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Windhorst v ADS Securities LLC

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Jul 17, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent obtained a judgment against Company A for approximately €27.2 million plus interest and costs. The Appellant is the controlling mind and beneficial owner of Company A. From December 2022 onward the Respondent sought information about Company A's means under CPR Part 71. Multiple Part 71 orders and consent orders were made (including by Judge Cook, Judge Eastman, Judge Stevens, Judge Pelling, Judge Marzec, Judge Alleyne and Judge Fine), but the Appellant repeatedly failed to attend examinations and comply with orders. On 19 August 2025 the Respondent applied for contempt for the Appellant's failure to attend a Part 71 hearing on 6 June 2025. The Appellant served evidence late (on 27 March 2026) and did not attend the March 2026 hearing before Judge Dias, being represented by Attorney West.

On 30 March 2026 Judge Dias found the Appellant in contempt and ordered committal for 18 months' imprisonment suspended on conditions, including a disclosure obligation to produce documents 14 days before the Examination Hearing. The Appellant appealed the sentencing and conditions. The Court of Appeal (Judges Fraser and Newey) heard the appeal on 2 June 2026 and dismissed it on 2 June 2026, with detailed reasons provided 17 July 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an 18‑month committal for contempt (suspended) was excessive.
  2. Whether the condition requiring the Appellant to produce "all documents in the Defendant's control" relating to means was unfair or impracticable given Company A's insolvency and the breadth of the requirement.
  3. Whether the court had jurisdiction to suspend a committal for contempt on a positive condition not specified in CPR Part 71 (i.e. whether positive conditions of suspension are permissible under the court's inherent jurisdiction and CPR Part 81/71 framework).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Ground 1: The 18‑month term was manifestly excessive and outside the range reasonably open to the court.
  • Ground 2: The requirement to produce "all documents" was unfair because (a) Company A was in Dutch insolvency and the office holder controlled documents, making production impossible; and (b) the term "all documents" was unparticularised and practically impossible given the group's size.
  • Ground 3: The judge had no jurisdiction to impose the fourth condition of suspension because it was not specified in CPR Part 71 (i.e. the court could not impose a positive condition outside rule 71.8).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's separate submissions beyond its reliance on the orders, case law cited by the court and the factual account of non‑compliance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AG v Crossland [2021] 4 WLR 103 Undisputed principles applicable to sentencing in contempt cases. The judge applied Crossland as guiding the assessment of harm/culpability when determining an appropriate sanction.
Michael Ashley v Tony Michael Jimenez [2025] EWHC 557 (Ch) Example of a Part 71 breach case; contemnor subject to suspended sentence and bench warrant issued. Used as a comparative illustration of Part 71 contempt sentencing, but treated as fact‑specific and of limited assistance.
Farrer v Meyer [2022] Costs LR 399 Example of a contempt sentence (committal for six months) and remark that court's patience may be exhausted. Relied on for principle that the court may need to "teach" a contemnor not to trifle with the court; supported seriousness assessment.
Cuciurean v (1) Secretary of State for Transport (2) High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 357 Characterisation of civil contempt as disobedience to an order and procedural context under Part 81. Quoted on the nature of civil contempt and its civil, not criminal, procedural setting; supported discussion of Part 81 and inherent jurisdiction.
R v O'Brien [2014] UKSC 23 [2014] AC 1246 Authority referenced for the nature of contempt and related language. Used to support explanatory passages on contempt terminology and purpose (Lord Toulson cited in Cuciurean extract).
Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 KB 114 Discussion of the conceptual difference between suspended sentences for criminal offences and suspended committals for contempt; retention of common law powers. Accepted that while statute did not provide for suspension in contempt, common law powers permit an effective suspended sentence for committal.
National Highways v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 QB Principles applicable to sanctions for contempt, including (a) available penalties, (b) objectives (punishment, compliance, rehabilitation), and (h) that imprisonment may be suspended on appropriate terms. Adopted as the correct framework for assessing sanction and the permissibility of suspending committal on terms; central to rejecting Ground 3.
Mohamed Saleem Khawaja v Stefanova [2023] EWCA Civ 1201 Warning on limited utility of comparing past cases; focus should be on assessing seriousness in the instant case. Applied to reject argument that other cases demonstrated excessiveness of an 18‑month term; court concentrated on facts here.
Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397 Commentary on language used in contempt authorities and descriptors of contemnors' behaviour. Quoted to support characterisation of the Appellant's conduct as contumacious and to justify the judge's language.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court emphasised the fundamental need to obey court orders and reiterated that contempt findings are made to the criminal standard because they may lead to deprivation of liberty. It reviewed relevant authorities (including National Highways and Crossland) setting out the objectives of contempt sanctions (punishment, securing compliance, rehabilitation) and the factors for assessing culpability and harm.

On Ground 1 the Court found the contempt to be serious: prolonged, deliberate non‑attendance, breach of a voluntary undertaking and a long history of non‑compliance demonstrating disrespect for the court. Applying the sentencing principles, an 18‑month committal was within the reasonable range and not manifestly excessive.

On Ground 2 the Court held that the disclosure condition was not unfair. The Appellant had been previously ordered to produce documents; Part 31 defines control and the temporal adjustment (14 days before the hearing) was not unjustified. The Court noted that the Appellant's contempts had sought to frustrate the enforcement process and that requiring production was appropriate.

On Ground 3 the Court analysed CPR Part 81 (contempt) and Part 71 (examination of judgment debtors). It concluded that Part 71 does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to impose positive conditions when suspending committal for contempt. Part 81 expressly preserves the scope of the court's inherent jurisdiction. The Court therefore held that a positive condition (including production obligations) can validly be imposed as a term of suspension where appropriate and clear.

Overall the Court found no legal error in the judge's exercise of discretion and that the conditions of suspension were sufficiently clear for enforcement.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The Court dismissed the Appellant's appeal on all three grounds, upholding the 18‑month committal for contempt (suspended) and the disclosure condition requiring production of documents not less than 14 days before the Examination Hearing.

Implications: The direct effect is that the sanction and its conditions as imposed by Judge Dias remain in force; the Appellant must comply with the disclosure obligation or face enforcement of the committal. The decision affirms that courts retain inherent jurisdiction to impose positive conditions as terms of suspension in contempt cases and applies established sentencing principles to contempts; the judgment does not purport to create a new general rule beyond those conclusions.