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Griffiths-Fowell, R (On the Application Of) v Birmingham City Council

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Jul 17, 2026

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Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent (a person with multiple physical and mental health disabilities) applied to Company A for homelessness assistance on 30 August 2022 with her brother included as part of her household. Company A accepted a duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 on 24 November 2022. Temporary placements were made in hotel accommodation and later in a property at [Number] Main Street, which Company A later reviewed as unsuitable because it lacked required adaptations for the brother. The Respondent issued judicial review claims challenging Company A's decisions in March 2024 and again in April 2025 seeking a declaration of breach of the main housing duty, an interim mandatory order and a final mandatory order to secure suitable accommodation.

Company A offered a different temporary property at [Number] Main Street (the "maisonette") on 6 May 2025 and works were proposed. An interim mandatory order was granted on 25 June 2025 requiring suitable accommodation by 16 July 2025. Company A later informed the Respondent on 22 September 2025 that its duty under s.193(2) had ceased under s.193(6)(d) on the basis that the Respondent had ceased to occupy the accommodation as her principal home. HHJ Rawlings (High Court) heard the substantive challenge on 8 October 2025 and, by orders dated 21 and 27 November 2025, (i) declared that Company A had been and remained in breach of the s.193(2) duty from 2 July 2024, and (ii) made a final mandatory order requiring Company A to secure suitable accommodation by a specified date. Company A appealed to the Court of Appeal on specified grounds including construction of s.193(6)(d), availability of alternative remedies, and alleged failure to apply public law (judicial review) principles.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court should have entertained judicial review given the availability of alternative statutory remedies (review under s.202 and appeal to the County Court under s.204 and s.204A).
Whether the High Court erred in applying ordinary civil fact-finding rather than public law (judicial review) principles when deciding whether Company A's s.193(2) duty had ceased under s.193(6)(d) and whether offered accommodation was suitable.
Whether s.193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996 should be construed to require that the "accommodation made available" be "suitable" such that vacatur of unsuitable accommodation does not terminate the housing duty.
Whether the judge erred in treating Company A's letter dated 4 June 2025 as an acceptance that the property was unsuitable.
Whether the appeal had become academic in light of changed personal circumstances and communications from the Respondent's lawyers, and whether the Court of Appeal should nevertheless determine the appeal insofar as a declaration remained extant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Company A contended that the High Court should not have proceeded by way of judicial review because the statutory route (s.202 review and s.204/s.204A appeal) was available and appropriate; judicial review is a remedy of last resort.
Company A argued the judge erred by deciding factual suitability matters himself rather than applying the public law standard of whether the authority's decision was one a reasonable authority could make.
Company A submitted s.193(6)(d) does not import a requirement that the "accommodation made available" be suitable, distinguishing s.193(6)(d) from s.193(5) which expressly refers to suitability.
Company A argued the judge wrongly interpreted its 4 June 2025 letter as accepting unsuitability.

Respondent's Arguments

The Respondent maintained judicial review was available and that exceptional circumstances justified its use in this case.
The Respondent contended the accommodation offered was and had been unsuitable for her and her brother and that Company A remained in breach of the s.193(2) duty.
The Respondent disputed Company A's notice that the duty had ceased under s.193(6)(d) and relied on the proposition that the accommodation referred to in s.193(6)(d) must be "suitable" for the duty to cease.
The Respondent's solicitors later informed Company A of changed personal circumstances (no longer seeking to live with her brother) and agreed not to seek restoration of the stayed mandatory order but did not consent to discharge of the declaration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R (Imam) v Croydon London Borough Council [2023] UKSC 45; [2025] AC 335	Limits on making mandatory orders to require compliance with statutory duties where compliance is impossible; discretionary considerations.	Applied as authority that courts should not order compliance where impossible; Court considered this when evaluating whether a mandatory order was appropriate.
Ali v Westminster City Council [1999] 1 WLR 384	County Court then had no jurisdiction to grant injunctions requiring local authorities to provide accommodation; framework for interim remedies prior to statutory amendment.	Used to explain legislative response (insertion of s.204A) and the limitations of county court powers as historically understood.
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450	Discretion to hear academic public law appeals in public interest but exercised sparingly.	Cited as guiding principles on whether an appeal that may have become academic should be heard.
R (Dolan and others) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and another [2020] EWCA Civ 1605; [2021] 1 WLR 2326	Example where Court of Appeal exercised discretion to hear an academic public law appeal in the public interest.	Referenced as an example of exercising discretion to hear academic appeals where public interest warranted it.
R (Glencore Energy UK Limited) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] EWCA Civ 1716; [2017] 4 WLR 213	Principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and courts should have regard to statutory alternatives (the "suitable alternative remedy" principle).	Applied to assess whether the Part 7 statutory review/appeal process was the appropriate route rather than judicial review.
Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 306	Purpose of s.204 to move main strain of homelessness judicial review work to County Courts; challenges under Part 7 generally to be pursued via s.204.	Relied upon to support the proposition that the statutory scheme directs many homelessness disputes to the County Court.
R v Brighton and Hove Council, ex parte Nacion [1999] 31 HLR 1095	Policy that local courts may be better placed to resolve local homelessness challenges.	Referenced in support of statutory allocation of work to County Courts.
Ravichandran v Lewisham London Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2011] PTSR 117	Suitability issues can be reviewed under the Part 7 review/appeal procedures; suitability and reasonableness issues fall within those provisions.	Used to show suitability disputes are matters for review and possible county court appeal.
R (Bano) v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2025] EWCA Civ 92; [2025] 1 WLR 2557	Confirmed Parliament intended s.202/s.204 review/appeal route to be used for decisions listed in s.202(1); exceptional circumstances required to justify judicial review where s.204 was available.	Applied to require exceptional circumstances for judicial review instead of the statutory route; Court found the High Court judge had properly exercised discretion in this case.
Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14	Illustration that courts on an appeal on a point of law apply similar public law principles (irrationality) rather than re-deciding facts.	Referred to when comparing county court review jurisdiction to judicial review principles.
Birmingham City Council v Ali [2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506	Section 206(1): accommodation secured under Part 7 must be "suitable".	Relied on to support the proposition that functions under Part 7 can only be discharged by securing suitable accommodation.
R (Best) v Oxford City Council [2009] EWHC 608 (Admin)	Held s.193(6)(b) could not be relied upon where the accommodation said to have been "made available" was not suitable.	Used to support interpretation that s.193(6) provisions presuppose accommodation made available in accordance with s.206 (i.e. suitable).
R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255	Statutory interpretation principle: words derive meaning from context; read provisions together.	Applied to interpret s.193(6)(d) in the context of s.206 and the Part 7 scheme.
R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28; [2023] 1 WLR 2594	Reinforces contextual approach to statutory interpretation.	Invoked to support the contextual reading of s.193(6)(d).
Sun Life and Ainsbury v. Millington (referenced authorities)	Older authorities on academic appeals (distinguished in Salem).	Distinguished as pertaining to private law, not public law, contexts when considering academic appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal (Judges Singh and Holgate, with Phillips J agreeing) proceeded as follows.

Jurisdiction/Academic appeal: The Court examined whether the appeal was academic. It concluded the appeal was not academic insofar as it challenged the High Court's declaration that Company A had been and remained in breach of the s.193(2) duty because that declaration remained extant and binding; the Court therefore proceeded to consider the substantive grounds of appeal limited to the declaration issue.
Alternative remedy (Grounds 1 and 5): The Court reviewed the statutory scheme (ss.202, 203, 204 and 204A and related provisions) and authorities (notably Glencore, Nipa Begum, Bano). It acknowledged the policy that Part 7 challenges should ordinarily be pursued by review and county court appeal and that judicial review is a remedy of last resort. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the High Court's discretionary decision to proceed with judicial review in the circumstances because Company A had not pleaded or raised the alternative remedy point promptly, failed to serve timely summary grounds of defence, and raised the objection too late (at trial). The Court concluded there was no error in the judge's exercise of discretion and rejected the alternative remedy grounds.
Application of public law principles (Grounds 3 and 6): Company A alleged the judge decided factual issues as if at first instance rather than applying the public law standard (whether the authority's decision was one open to it). The Court read the High Court judgment fairly and concluded that the judge, in substance, applied public law principles. In any event, even if there had been slight lapses in expression, the Court concluded that there was only one reasonable view on the evidence, namely that the property at [Number] Main Street (the maisonette) was not suitable for the Respondent and her brother unless and until remedial works were completed; therefore Company A could not reasonably have concluded it was suitable.
Construction of s.193(6)(d) (Grounds 2 and 4): The Court analysed s.193(6)(d) in its statutory context with s.206, applying orthodox principles of statutory interpretation (O; PACCAR). It concluded that the phrase "accommodation made available" in s.193(6)(d) refers to accommodation made available in accordance with s.206 — that is, "suitable" accommodation. Accordingly, if the accommodation was not suitable, the s.193(2) duty is not discharged by the applicant ceasing to occupy it as their only or principal home. The Court rejected the appellant's contrary construction and also rejected the complaint that the judge erred in reading the 4 June 2025 letter as accepting unsuitability, noting the letter acknowledged lack of accessibility and proposed adaptations and thus could be read as accepting unsuitability in the property's then condition.
Conclusion on merits: Having rejected the grounds of appeal, the Court concluded there was no error in the High Court's finding that Company A had been and remained in breach of its s.193(2) duty from 2 July 2024 and that the interim mandatory order should be made final (subject to other procedural matters described in the record).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal by Company A was dismissed.

Implications: The Court upheld the High Court's declaration that Company A had been and remained in breach of its main housing duty under s.193(2) from 2 July 2024. The Court confirmed that (i) judicial review may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances notwithstanding the statutory review/appeal route and that the High Court did not err in exercising its discretion here; and (ii) s.193(6)(d) must be read in context with s.206 so that the accommodation "made available" must be "suitable" for the duty to cease. The opinion does not purport to create a wider novel precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and discretionary rulings; its direct effect is to affirm the High Court's declaratory relief on the facts of this case.

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