | Each allegation of malice must be separately analysed; equivocal evidence is valueless. | Used alongside Somerville to show the strict approach to dishonesty-type allegations. [Para 191] |
| Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 | Dishonesty is not inferred from facts equally consistent with negligence; allegations must be particularised. | The court used it to support the requirement for a cogent and particularised case of dishonesty. [Para 192][Para 194] |
| Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 | Fraudulent misrepresentation principles concerning falsity and recklessness. | The court rejected its use to convert recklessness into a basis for defeating honest opinion. [Para 214][Para 229] |
| Baturina v Times Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 308, [2011] 1 WLR 1526 | Doubts about admitting evidence of what readers with special knowledge thought a statement meant. | Cited to support the conclusion that third-party views are not admissible to decide objective honesty. [Para 133] |
| Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 1 AC 115 | Considered on a separate parliamentary privilege point. | The court held that the Respondent’s reliance on it was misplaced because it concerned Article 9, not the honesty of the later tweet. [Para 227] |
| R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52 | Also concerned Article 9 and parliamentary privilege. | Used only to reject the Respondent’s analogy about repeating a parliamentary statement outside Parliament. [Para 227] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Section 3(4): Objective honesty
The court held that section 3(4) asks a purely objective question: whether an honest person could have held the opinion on the stated facts, not whether the Appellant in fact held it. [Para 66][Para 68] It rejected the idea that the opinions of third parties could be used as a yardstick, explaining that the issue is ordinarily one for judicial judgment on common knowledge and context, not evidence of what other people thought. [Para 125][Para 130][Para 134][Para 137]
The court also held that the Doctors’ Letter and the IHRA material were not admissible aids to deciding the objective question, because antisemitism is an ordinary-language concept with contested boundaries and no agreed authoritative definition. [Para 140][Para 141][Para 156][Para 159]
Applying that approach, the court concluded that the uncontroversial facts about the Holocaust, the pandemic, and the vaccine rollout were relevant and admissible as part of the factual basis for the opinion, and that an honest person could regard the comparison as antisemitic in character. [Para 152][Para 154][Para 169][Para 170] The court therefore held that no trial was needed on section 3(4) and that the judge’s contrary reasoning was legally flawed. [Para 172][Para 174][Para 176]
Section 3(5): Dishonesty disqualification
The court explained that section 3(5) requires proof that the defendant did not genuinely hold the opinion; objective unreasonableness alone cannot establish that. [Para 186][Para 188][Para 216] It held that the judge had applied too low a standard by treating the Respondent’s case as merely requiring fuller evidence, rather than asking whether the pleaded facts raised a probability of dishonesty. [Para 218][Para 220]
The court rejected the Respondent’s pleaded points on the IHRA definition, the absence of a truth plea, the continued publication of the tweet, the Appellant’s education, the parliamentary context, the wording of the tweet, and supposed wider animus, holding that none of them made it probable that the Appellant did not believe what he said. [Para 221][Para 228][Para 232][Para 233] It further held that recklessness is not enough under section 3(5), because the statutory test is whether the opinion was actually held, not whether the defendant was indifferent to its truth. [Para 224][Para 229][Para 230]
The court also held that the Appellant bore no evidential burden to explain his state of mind unless and until the Respondent had advanced a sufficiently cogent case to answer. [Para 234][Para 235][Para 237]
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed. The Reply was struck out and summary judgment was entered for the Appellant. [Para 239][Para 240] The immediate consequence was that the claim did not proceed to trial on the honest opinion defence or the section 3(5) issue, and the court’s reasoning clarified that third-party opinions are not admissible to decide objective honesty and that objective unreasonableness alone does not prove dishonesty. [Para 172][Para 176][Para 137][Para 159][Para 237]
Alert