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Evans, R. v

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Jun 23, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Attorney General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer as unduly lenient the sentence imposed on the Defendant following conviction for one count of doing acts tending or intended to pervert the course of public justice. The Defendant, a serving police constable attached to The Police Station, was convicted after a jury trial in the Crown Court before Judge Griffith on 8 December 2025 and, on 2 March 2026, was sentenced to 12 months' immediate imprisonment and a surcharge.

On 22 March 2023 the Defendant reported being stopped and searched by a person purporting to be a police officer. That account led to a large investigation by Company A and the arrest and temporary custody and suspension of an officer (referred to below as the Innocent Officer) whose vehicle was later shown by data not to have been involved. Subsequent review of CCTV and automatic number plate recognition established that the Defendant's account was false. The Defendant consistently denied making false statements during police interview but was convicted after trial. The Court of Appeal (Judge Dingemans, Judge Garnham and Judge Williams) heard the Attorney General's reference on 23 June 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentence of 12 months' immediate imprisonment imposed on the Defendant was unduly lenient.
  2. If the sentence was unduly lenient, whether leave should be granted and the appropriate increase in sentence consistent with the sentencing guideline for perverting the course of justice.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Brocklehurst (on behalf of the Attorney General)

  • Submitted the offence was category 1A with a starting point of four years' custody.
  • Argued there should have been upward adjustment for two high culpability A factors and two category 1 harm factors.
  • Contended that although mitigation existed, the reduction applied by the trial judge was excessive, rendering the sentence unduly lenient.

Attorney Ponte (on behalf of the Defendant)

  • Accepted the starting point of four years but argued for reduction due to the unusual nature of the case and absence of intent to harm others.
  • Relied on mitigation: troubled upbringing, exceptional progress to become a police officer, loss of employment, diagnosed complex PTSD, and caring responsibilities for stepchildren.
  • Submitted the trial judge conducted the sentencing exercise and that the imposed sentence was not unduly lenient; asked the court to exercise its discretion not to interfere even if leave were granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted the parties' classification of the offending as category 1A under the applicable sentencing guideline (starting point four years; category range two to seven years). At step 1 the judge was entitled to find two culpability A factors: sustained conduct and abuse of position or office (the Defendant being a serving police officer). The Court also found two category 1 harm factors engaged: (a) serious consequences for an innocent party (the Innocent Officer was arrested, kept in custody and suspended) and (b) serious distress to an innocent party and his family (including reputational harm).

The Court explained the guideline process (steps 1–6) and noted the table permits adjustment outside the category range in some cases after consideration of additional factors. The appellate panel concluded the trial judge had taken the starting point to the bottom of the range and then separately reduced the sentence under factors listed as "reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation," an approach that risked double counting. While the Court accepted the presence of significant mitigating factors (previous good character, positive references, complex PTSD, caring responsibilities, deprived background, employment prospects and loss of job), it considered the trial judge's reductions went too far below the category range given the combination of two high culpability factors and two category 1 harm factors.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors strictly on the material before it, the Court concluded the appropriate sentence reflecting both offending seriousness and personal mitigation was two years' imprisonment. The Court also considered whether to exercise discretion not to increase the sentence; it granted leave because the trial judge had erred in applying the guideline leading to a sentence that was too low.

Holding and Implications

SENTENCE INCREASED

Holding: The Court granted leave, allowed the Attorney General's reference, and increased the Defendant's sentence from 12 months' immediate imprisonment to two years' immediate imprisonment. The Court directed the Defendant to surrender to The Police Station by 4 pm on the day of the order.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Defendant must return to custody to serve the increased custodial term. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond application and correction of the sentencing guideline to the facts of this case.