VGT & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Reference by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 seeking leave to refer three sentences as unduly lenient following a jury trial before Judge Bright. After a four-week trial, three youths were convicted: Offender A was convicted of murder of the Victim; Offender B and Offender C were convicted of manslaughter. On 27 February 2026 Offender A was sentenced to detention at His Majesty's Pleasure under section 259 of the Sentencing Act 2020 with a minimum term of 11 years and 42 days. Offender B received 2 years 10 months' detention and Offender C 2 years 4 months' detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), comprising Judge May, Judge Saini and Judge Picton, heard the application on 1 June 2026 and refused leave to refer the sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the minimum term imposed on Offender A (murder) was unduly lenient because the sentencing judge should have moved up from the 13-year starting point in paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 to reflect that Offender A was at the upper end of the 10–14 age range.
2. Whether the custodial sentences for Offender B and Offender C (manslaughter) were unduly lenient because the sentencing judge erred in placing their culpability in category C of the Adult Unlawful Act Manslaughter Guideline rather than category B.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Jarvic (on behalf of the Solicitor General)

• In Offender A's case: relied on BGI and CMB [2024] EWCA Crim 1591 to submit that starting points must not be applied mechanistically and that a child at the top of the 10–14 range should ordinarily attract movement from the 13-year starting point, so the minimum term should have been increased before adjustment for mitigation.
• In Offender B and Offender C's cases: submitted that the correct culpability category under the Adult Manslaughter Guideline was B (an unlawful act carrying a high risk of death or GBH that was or ought to have been obvious), so the judge should have adopted the higher starting point (12 years for an adult) and the resulting youth reductions would still have produced longer sentences.

Offenders' Arguments

• Offender A (represented by Attorney Littler): emphasised significant cognitive limitations, ADHD, developmental immaturity, adverse childhood experiences and victim status for modern slavery; submitted these justified substantial downward adjustment and that the judge properly reflected immaturity in reducing the minimum term.
• Offender B (represented by Attorney Summers) and Offender C (represented by Attorney English): submitted the judge correctly treated culpability as a matter of what was or ought to have been obvious to the particular child in the circumstances; argued the judge was best placed to assess this having heard evidence (including Offender B giving evidence) and that the Adult Guideline must be applied indirectly and bearing in mind the child's maturity and perspective.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by accepting the sentencing judge's factual findings were open to him. On Offender A's challenge the court reviewed the application of Schedule 21 paragraph 5A and the authorities (notably BGI and R v Jones) explaining that starting points are guidance and must not be applied mechanistically. The panel held that BGI does not compel an upward movement of the 13-year starting point for a child at the top of the 10–14 range; children vary in maturity and the judge had lawfully adjusted the starting point for aggravating and mitigating features, including significant mitigation from immaturity, cognitive limitations, adverse childhood experiences and progress on remand. The court found no error in the judge's exercise of discretion and refused leave in respect of Offender A.

As to Offender B and Offender C, the court noted the Adult Manslaughter Guideline applies only indirectly via the Sentencing Children and Young People Guideline (paras 6.45–6.46) and that culpability factors must be considered in light of the offender's youth and maturity. The contested culpability factor—whether a high risk of death or GBH was or ought to have been obvious—cannot be transposed from an adult to a child without assessing what would have been obvious to that particular child. The sentencing judge had heard evidence, observed witnesses (including Offender B giving evidence) and considered the prosecution's submissions about obviousness; he concluded culpability fitted category C. The Court of Appeal found no error in that assessment and refused leave in relation to Offender B and Offender C.

Holding and Implications

REFUSED

Holding: The Court refused leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient. The minimum term for Offender A and the custodial terms for Offender B and Offender C remain unchanged.

Implications: The decision confirms that (a) Schedule 21 starting points for young offenders are guidance to be applied flexibly and do not mandate an upward adjustment solely because an offender is at the upper end of an age range; and (b) where an Adult Guideline is applied indirectly under the Children and Young People Guideline, culpability assessments must account for the child's age, maturity and what would have been obvious to that child. The opinion did not purport to establish any new precedent beyond these applications; the direct effect is that the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge stand.