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CHA, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an Attorney General's Reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 seeking leave to refer for being unduly lenient the minimum term set for the Defendant following conviction for murder and related offences. After a trial the Defendant (aged 52 at the time) was convicted on 12 December 2025 of five offences: murder, cruelty to a child, perverting the course of justice, and two counts of perjury. On 16 January 2026 the trial judge, Judge Ellenbogen, sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 27 years and 321 days (calculated by deducting time on remand from a term of 29 years and six months). Concurrent determinate sentences were imposed for the associated offences; those determinate sentences were not challenged in this Reference.
The factual matrix (agreed and taken from the Final Reference) is that the Defendant murdered his wife (the Victim) in June 2016 in the family home, having planned the killing, researched methods and substances beforehand, involved and manipulated his older child (Child 1) to facilitate the attack and its cover-up, inflicted a wound on Child 1 to support a false narrative, and for many years thereafter maintained false accounts including at criminal and family proceedings. Child 1 retracted the false account in 2021–2023, leading to a re-trial and conviction in December 2025. The Solicitor General brought the present Reference challenging the length of the minimum term as unduly lenient.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the minimum term of 27 years and 321 days set by the trial judge was unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
- Whether the trial judge's choice of the 30-year starting point under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, and the judge's subsequent approach to aggravating factors (including involvement and exploitation of Child 1 and Child 2 and the related offences), failed to reflect the full seriousness of the offending so as to require further uplift to the minimum term.
- Whether applying an additional uplift to reflect associated offences (child cruelty, perverting the course of justice, perjury) would involve impermissible double counting of features already reflected in the chosen starting point.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney General's Submissions (represented by Attorney Little)
- The minimum term was too low and therefore unduly lenient.
- The circumstances of the murder in a domestic context with children present qualified it as a murder of particularly high seriousness meriting a 30-year starting point under Schedule 21, and the judge should have further uplifted the minimum term to reflect the additional and continuing offending (child cruelty, perverting the course of justice, perjury) rather than treating the 30-year starting point as exhaustive.
Defendant's Submissions (represented by Attorney Grahame)
- There were two lawful ways to reach an appropriate minimum term: (i) adopt a 15-year starting point and apply very substantial aggravation for the murder and associated offences, or (ii) adopt the 30-year starting point after concluding the murder was particularly high in seriousness and not then add further uplift for the same features.
- The trial judge properly chose the second route and correctly avoided double counting by declining to further aggravate the 30-year starting point for factors already reflected in that choice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41 | Approach to References under s36: court may only increase sentences it concludes were unduly lenient; unduly lenient means outside the range a judge could reasonably consider; court has discretion whether to exercise powers. | The court applied this framework to determine whether the minimum term fell outside the reasonable range and whether it should exercise its discretion to increase it. |
| Attorney General's Reference (No 132 of 2001) (R v Johnson) [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 | Purpose of s36: to correct gross error, allay widespread public concern, and preserve public confidence where sentencing departs substantially from norms. | The court invoked this authority to confirm the limited and exceptional role of a Reference and the circumstances in which intervention is appropriate. |
| R v Peters and others [2005] EWCA Crim 605; [2005] 2 Cr App R(S) 101 | Guidance that the court will examine the specified period and will not interfere with the minimum term unless manifestly excessive or wrong in principle; sentencing is an art and appellate interference is limited. | The court relied on this to emphasise deference to the trial judge's assessment and that interference requires the sentence to fall outside the proper range. |
| R v Jones and others [2005] EWCA Crim 3115; [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 19 | Guidance on fixing minimum terms for murders of "exceptionally high" or "particularly high" seriousness; the starting points in Schedule 21 are broad; avoid double counting factors that have dictated the choice of starting point. | The court applied the principles about starting points and double counting to assess whether the trial judge had adequately reflected all aggravating features and whether further uplift was appropriate. |
| Sullivan | Referenced as part of prior Court of Appeal practice guiding sentencing and assessment of minimum terms (no full citation in the provided opinion). | Used as background authority alongside Peters to underline established appellate restraint and approach to minimum term assessment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reminding itself of the limited scope of s36 References: intervention is appropriate only where a sentence is unduly lenient, i.e. outside the range which the judge, applying their mind to relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate, and having regard to established authorities emphasizing deference to the trial judge.
The court reviewed the trial judge's sentencing exercise. The judge had adopted the 30-year starting point under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, concluding that the combination of features rendered the murder particularly high in seriousness. The judge expressly listed the factors relied upon (significant premeditation and planning; grotesque involvement of Child 1; physical injury to Child 1; causing Child 2 to believe a false narrative; domestic context; drug use; tracing and tracking of the Victim; emotional manipulation including threats of self-harm; enquiries about injuring the new partner; and prolonged perjury and perverting the course of justice delaying justice).
Although the judge treated those features as justifying a 30-year starting point and rejected a whole-life order, the appellate court considered whether the judge had fully reflected the exceptional degree of exploitation, suborning and ongoing manipulation of the Defendant's children — conduct not explicitly envisaged by Schedule 21's non-exhaustive lists. The court found the exploitation and sustained abuse of Child 1 (recruiting the child to participate in and then to conceal the murder, injuring the child with the murder weapon, and repeated reinforcement of the false narrative over years and across court proceedings) represented a distinct and particularly grievous harm that had not been sufficiently reflected in the final minimum term.
Applying the authorities on starting points and the risk of double counting, the court concluded that, while deference to the judge was warranted, the totality of the offending (murder together with the prolonged, deliberate exploitation and consequent damage to the two children and the associated obstructive conduct) required a further uplift to the minimum term. The court therefore exercised its discretion under section 36 to increase the minimum term.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court granted leave and concluded that the minimum term was unduly lenient. It QUASHED the minimum term of 27 years and 321 days and REPLACED it with a minimum term of 31 years and 321 days.
Implications: The direct effect is the increase of the Defendant's minimum term for the life sentence to 31 years and 321 days; the determinate sentences for the associated offences remain unaffected. The decision reflects the court's view that the exceptional exploitation and long-term manipulation of the Defendant's children warranted further uplift. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, general rule beyond its application to the particular facts; it addresses the application of established sentencing principles to these facts.
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