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MJ v The Minister for Justice, AA v The Minister for Justice [No. 2] (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
This summary concerns costs applications following the principal judgment in the joint judicial review proceedings brought by Applicant 1 and Applicant 2 against the Defendant, which refused each Applicant's applications for mandamus and declaratory relief directing the Defendant to decide their respective applications for citizenship under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956. The matters were listed together as representative or "pathfinder" cases from a holding list of approximately 158 similar cases in which decisions on naturalisation were outstanding because the Defendant awaited background-check information from Entity A. The two pathfinder matters were selected to represent a broad factual spectrum. Leave and case management steps occurred in 2024–2025; the costs judgment was delivered by Judge Bradley on 18 June 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay in deciding each Applicant's application for naturalisation amounted to a wrongful refusal to make a decision (i.e., whether the delay was so unjustified or egregious as to be tantamount to refusal).
- Whether, in the circumstances of these pathfinder/public interest cases, the unsuccessful Applicants should be relieved from the usual order for costs (i.e., whether no order as to costs should be made).
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant 1's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Keogh)
- The Applicant's proceedings were a pathfinder/test case selected to resolve many similar cases; there were approximately 158 other cases in the holding list.
- There was an element of novelty and systemic public importance in clarifying law on delay in citizenship processing; the Applicant had agreed to be a test case.
- The Applicant sought no order as to costs on public interest grounds; alternatively, if costs were sought against the Defendant, a partial costs award (suggested at 50%) was proposed.
Applicant 2's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Flynn)
- The Chief State's Solicitor's Office had invited Applicant 2's case to proceed as a test case; both the Defendant and Applicant 2 had treated the matter as a pathfinder.
- Applicant 2's case satisfied the criteria for public interest litigation per the decision in Little (No. 2) and so the appropriate starting point was no order as to costs.
- Personal interest in the outcome was not a disqualifying factor to public-interest treatment.
Defendant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Murphy)
- The Defendant, having succeeded, was presumptively entitled to costs under the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 unless discretion was exercised otherwise.
- The matters were governed by established principles of the law of mandamus and did not expose any lack of clarity in statutory provisions; pathfinder status was one factor but not determinative on costs.
- In relation to Applicant 2, although the court had directed the addition of such a case, assigned lead/pathfinder status should not automatically preclude an award of costs to the Defendant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Little v The Chief Appeals Officer & Ors (No. 2) [2024] IESC 53 | Framework for exercising discretion not to award costs in public interest proceedings; non-exhaustive balancing factors (paras cited in the judgment). | The court applied the Little (No. 2) factors to assess whether the unsuccessful Applicants should be relieved from costs; concluded the cases met some public-interest criteria but did not satisfy the exceptional threshold in para. 71 to warrant awarding costs to unsuccessful Applicants. |
| Daly and Murphy v An Taoiseach and Ors [2026] IEHC 133 | Referenced in discussion of joint cases on costs and comparative authorities on costs in public-interest litigation. | Referred to as part of the body of authorities considered by counsel; used by Applicants to support a submission for reduced or no costs but not determinative. |
| Curtin v Dáil Éireann [2006] IESC 27 | Authority discussed in the context of costs in public-law litigation. | Referred to by Applicants in submissions on appropriate costs outcomes; the court treated such authorities as part of the wider costs jurisprudence but found no basis to award costs to Applicants here. |
| Singh v The Minister for Justice and Equality; Zydek v The Minister for Justice and Equality; Shahid Arshad v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 437 ("Singh") | Principles on when delay amounts to refusal in effect; observations on delay and mandamus. | The principal judgment relied on Singh in concluding that the delays in these cases did not amount to a wrongful refusal or were not so egregious as to be tantamount to refusal. |
| Point Exhibition Co. Ltd v The Revenue Commissioners [1993] 2 I.R. 551 | Authoritative remark(s) relied on concerning the applicable legal principles (cited at p. 555). | Referenced in the principal judgment as part of the established authorities supporting the court's conclusion on the applications for mandamus and delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Bradley summarised that the central factual concern was whether the elapsed periods (40 months for Applicant 1 and 41 months for Applicant 2) and the Defendant's engagement amounted to a wrongful refusal or an egregious, unjustified delay tantamount to refusal. The principal judgment applied established authorities (including Singh and Point Exhibition) in concluding there had been no such wrongful refusal or egregious delay. The court accepted that the Defendant had explained the delays arose from outstanding information provided by Entity A and that Applicants had been informed.
On costs, the court applied the discretionary framework in Little (No. 2), acknowledging the pathfinder/public-interest character of the proceedings and the holding list of many similar cases. The judge drew a distinction between pathfinder cases that dispose of many cases by applying settled principles and pathfinder cases that resolve genuine legal uncertainty in ambiguous statutory provisions. These proceedings fell into the former category. Accordingly, although the matters had systemic importance, they did not meet the exceptional criteria to exempt unsuccessful Applicants from the ordinary costs consequences. Balancing the relevant factors, and noting case-specific considerations, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs so that each party bears its own costs.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: The court ordered that there be no order as to costs in each judicial review application; each party is responsible for its own costs.
Implications: The direct effect is that neither Applicant recovers costs and the Defendant does not receive an award of costs. The court treated the matters as public-interest pathfinder cases but concluded they were resolved by established mandamus principles and did not qualify for the exceptional costs relief described in Little (No. 2). No novel legal precedent altering the law of mandamus or costs was established by this costs decision; it reflects the exercise of discretion on the facts of these cases.
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