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Lissan Coal Company [Ireland] Ltd and Anor v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Ors (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
Jul 14, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs challenged decisions of Company A made on 21 June 2024: (i) approval of the Blanchardstown to City Centre Core Bus Corridor Scheme under s.51 of the Roads Act 1993 ("the S.51 Approval"); and (ii) confirmation of the associated compulsory purchase order ("the CPO"). The Plaintiffs alleged that certain "Bus Gates" in the Scheme on The Road would deprive their Filling Station business of almost all passing trade and render it commercially unviable, sought certiorari on multiple grounds, and advanced related constitutional and compensation arguments. The State was joined. Judgment was delivered on 30 April 2026. In that judgment Judge Holland quashed the S.51 Approval on Ground 6 (EIA and planning analysis as to the effect on the Filling Station), rejected most other grounds (including Grounds 5 and 8 and the challenge to the defence of statutory authority), upheld Ground 7 in part (insufficient reasons for refusal of an oral hearing) but declined certiorari relief on that ground, and rejected Ground 3 (interpretation of s.213(2)(a) PDA 2000). A final orders ruling was delivered 14 July 2026, including a remittal limited to the Bus Gates' effect on the Filling Station, dismissal of the challenge to the CPO, a declaratory finding about inadequate reasons for refusal of an oral hearing, an extension under s.217(6A) PDA 2000 in specified terms, an order as to costs (Company A to pay 70% of the Plaintiffs' costs), and refusal to certify a right of appeal under s.50A(7) PDA 2000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the S.51 Approval and the CPO were lawfully made in light of the Bus Gates' effect on the Plaintiffs' Filling Station (EIA and planning grounds).
  2. Whether the phrase "any easement, way-leave, water-right or other right over or in respect of any land" in s.213(2)(a) PDA 2000 includes a public right of way (i.e. whether restriction/interference with a public right of way is an "acquisition of land").
  3. If the answer to issue 2 is affirmative, whether restriction or interference with a public right of way must be identified in a CPO rather than authorised by s.51 approval as a traffic-management measure.
  4. Whether, if the S.51 Approval is quashed, the associated CPO may lawfully remain in force or be extended pending fresh determination of the remitted S.51 application.
  5. Whether the High Court should certify a point of law for appeal under s.50A(7) PDA 2000 (statutory test: point of law of exceptional public importance and desirability in the public interest).
  6. Final relief issues including remittal terms, declaratory relief on the oral hearing ground, effect of certiorari on the CPO, and costs.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Bus Gates in the Scheme would deprive the Plaintiffs' Filling Station of passing trade and render it commercially unviable; that effect was characterised in the EIAR as "Negative, Very Significant and Long-Term".
  • That restriction or interference with the public right of way on The Road constituted an "acquisition of land" within s.213(2)(a) PDA 2000 and therefore had to be identified in the CPO (and attract compensation avenues).
  • The Scheme and/or CPO represented an unjust attack on constitutional property rights and certain statutory provisions were unconstitutional or contrary to ECHR Article 1 of Protocol 1; sought declaratory and injunctive relief and certiorari quashing the Impugned Decisions on multiple grounds.
  • Sought a certificate to appeal centered on the statutory-construction issue in s.213(2)(a) and related questions (three proposed questions for certification).

Respondents' Arguments (Company A, Company B, The State)

  • The restriction or interference with a public right of way is not an "acquisition of land" within s.213(2)(a); s.213 must be read consistently with other provisions (including express extinguishment powers) and practical workability.
  • The Plaintiffs' trial case had been confined to persons "specially damaged"; the proposed certification question sought to expand that case impermissibly to a general rule requiring CPOs for all interferences with public rights of way.
  • The Scheme is of high public importance and delay caused by appeal would be against the public interest; novelty of the point does not equate to uncertainty warranting certification.
  • Even if the statutory interpretation point were resolved for the Plaintiffs, it would not be dispositive of the proceedings because the Judgment also rested on alternative and discretionary bases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waterville Fisheries Development Ltd v Aquaculture Licenses Appeals Board, [2014] IEHC 38 Authority relevant to requirement for an oral hearing and remedies where reasons for refusing an oral hearing are challenged. Influenced the rejection of certiorari relief on the oral hearing ground (Ground 7) despite finding inadequate reasons.
Crofton Buildings & Anor -v- An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 12 Principles on relief, remittal and the scope of remedies following quashing of administrative decisions. Supported the court's provisional view that a proportionate, limited remittal (confined to bus gates' effect) was permissible.
Doyle v An Coimisiún Pleanála and On Tower [2026] IEHC 207, [2026] 3 JIC 2606 Emphasises legislative intention that planning cases generally be confined to the High Court; weight against certification. Cited to reinforce the statutory test and the presumption against certifying appeals in planning cases.
Cork Harbour Alliance for a Safe Environment v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 231 (CHASE) Support for limited appellate intervention in planning cases. Referenced as part of the body of caselaw informing certification principles.
Monkstown Road Residents' Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 9 (MRRA) Summarises certification principles: exceptional public importance and desirability in public interest; caution on certification. Used to frame the statutory criteria and the evaluative approach to certification.
Glancré Teoranta v. An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 250 Example of caselaw developing principles on certification and judicial review. Cited as part of the broader authority informing certification analysis.
S.A. v The Minister for Justice and Equality, (No 2) [2016] IEHC 646 Example of caselaw on points of law and certification. Cited in the discussion of the body of authority relevant to certification criteria.
Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2025] IEHC 178 Principles on novelty, uncertainty, and the finality role of High Court decisions in planning matters. Quoted to explain that absence of appellate authority does not per se create uncertainty warranting certification.
Power v An Bord Pleanála & Knocknamona Windfarm [2024] IEHC 247 Authority for a holistic analysis focused on s.50A(7) criteria. Supported the court's holistic evaluative approach to whether certification should be granted.
Heavey v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IECA 17 Emphasises s.50A(11) limit: appellate jurisdiction confined to the certified point of law. Applied to reject that the certified question could encompass a separate challenge to the exercise of discretion in refusing relief.
Cooper v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 278 Reinforces jurisdictional limits on appellate review to the certified point of law. Used to support the proposition that certification must precisely identify the point of law.
Freeney v. An Bord Pleanála [No. 2] [2025] IEHC 36 Requirement that the point of law be precisely stated for certification. Cited to support the need for precision in the certification question.
Stanley v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2022] IEHC 671 Requirement of precise identification of the point of law for appellate jurisdiction. Referenced in the court's analysis of stateability and jurisdictional limits.
Massey v An Bord Pleanála (No.4) [2025] IEHC 309 Public interest and risk of delay in important infrastructure projects weigh against certification. Applied in assessing public interest in the Scheme and the impact of delay.
Moss v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Lightsource [2026] IEHC 175 Nature of project and risks of delay as factors in public interest assessment. Relied upon in weighing public interest against certification.
Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 3 Public interest considerations in renewable/infrastructure projects. Cited to illustrate how project nature informs public interest analysis.
Halpin v An Bord Pleanála & Greenfield [2020] IEHC 218 Leave to appeal may be refused where allowing appeal would further delay important development. Invoked in assessing the undesirability of delay to the Scheme.
Callaghan v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 493 Authorities on novelty and uncertainty in statutory interpretation and certification. Cited in the court's discussion of novelty versus uncertainty.
Maguire T/A Frank Pratt & Sons (No. 2) [2023] IEHC 209 Authorities on the weight to be given to novelty in certification decisions. Used in the court's evaluation of whether the novel point created uncertainty warranting certification.
Phoenix Rock Enterprises v An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2023] IESCDET 97 As authority referenced concerning the finality and precedential effect of High Court decisions. Footnoted in relation to Stapleton's exposition on finality and uncertainty.
Fursey Maguire v Meath County Council [2023] IESCDET 96 Similar treatment as to finality and precedent in absence of appellate decisions. Footnoted alongside Phoenix Rock in the discussion of Stapleton.
Waltham Abbey Residents & Pembroke Road Association v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30 Workability principle of statutory interpretation; legislative intent not to produce impractical results. Invoked by respondents and considered in determining whether s.213 should be interpreted to require CPOs for all interferences with public rights of way.
Pat O'Donnell & Co v Dublin City Council & Uniphar [2026] IESC 36 Workability and statutory interpretation principles. Referenced in relation to avoiding interpretations that produce impractical consequences.
Dowling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 249 Admissions by parties cannot entrap the court into an incorrect statutory interpretation. Applied to reject reliance on an alleged admission by Company B as determinative of s.213's meaning.
Wildtree Hotels Ltd. v. Harrow L.B.C. [2001] 2 A.C. 1 Commentary on the uncertainty of the "special damage" rule in public nuisance. Quoted to illustrate the practical difficulty and scope for dispute in applying a special-damage rule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded as follows:

  • The core factual finding (unchallenged) was that the Bus Gates would deprive the Plaintiffs' Filling Station of almost all passing trade and likely render it commercially unviable.
  • On EIA and decision-making: the EIAR characterised the Filling Station's closure as "Negative, Very Significant and Long-Term"; the Inspector's contrary view (that the Filling Station could continue to operate) was, in the court's view, a material error of fact; the Commission accepted the Inspector's characterisation, rendering its EIA decision irrational and unfair to the Plaintiffs. For that reason the S.51 Approval was quashed on Ground 6.
  • Viewed alternatively as planning analysis, the S.51 Approval likewise failed for the same reasons and was quashed.
  • The court considered remedy: a proportionate certiorari and remittal limited to the Bus Gates' effect on the Filling Station was appropriate rather than a full reopening of the entire Scheme; Crofton was relied upon to justify a narrow remedial remit.
  • Ground 7 (reasons for refusal of an oral hearing) succeeded on the adequacy of reasons but, having found no substantive requirement for an oral hearing in the circumstances and in light of Waterville Fisheries, the court rejected certiorari relief on that ground while reserving declaratory relief.
  • Grounds alleging unjust attack on constitutional property rights (including Grounds 5 and 8 and the challenge to the statutory defence of authority) were rejected: the court found no unjust attack on constitutional rights and held the Plaintiffs may seek compensation, if any, under common law/statute; recourse to the Constitution would not avail.
  • On s.213(2)(a) PDA 2000 (Ground 3): the court concluded that the phrase "any easement, way-leave, water-right or other right over or in respect of any land" does not encompass a public right of way; the concept of "acquisition" of a public right of way is incongruous; statutory amendments allowing extinguishment of public rights of way post-acquisition indicate that s.213 was not intended to treat restriction/interference with public rights of way as an "acquisition of land". Consequently, restriction by Bus Gates was not an "acquisition of land" requiring listing in the CPO.
  • On certification for appeal under s.50A(7): the court applied the statutory test (point of law of exceptional public importance; appeal desirable in the public interest) and related caselaw. It found the Plaintiffs' proposed Question 1 expanded the trial case (removing the "special damage" limitation) and would not be dispositive of the proceedings because the Judgment rested on other grounds and discretionary considerations. The public importance of the Scheme and the prejudice of delay, novelty without relevant legal uncertainty, and limits on the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction under s.50A(11) all weighed against certification. The application for a certificate was refused.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court quashed the S.51 Approval insofar as it authorised the two Bus Gates on The Road and remitted that limited question to Company A for reconsideration; the court dismissed the Plaintiffs' challenge to the CPO; the court declared inadequate reasons were given for refusal of an oral hearing; and the court refused to certify any question for appeal under s.50A(7) PDA 2000.

Implications:

  • The limited quashing means the Scheme must be reconsidered by Company A as to the Bus Gates' impact on the Plaintiffs' Filling Station; the remainder of the Scheme and the confirmed CPO remain operative.
  • The court granted a time extension under s.217(6A) PDA 2000 in specified terms and ordered Company A to pay 70% of the Plaintiffs' costs; liberty to apply was preserved.
  • No certificate to appeal was granted; the court refused to refer the statutory-interpretation question to the Court of Appeal as not sufficiently dispositive and not satisfying the statutory test. The court did not purport to lay down an expansive new precedent beyond its reasons in the judgment.