Roberts, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from a sentence imposed by Judge Laird in the Crown Court at The City. The Appellant, a serving police officer with The Police Force and a trained response driver, was tried and on 4 February 2026 convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving arising from a road traffic collision on 8 July 2022. Alternative counts of causing death and causing serious injury by careless driving, to which the Appellant had pleaded guilty previously, were ordered to lie on the file. On 7 April 2026 Judge Laird sentenced the Appellant to 27 months' imprisonment and disqualified him from driving for 5 years and 1 month (comprising a 4-year notional disqualification and a 13-month extension under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988). The Registrar referred the Appellant's application for leave to appeal against sentence to the Full Court, noting that the period of disqualification appeared unlawful under R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455. The Full Court granted leave to appeal and heard submissions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of 27 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
2. Whether, in all the circumstances (including mitigation), the custodial sentences should have been suspended.
3. Whether the period of disqualification and the application of an extension period under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 were lawfully imposed, having regard to R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Ponte)

• The sentencing court elevated the starting point by too much and did not make sufficient reductions for mitigation.
• The judge treated a comment in the pre-sentence report as an admission that the Appellant deliberately ignored training and the law, which was factually inaccurate and unfair because the Appellant did not give evidence to answer that inference.
• Given the exceptional mitigating circumstances (military and police service, lack of previous convictions, genuine remorse, family responsibilities including care for a disabled daughter, and the victims' family's plea for leniency), the sentence should have been within the range capable of suspension and thus a suspended sentence should have been imposed.

Prosecution's Arguments (Attorney Harrison)

• The sentence was severe but not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive; the jury quickly found dangerous rather than careless driving and the harm was of the utmost seriousness.
• The Crown served a Respondent's Notice in opposition to the appeal but tempered oral submissions in light of the case particulars.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the facts: the Appellant, responding to a grade 1 emergency with lights and siren activated, drove through red lights and failed to reduce speed sufficiently before entering a junction, colliding with a motorcycle which had entered on green. The court accepted the sentencing categorizations adopted below (culpability Category C; harm at the utmost seriousness for death; harm Category 1 for serious injury). The Full Court identified significant mitigation including distinguished military service, police service, lack of previous convictions, genuine remorse, a blameless driving history, the genuine emergency being attended, and family responsibilities including care for a disabled daughter.

The court concluded that the sentencing judge made a factual finding — that a remark in the pre-sentence report amounted to an admission the Appellant deliberately ignored training and the law — which was not supported to the criminal standard. That mischaracterisation had materially coloured the judge's approach. Taking that into account together with the substantial mitigation (including factors not expressly referred to by the judge such as diagnosed PTSD and the impact on family), and applying the principle of totality, the Full Court determined the appropriate immediate custodial sentence on the lead offence would have been at the bottom of the guideline range: 24 months' custody.

Having assessed the Definitive Guideline factors relevant to suspension, the court found no real risk of reoffending, good prospects of rehabilitation (supported by a positive prison report), absence of compliance concerns, and strong personal mitigation. The court therefore considered that appropriate punishment could be achieved by a suspended sentence order rather than immediate custody. On disqualification, applying R v Needham, the court found the original disqualification calculation unlawful; because the custodial sentence was suspended there is no extension period under section 35A, so the mandatory 5-year disqualification was substituted.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding/Direct orders imposed by the court:

• The sentence of 27 months' imprisonment on Count 1 (causing death by dangerous driving) was quashed and substituted with a suspended sentence order of 24 months suspended for 18 months.
• The sentence of 12 months on Count 3 (causing serious injury by dangerous driving) was quashed and substituted with a suspended sentence order of 12 months suspended for 18 months, to run concurrently with Count 1.
• The unlawful disqualification structure (4 years plus 13-month extension) was quashed; the mandatory 5-year disqualification from driving was substituted. The 2-year concurrent disqualification on Count 3 and the requirement to pass the extended driving retest remain undisturbed.

Implications: The direct effects are the substitution of suspended sentences and correction of the unlawful disqualification to the mandatory 5-year period. The court did not purport to establish new precedent beyond applying existing principle in R v Needham and sentencing principles; no broader legal principle was newly established by this judgment.