Summary of Court of Appeal Judgment (Anonymised)

Factual and Procedural Background

The 2017 Act authorised construction of Phase One of a high speed railway. The Appellant is a local planning authority whose area is traversed by a spur authorised by the Act. The nominated undertaker (Interested Party, referred to below as Company A) carried out further design work and proposed a 2.9km extension to an authorised tunnel (the Bromford Tunnel Extension or "BTE") with an eastern portal (the "BTEP"), creating a tunnel of 5.8km in total. The BTE was not specified as a scheduled work in Schedule 1 to the 2017 Act.

Company A applied to the Appellant under Schedule 17 for approval of plans/specifications relating to the BTEP; the Appellant declined to determine the application and Company A appealed to the Secretaries of State (the Respondents). The Respondents' decision (14 May 2024) allowed Company A's appeal and treated the revised works as authorised by s.2 of the 2017 Act and as benefiting from the deemed planning permission in s.20(1). The Appellant sought judicial review; the High Court dismissed the claim. The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court considered two issues: (1) whether the revised works were authorised by s.2 of the 2017 Act; and (2) if authorised, whether those works benefited from the deemed planning permission in s.20(1).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Bromford Tunnel Extension and its eastern portal (the revised works) were authorised by s.2 of the High Speed Rail (London‑West Midlands) Act 2017.
2. If authorised, whether those revised works had the benefit of the deemed planning permission conferred by s.20(1) of the 2017 Act, in particular the correct construction of s.20(2)(c) and s.68(4)–(5) in relation to EIA requirements.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Section 2 did not authorise the construction and maintenance of the BTE; s.2(1) is limited to ancillary works and items of a kind listed in sub‑paras (a)–(h).
• Where Parliament intended to authorise tunnels it did so in Schedule 1; allowing s.2 to authorise the BTE would exceed the statutory scheme and circumvent the limits on scheduled works.
• s.20(2)(c) should be construed so that non‑scheduled works which were not the subject of environmental assessment during the Bill process do not benefit from the deemed planning permission unless they were “covered by” that Bill EIA in the manner s.68(4) describes.

Respondents' and Company A's Arguments

• Section 2(1) authorises a wide range of non‑scheduled works and the BTE falls within that power as works “necessary or expedient” for Phase One purposes.
• Deemed planning permission in s.20(1) extends to non‑scheduled works provided they do not give rise to any new or different likely significant effects compared with those reported in the Environmental Statement for the Bill (the "no new or different significant effects" test); the BTE was within the environmental envelope and complied with EMRs.
• Where relevant, the approach in Milne / the Rochdale envelope supports treating flexible subsequent works as "covered" by an earlier EIA if they fall within the scope or envelope assessed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 324	Parliamentary hybrid Bill process can satisfy EIA Directive requirements; Standing Orders adapted EIA procedure for Bills.	Used to show the 2017 Act was enacted and the Parliamentary process was intended to implement EIA objectives; context for construing s.20 and s.68.
R (Finch) v Surrey County Council [2024] UKSC 20; [2024] PTSR 988	EIA as a procedural process with defined stages (ES, consultation, examination, reasoned conclusions); public participation integral.	Relied on to explain the EIA process and the importance of the process (not just substance) when construing s.20(2)(c).
Berkeley [2001] 2 AC 603	EIA compliance is procedural; it is not enough to say compliance would have made no difference to substantive outcome.	Referred to support the proposition that fulfilling the EIA process is essential irrespective of whether information would alter the decision.
R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13; [2003] 2 AC 687	Purposive approach: give effect to Parliament's purpose; read statute in context and historical background.	Cited as authority for purposive statutory interpretation applied to the 2017 Act.
R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28; [2023] 1 WLR 2594	Statute must be construed in context and in light of purpose; defined terms in statute are primary guides to meaning.	Relied upon to emphasise importance of statutory definitions (s.68) for interpreting "covered by an environmental assessment".
CG Fry and Son Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2025] UKSC 35; [2025] PTSR 1823	No dichotomy between natural meaning and purposive approach; context and purpose govern construction.	Invoked to support the unified interpretative approach to s.20 and s.68.
R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255	Words derive meaning from statutory context; external aids secondary.	Used to stress that context within the Act and related provisions governs interpretation of s.20(2)(c).
R (Edison) v Central Valuation Officer [2003] UKHL 20; 4 All ER 209	Presumption Parliament does not intend absurd or unreasonable results; but strength of presumption varies with degree of unreasonableness.	Referred to when addressing respondents' argument that the court's construction would lead to absurd consequences.
Hirachand v Hirachand [2024] UKSC 43; [2025] AC 599	Assume Parliament legislates having knowledge of relevant law.	Used to infer that Parliament was aware of EIA law when enacting s.20(2).
R (Hillingdon London Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 1005; [2021] PTSR 113	EMRs cannot authorise or mandate something inconsistent with the Act.	Applied to reject reliance on EMRs as altering statutory control under Schedule 17 or s.20.
R v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Milne [2001] Env. L.R. 406	Principles on outline permissions and EIA; flexibility may be permitted where ES and conditions appropriately constrain evolution ("Rochdale envelope" principles).	Considered by parties; Court held Milne does not support the respondents' construction of s.20(2)(c) and clarified limits of that principle in this statutory context.
R v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Tew [2000] Env. L.R. 1	Insufficient description in outline permission can breach EIA requirements; cannot defer assessment of likely significant effects until later if significant.	Referred to in the discussion of the limits on flexible descriptions of development and EIA requirements (Tew underpinning Milne).
Adriatic Land 5 Limited v Long Leaseholders at Hippersley Point [2025] EWCA Civ 856; [2026] 1 WLR 1857	Post‑enactment Explanatory Notes do not carry particular legal status; caution in treating them as aids.	Relied on to discount post‑enactment Explanatory Notes as authoritative aids to construing s.2(1).
Cusack v Harrow London Borough Council [2013] UKSC 40; [2013] 1 WLR 2022	Canons of construction are guidelines rather than strict rules.	Applied to reject over‑reliance on ejusdem generis and similar canons to limit s.2(1)(i).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied a purposive approach, reading provisions in context and with regard to EIA objectives. The analysis proceeded in two main parts.

Issue 1 — s.2(1) (authorization)

• The court concluded s.2(1) uses broad language permitting works "necessary or expedient" for Phase One purposes and is not confined to minor or purely ancillary items. The definition of "Phase One purposes" in s.67 supports a broad scope.
• Sub‑paras (a)–(h) in s.2(1) include items that may be ancillary or integral to the railway; sub‑para (i)'s wide wording ("such other works, of whatever description") cannot be read down by ejusdem generis where no coherent genus is discernible.
• Constraints exist: works must be for Phase One purposes, lie within Act limits, and remain subject to Schedule 17 controls and s.20(2) exceptions. Explanatory materials and statutory guidance were not decisive aids to construe s.2(1).
• Applying these principles, the court held the BTE is authorised by s.2(1).

Issue 2 — s.20(1) and s.20(2)(c) (deemed planning permission and EIA)

• Section 20(1) grants deemed planning permission for development authorised by the Act, subject to exceptions in s.20(2). For non‑scheduled works, s.20(2) applies cumulatively: (a) likely to have significant environmental effects; (b) not exempt; and (c) not covered by an environmental assessment in connection with the Bill.
• The court emphasised that s.20(2)(c) must be read with the statutory definition in s.68(4)–(5): a non‑scheduled development is "covered by an environmental assessment in connection with the Bill" only if information about that specific development was, at the time of deposit/publication, contained in a deposited statement that constituted an environmental statement under the EIA Regulations.
• The respondents' and Company A's "no new or different likely significant effects" test (i.e. comparing overall effects with those in the Bill ES and treating no greater overall harm as sufficient) conflated s.20(2)(a) and (c) and was inconsistent with s.68(4). The correct test focuses on whether the particular development had been the subject of EIA material at the Bill stage, not whether its likely effects (if now assessed) would be no greater than previously assessed effects.
• The court noted the Secretary of State's earlier (March 2021) screening decision treated the changes as falling within Annex II para.13(a) and requiring EIA; the later acceptance of the "no new or different" approach in the decision letter was a misinterpretation of s.20(2)(c).
• Accordingly, because the BTE and BTEP were non‑scheduled works that would be likely to have significant effects and were not covered by an environmental assessment in connection with the Bill as s.68(4) requires, the deemed planning permission did not apply to them.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

Holding:

• The court held that the Bromford Tunnel Extension (BTE) is authorised by s.2(1) of the High Speed Rail (London‑West Midlands) Act 2017.
• The court also held that the deemed planning permission in s.20(1) of the 2017 Act does not apply to the BTE and its eastern portal because s.20(2)(c) (read with s.68(4)–(5)) excludes non‑scheduled development that was not the subject of an environmental statement deposited in connection with the Bill.

Implications:

• Direct effect: The Appellant is entitled to a declaration that the deemed planning permission conferred by s.20(1) does not apply to the Bromford Tunnel Extension and the tunnel's eastern portal referred to in the Respondents' decision letter dated 14 May 2024.
• The decision clarifies that, for non‑scheduled works which are likely to have significant environmental effects, the statutory test in s.20(2)(c) requires that material on that particular development formed part of the deposited environmental statement during the Bill process; it is not satisfied merely by showing no greater overall environmental harm compared with the Bill ES.
• The court emphasised procedural protections of the EIA regime and the need for efficient handling where an express planning permission and EIA are required; it noted the public interest in the timely progression of nationally significant infrastructure while preserving EIA procedural standards.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided judgment text and is fully anonymised in accordance with the instructions provided.