- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Black Horse Ltd v Angel & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
The Claimants (in excess of 5,000 individuals who bought motor cars over the last 14 years) brought eight multi‑claimant proceedings against eight motor finance companies (the Defendants, hereafter "Company A" to "Company H") alleging that Defendants failed to disclose discretionary commission arrangements paid to car dealers/brokers. The Claimants relied on s.140B(1)(a) Consumer Credit Act 1974 seeking repayment on the basis that the creditor–debtor relationships were unfair under s.140A. The Claimants issued generic, largely factual‑free particulars of claim in November 2022 and amended schedules identifying credit agreements.
At first instance (County Court, Birmingham) the circuit judge (Judge Worster) disaggregated the omnibus claim forms under CPR 7.3, directing that the individual claims proceed separately. The High Court judge (Judge Ritchie) allowed the Claimants' appeal and re‑exercised the discretion, finding that the convenience test under r.7.3 was satisfied, identifying broad common issues and directing generic pleadings and disclosure (including brokerage agreements). Limited permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted on one ground (ground 4) by Judge Zacaroli. This second appeal concerns whether the High Court judge erred in the re‑exercise of his discretion and the consequential case management orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a single multi‑claimant claim form (per defendant) complies with CPR r.7.3 — i.e., whether multiple claims "can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings."
- Whether there are common issues of law or fact (notably: (a) interpretation/application of CONC disclosure rules ("the CONC point") and (b) whether dealers acted as agents/credit brokers for lenders under s.56 CCA) that justify common disposal or lead/test cases.
- Whether the High Court judge erred in re‑exercising the discretion of the circuit judge to order omnibus management, generic defences and wide disclosure (including brokerage/commission agreements).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- Each claim requires a fact‑sensitive, holistic assessment under s.140A; unfairness cannot be determined as a common issue across thousands of differing factual matrices.
- The circuit judge's decision to disaggregate was correct; the High Court judge improperly re‑exercised the discretion (contrary to Abbott and consistent first‑instance authorities) and imposed disproportionate disclosure burdens across all claims.
- Lead/test case exercises and sampling will not produce binding determinations for other claimants; persuasive value is insufficient to justify omnibus disposal.
Claimants' Arguments
- It is convenient to manage the claims together under r.7.3 because there are common legal issues (CONC, agency) and the trial of carefully selected lead cases would produce persuasive rulings that would promote widescale settlement and proportional disposal.
- Defendants possess the brokerage/commission information; disclosure is necessary to select lead cases and to plead individual claims properly.
- If the omnibus management is reversed, most claimants would be dispersed to small claims courts and would be unlikely to pursue their claims effectively due to cost and resource imbalance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abbott v Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 1807 (KB) ([2023] 1 WLR4002) | Formulation of convenience/commonality tests for r.7.3 (identified tests said by Abbott to be relevant). | Noted that the circuit judge applied Abbott's test to disaggregate; the Court analysed Abbott's tests and their continued relevance in light of Morris. |
| Morris & Others v Williams & Co Solicitors [2024] EWCA Civ 376, [2025] Ch 34 | Clarified that Abbott's exclusionary tests were too restrictive; "conveniently" should be construed broadly and flexibly. | Held to supersede Abbott in principle; the High Court judge relied on Morris to re‑exercise discretion in favour of omnibus case management. |
| Kerrigan v Elevate Credit International Ltd [2020] EWHC 2169 (Comm) ([2020] CTLC 161) | Authority on CONC and burden of proof: where rules are breached substantively it may be difficult for defendant to show fairness. | Referred to by the circuit judge on the CONC point; Court noted Kerrigan but treated it as non‑determinative for omnibus management. |
| Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Limited [2014] UKSC 61; [2014] 1 WLR 4222 | Broad framing of s.140A: unfairness is wide, fact‑sensitive; regulatory codes are evidence of standard but not determinative. | Used to emphasise the wide, holistic enquiry required under s.140A and to caution against simplistic common‑issue determinations of unfairness. |
| Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland [2023] UKSC 34; [2024] AC 955 | Reinforces the breadth and open‑ended nature of s.140A inquiries. | Relied upon to support the proposition that unfairness inquiries are broad and fact‑specific. |
| Hopcraft & Anr v Close Brothers Limited [2025] UKSC 33; [2025] 3 WLR 423 ("Johnson") | Consideration of discretionary commissions and their relevance among a wide range of factors pointing to unfairness; no automatic presumption from size of commission. | Cited to show that commission size is a relevant factor but not dispositive; court rejected any presumption that large undisclosed commission equals unfairness. |
| Farol Holdings Ltd and others v Clydesdale Bank PLC [2024] EWHC 593 (Ch) | Relevant to remedies under ss.140A/140B and quasi‑causation issues. | Referenced for the proposition that remedies must approximate the position had unfairness not occurred. |
| Adams v Ministry of Defence [2024] EWHC 1966 (KB) | First‑instance example where r.7.3 was not made out on the facts. | Used as one of several first‑instance contrasts illustrating fact‑sensitive outcomes under r.7.3. |
| Abernethy v Barclays Bank UK PLC [2025] EWCC 1 | First‑instance ruling on convenience in multi‑claimant context (example of differing judicial approaches). | Noted as part of the landscape showing divergent case management outcomes; cited by permission‑to‑appeal decision as relevant background. |
| Tew v BoS (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) No 1 PLC [2010] EWHC 203 (Ch) | Group litigation/identification of central and specific issues in multi‑claimant matters. | Referenced as an example where common issues were successfully identified and managed. |
| Lancaster v Peacock [2020] EWHC 1231 (Ch) | Use and purpose of sample/lead claimants in multi‑claimant litigation. | Used to support the accepted utility of lead/sample claimants to decide common and persuasive issues. |
| Various SAM Borrowers v BOS (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) No 1 PLC and Others [2022] EWHC 2594 (Ch) ([2022] Costs LR 1715) | Example of multi‑claimant management and use of lead cases. | Referred to in support of lead‑case methodology. |
| Tanfern Limited v Cameron‑Macdonald (Practice Note) [2000] 1 WLR 1311 | Standard for appellate interference with case management decisions ("generous ambit" test). | Applied as the standard limiting appellate intrusion into case management decisions. |
| Re Sprintroom Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 932 ([2019] 2 BCLC 617) | Guidance on the limited scope of appellate review of case management decisions. | Referred to when assessing whether the High Court judge had exceeded permissible discretion. |
| Young v Santander Consumer (UK) PLC (2023 unreported) | Illustrative of disproportionate cost relative to small individual recoveries in discretionary commission claims. | Used to illustrate practical difficulties and potential inefficiency of trying many small individual claims. |
| Harrison v Black Horse Ltd [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 455 | Authority noting that a decision on one unfair relationship is unlikely to be determinative of another. | Relied upon by Defendants' submissions to emphasise fact‑sensitivity of s.140A inquiries. |
| R (Clydesdale Financial Service Limited) v Financial Ombudsman Service Limited [2014] EWHC 3237 (Admin); [2025] Bus LR 1323 | Interpretation of CONC 4.5.3R — that more than bare disclosure may be required in some cases. | Cited in argument on CONC; Court held Kerr/Clydesdale did not produce a definitive, universally binding position. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Coulson began by recognising two constraints: (1) the limited scope of the present appeal (permission refused on other grounds) and (2) the high appellate threshold for disturbing a case management decision. He reviewed the applicable procedural law (CPR r.7.3 and r.19.1), the competing authorities (notably Abbott and Morris) and the substantive law under ss.140A/140B CCA and CONC.
The court analysed whether the High Court judge erred in re‑exercising the discretion. It accepted Morris's correction of Abbott (that r.7.3 must be interpreted broadly) but emphasised that the circuit judge's reliance on Abbott did not automatically make his decision wrong; permission had not been given to pursue that ground. The real question was whether the High Court judge, in re‑exercising the discretion, made an error of principle or left a material factor out of account.
The court considered (a) whether unfairness could be determined as a common issue (concluding it could not, and rejecting any presumption that a large undisclosed commission alone equates to unfairness), (b) whether there were nonetheless common issues of law or fact (the CONC disclosure point and the s.56/agency point were capable of recurring across many claims and therefore qualified as "broad common issues"), and (c) whether lead/test cases could be a convenient and proportionate way forward (the court accepted that lead cases, carefully chosen, could produce persuasive guidance likely to promote settlement).
The court also examined procedural failings by the Claimants (notably failure to plead individual claims and initially vague sampling proposals) and the practical reality that many claims might not proceed if disaggregated. Weighing these factors alongside the High Court judge's nine‑factor analysis of convenience, the court concluded there was no identifiable legal flaw in the High Court judge's re‑exercise of discretion and that his case management orders were within the permissible range.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
Holding: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court judge's orders: the omnibus claim forms may proceed under r.7.3, and the consequential case management directions (generic defences and disclosure of brokerage/commission arrangements and related documents) stand. The stay on those directions was removed and the matter remitted to the Birmingham County Court for further directions.
Implications: The direct effect is that the High Court's case management regime remains in place and the Defendants must comply with the ordered disclosure and pleading timetable. The Court emphasised this decision is fact‑specific and limited by the appellate scope; it did not purport to lay down a new general rule for all multi‑claimant litigation. The judgment also signalled (i) the practical utility of lead/test cases and persuasive rulings in multi‑claimant disputes and (ii) that procedural rules (and potential CPRC review of r.7.3) may be of continuing interest given the increase in such claims. No wider binding change of principle was declared by this judgment.
Alert