- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Okoroji v Crown Prosecution Service
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was convicted on 20 December 2024 in the Youth Court by Judge Dean of three offences of sexual activity with a child contrary to s.9 Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Appellant and the Complainant were school students aged between 13 and 14 at the material times. The Complainant disclosed a series of sexual assaults to a worker from The Hospital (CAMHS) and gave a video-recorded account on 15 July 2021; the Appellant was interviewed within weeks. Investigators 1 and 2 and the Respondent reviewed the file repeatedly over the period from mid‑2021 to late‑2023. Charges were authorised on 15 November 2023 and the Appellant was charged on 16 November 2023. The Appellant applied in the Youth Court to stay proceedings for abuse of process on grounds of delay; Judge Dean refused that application and sentenced the Appellant. The Appellant brought a stated case under s.111 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, challenging as wrong in law the refusal to stay on the ground that delay and alleged failure to follow CPS policy amounted to an affront to justice. Judge McGowan heard the appeal on 14 May 2025.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was a basis on which the District Judge should have concluded that the Respondent (CPS) failed to follow settled policy, including failing to investigate with appropriate expedition.
- If such a failure existed, whether the District Judge should have stayed proceedings as amounting to an affront to justice (abuse of process under the second limb).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Attorney Mawer submitted that the delay, particularly December 2021 to June 2022, was inordinate and unacceptable and that the Respondent and investigators failed to act with appropriate expedition for a young accused.
- It was submitted the CPS did not conduct reviews in line with its own Youth Offenders guidance and that diversion or out‑of‑court disposals were not adequately considered; the decision to prosecute therefore demonstrated failure to follow policy and could amount to an abuse of process.
- It was argued the failure to refer to the Youth Justice Service was evidence of procedural omission contributing to delay.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent conceded the delay was significant and concerning but submitted the trial was conducted fairly and the delay resulted in part from the Respondent following guidance by pursuing inquiries, third‑party material and conducting repeated reviews.
- The Respondent maintained that referral to the Youth Justice Service would have been futile and that out‑of‑court disposal was unlikely given the seriousness of the allegations.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Chief Constable of Kent and Another ex parte L, R v DPP ex parte B [1991] 93 Cr App R 416 | Judicial review may succeed where a decision to prosecute was made without any or sufficient inquiry into the accused's circumstances and character. | The court considered whether the Respondent had failed to make sufficient inquiries; it concluded the Judge's finding that adequate inquiries were pursued meant no such failure was established here. |
| R (on the application of E, S and R v DPP [2011] EWHC 1465 (Admin) | Failure to show that legal guidance has been followed may result in the decision to prosecute being quashed. | The authority was noted as part of the guidance; the court considered it but accepted the Judge's view that there was no failure to follow guidance sufficient to quash or stay proceedings. |
| R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 (HL) | Second limb: the court may stay proceedings where to try the accused would be such an affront to justice as to bring administration of justice into disrepute. | The court applied the second limb test, asking whether delay etc. made trial an affront to justice, and endorsed the Judge's conclusion that it did not. |
| R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48 | "Interests of justice" involves an exercise of judgment balancing multiple relevant factors; not a hard‑edged concept. | The court used this approach to assess whether the Judge had reasonably balanced factors (delay, seriousness, fairness, public interest) and found no error of law. |
| R v Adaway [2004] EWCA Crim 2831 | Failure to follow prosecutorial policy may give rise to an abuse of process. | The court acknowledged the principle but accepted the Judge's finding that any delay arose from the Respondent following policy by pursuing reasonable lines of inquiry rather than from a policy breach. |
| Jones v DPP [2011] EWC 50 (Admin) | The High Court held that even where a prosecution is brought in breach of a clear and settled policy, intervention requires that allowing proceedings to continue would bring administration of justice into disrepute. | The court applied this threshold; it agreed with the Judge that continuation would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute here. |
| R v Salt and anor [2015] EWCA Crim 662 | The second limb requires a wider examination and balancing of factors, weighing public interest in trial and complainants' rights against integrity of the system. | The court applied the Salt balancing exercise and concluded the Judge correctly weighed the public interest in trying grave offences against the integrity concerns arising from delay. |
| R v Ghafoor [2002] EWCA Crim 1857 | Authority cited as providing protective considerations at sentencing for young offenders. | The Judge had regard to this authority and s.29(1) Children and Young Persons Act 1963 in framing sentence; the court accepted that sentencing protections were afforded. |
| D.P.P v Humphrys [1977] A.C.1 | The power to stop a prosecution should be used only in the most exceptional circumstances. | The court reiterated that a stay is exceptional and accepted the Judge's exercise of that principle in refusing the stay. |
| R v Derby Crown Court Ex P Brooks 80 CR. App. R.164 | The objective of the discretionary power is to ensure a fair trial for both defendant and prosecution. | The court noted fairness to both sides was considered by the Judge and that the trial had been fair; this supported refusing the stay. |
| R v Telford Justices Ex P Badham, 93 CR. App. R.171 | The burden of proof on an application to stay for abuse lies on the defendant to the civil standard. | The court applied that evidential burden and agreed the defence had not met it in this case. |
| R v S (SP) [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 23 | The decision whether to stay proceedings is an exercise of judicial assessment dependent on judgment. | The court accepted the Judge's evaluative exercise as within lawful discretion and not wrong in law. |
| Mansfield v D.P.P [2021] EWHC 293 (Admin) | Courts of summary jurisdiction have power to stay proceedings in both first and second limb cases. | The court recognised the scope of summary courts' powers and considered the Judge's exercise consistent with that authority. |
| R v Maxwell [2011] 2 Cr.App. R.31 | See R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48) The interests of justice require balancing relevant factors in an exercise of judgment. | The court relied on the same Maxwell principles in reviewing whether the Judge balanced factors correctly and found no legal error. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court emphasised the legal framework that a stay for abuse of process arises where (1) a fair trial is impossible or (2) proceeding would be an affront to justice. It adopted the governing authorities requiring an exceptional threshold, the evidential burden on the defence to the civil standard, and a balancing exercise of competing factors (Maxwell; Salt).
The court examined the agreed chronology and the CPS Youth Offenders guidance, noting that guidance requires expedition but also comprehensive inquiries into a young person's circumstances. The Judge below had considered the absence of disclosure of CPS reviews but declined to infer bad faith or non‑compliance; he reasoned objectively that much of the delay resulted from pursuing the inquiries the guidance required.
The Judge found (and this court accepted) that: the trial had been fair; the Complainant's evidence had been preserved early (video record) and the Appellant had been on notice; referral to the Youth Justice Service would have been futile given the Appellant's lack of previous contact; and the allegations were likely too serious for out‑of‑court disposal. The Judge acknowledged the developmental impact of delay and reflected that in sentencing. The appellate court concluded no error of law in that reasoning and that the balancing did not produce an outcome amounting to an affront to justice.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court upheld Judge Dean's refusal to stay the proceedings for abuse of process.
Implications: The direct effect is that the Appellant's conviction and sentence stand; the court found no error of law in the Judge's approach and did not establish a precedent of law‑breaking by the Respondent. No new legal principle was established; the decision applied existing authorities and confirmed that, on the facts, delay attributable in part to pursuing CPS guidance did not amount to an affront to justice sufficient to stay proceedings.
Alert