Summary of Judgment — Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Deceased was a solicitor who practised in The City and conducted his practice through Company A. On his death the executors under his will were the First Respondent and the Second Respondent. The Appellant was the Deceased's partner and had limited entitlements under the will; the residue was held on trust for the Children. Following the Deceased's death there was contested litigation in The City concerning probate, company control of Company A and allegations made by the Appellant.

The First and Second Respondents commenced multiple proceedings including (i) a Part 8 company claim and an application under section 125 CA 2006 to effect a change of registered shareholder, (ii) a protection from harassment claim, and (iii) a probate claim seeking probate of the will. Interim and final injunctions (the Executors' Order and the Administrators' Order) were made restraining the Appellant from specified conduct. The Appellant was found to have breached the Executors' Order and the Administrators' Order.

HHJ Judge Tindal (Judge Tindal) made committal orders on 26 January 2026 sentencing the Appellant to suspended terms of imprisonment for breaches of those orders (the Committal Order). The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. Judge Arnold delivered the lead judgment; Judge Asplin concurred.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant's appeal against the Committal Order succeeds given she did not appeal the antecedent substantive orders finding breaches.
2. Whether the sanctions imposed for contempt (suspended imprisonment) were outside the reasonable range available to the trial judge.
3. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the Executors' Order and the Administrators' Order (including the relevance of domicile and forum conveniens arguments).
4. Whether there was procedural unfairness in the committal proceedings, including service and the form and timing of application documents.
5. Whether lawful expression had been mischaracterised as harassment.
6. Whether allegations of abuse of process, conspiracy or fraud undermined the validity of the prior orders and the committal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Executors' Order was unlawful and an abuse of process; it was used to silence allegations of fraud and to avoid proper consideration of jurisdiction.
• The procedure was unfair because the Appellant was refused permission to attend remotely, impairing her ability to present her case.
• The judge erred as to jurisdiction and the relevance of domicile.
• The judge failed to address the Appellant's allegations of fraud, misuse of section 125 CA 2006, and made irrational findings.
• Lawful expression was wrongly characterised as harassment.
• The committal proceedings were tainted by the alleged unlawfulness of the underlying orders.
• The Appellant's conduct arose from legitimate objections to the Administrators' actions in the interests of the minor heirs and/or as ultra vires.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal analysed the appeal on the following lines.

1. Scope of the appeal: The court observed that the Appellant had not appealed (or had been refused permission to appeal) the antecedent findings and orders which established the breaches. Therefore the present appeal was, in practical effect, limited to sanction for the breaches proven earlier; the court had no jurisdiction on this appeal to re-open validity of earlier orders which were not properly before it.
2. Sanction review: Because the Appellant did not challenge the proportionality or reasonableness of the sentences imposed, and because the sentences fell within the reasonable range available to Judge Tindal, the court saw no basis to interfere with the sanctions.
3. Jurisdiction: The court explained that the protection from harassment orders were properly made under sections 3 and 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and that jurisdictional challenges relating to the company or probate claims did not undermine the court's jurisdiction to make and enforce those harassment orders.
4. Merits of allegations of fraud/conspiracy: The Court adopted Judge Tindal's prior detailed findings that the Appellant's allegations were unfounded and that the challenged facts did not indicate fraud or conspiracy.
5. Procedural fairness and service: The court examined procedural complaints, including deficiencies in the Form N244 application notice and the timing of the Form N600. It concluded Judge Tindal had carefully considered procedural fairness and correctly found there was no unfairness: the Appellant had notice of the application sufficiently in advance, had opportunities to attend or seek representation or an adjournment, had elected not to attend, and had been aware of her rights from earlier materials and hearings.
6. Freedom of expression: The court noted that Judge Tindal had considered the Appellant's expression rights in earlier judgments and had given cogent reasons for concluding those rights were outweighed by the protected parties' rights against harassment.
7. Conclusion on grounds: For the reasons above the court found each of the Appellant's grounds to be without merit and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Holding: The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the Committal Order and certified the appeal as totally without merit. The court held that (a) the Appellant had not properly challenged the antecedent orders establishing the breaches, (b) the High Court had jurisdiction to make and enforce the protection from harassment orders, (c) the committal sanctions were within a reasonable range, and (d) there was no procedural unfairness sufficient to vitiate the proceedings.

Implications: The committal sentences imposed by Judge Tindal remain in force (suspended as ordered). The Court of Appeal suggested that any application for a civil restraint order should be made to the High Court on notice to the Appellant rather than imposed by the Court of Appeal of its own motion. The judgment did not purport to create new precedent beyond applying established principles (including the rule in M v Home Office that orders must be obeyed unless set aside).