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Sintes v London Borough of Tower Hamlets
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from a County Court liability judgment arising from personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff when she tripped over metal poles projecting from a market stall trolley on a public footpath adjacent to Whitechapel Market after dark on 19 December 2019. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant (the local licensing authority for the market) in negligence and public nuisance. Quantum was agreed and the trial before Judge Evans was on liability only. Judge Evans found for the Plaintiff on 30 July 2025. The Defendant obtained permission to appeal and the appeal was transferred to this Court. Judge Stuart-Smith delivered the leading judgment allowing the appeal; Judges Yip and Bean agreed. The effect ordered was that judgment be entered for the Defendant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a common law duty of care in respect of hazards on the adjacent public footpath created by a third-party market trader.
- Whether the metal poles and trolley constituted a public nuisance.
- If a duty existed or a nuisance was established, whether the Defendant breached that duty (including the timing and frequency of inspections) and, if so, whether the breach caused the Plaintiff's accident.
- Whether there was contributory negligence by the Plaintiff.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The poles constituted an obstruction and public nuisance on the footpath related to market operations.
- The Defendant, as licensing and market-management authority exercising supervisory powers and operating SOPP inspection regimes, had assumed responsibility or sufficient control such that it owed a duty to take reasonable care (including inspections and removal or warning) to prevent or abate such hazards.
- The Defendant breached duties by failing to inspect and remove or warn, and the poles had been abandoned for some time such that the Defendant should have been aware.
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant's role was regulatory/licensing; primary responsibility for safe set-up, maintenance and removal of receptacles rested with individual licence holders (market traders).
- The relevant highway authority for the footpath was a different entity (Company B), not the Defendant; the Defendant was not occupier of the highway.
- The statutory scheme and licence conditions do not amount to an assumption of private-law responsibility or a degree of control equivalent to that required to impose a negligence duty; inspection obligations in the SOPP were supervisory and contingent on resources.
- Any claim should be against the responsible stallholder; the County Court's factual finding that the poles had been present from 14:45 was unsupported and plainly wrong; causation was not established if inspection obligations had not yet expired at the accident time.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gorringe v Calderdale MBC | Authority on limits of imposing duty for omission by public authorities (failure to repaint signs not creating private-law duty). | Cited to support that past regulatory action does not create a baseline private-law duty to repeat that action; SOPP did not change the baseline. |
| Stovin v Wise | Authority addressing liability for omissions by public authorities. | Referenced as not precluding the court from finding a duty where applicable, but overall supported caution in imposing duties for omissions. |
| Dorset Yacht v Home Office | Example of liability where defendant had special control over third parties. | Distinguished: the court held Defendant's control over market traders was not comparable to the control in Dorset Yacht. |
| Phelps v Hillingdon BC | Examples where assumption of responsibility can arise from functions undertaken. | Noted as prior instance of assumption of responsibility, but court found facts here did not meet that standard. |
| Barrett v Enfield LBC | Another authority on assumption of responsibility by public bodies. | Referred to illustrate contexts where duty arose; held distinguishable on facts. |
| Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police | Modern summary of principles governing when public authorities owe duties in negligence; distinction between making matters worse and failing to protect. | Adopted as the correct framework: claimant must show Defendant made matters worse or fell within exceptions (assumption of responsibility or special control) to found duty. |
| Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police | Explanation that common law generally does not impose liability for pure omissions; need to show defendant caused harm. | Applied to reject imposing duty for failure to prevent harm caused by a third party. |
| N v Poole BC | Assumption of responsibility may not arise from intrusive or prolonged public-law involvement absent a promise or reliance. | Used to support conclusion that investigative/monitoring functions did not amount to a private-law assumption of responsibility here. |
| Kent v Griffiths | Example where assumption of responsibility and reliance gave rise to duty (ambulance dispatch case). | Cited as an example distinguishing cases where reliance/promise exists from those where it does not. |
| Robinson | Illustrates duty where defendant's positive act made matters worse. | Contrasted with omission cases; court applied distinction to the facts. |
| Capital & Counties | Emergency-service liability for acts making matters worse (e.g., turning off sprinklers). | Referenced in discussing limits of duties for public authorities. |
| East Suffolk | Baseline comparison: what would have happened if defendant had done nothing; historical action does not create ongoing duty. | Applied to hold that SOPP/previous steps did not alter the baseline; Defendant had not made matters worse by setting SOPP. |
| Volpi v Volpi | Principles for appellate review of factual findings. | Applied to assess whether Judge Evans' finding that the poles were present from 14:45 was plainly wrong; Court found it was plainly wrong. |
| Ali v Bradford MBC | Highway authority not occupier; no private-law duty to keep highway clear of obstructions without more. | Considered relevant: Court accepted the analogy and held the Defendant (not highway authority here) was not automatically liable as occupier; cited for limits on nuisance claims against authorities. |
| Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan | Principle on adoption/continuation of nuisance by knowledge and acquiescence. | Applied to require proof of knowledge and opportunity to abate; court found plaintiff could not show Defendant knew or ought to have known when poles were placed. |
| Diboll v City of Newcastle Upon Tyne | Authority where local authority held liable in nuisance as market authority/manager permitting dangerous projection into highway. | Cited by Plaintiff; Court accepted it supports liability in some circumstances but held it does not establish that licensing authority is necessarily liable where control is supervisory. |
| Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council | Owner-occupier may be liable for licensees' activities that cause nuisance off the land; analysis of "adoption" of nuisance. | Discussed as distinguishable on facts; not determinative here. |
| LE Jones (Insurance Brokers) Ltd v Portsmouth City Council | Council with sufficient control (contractual agency) may be liable where it has control leading to nuisance. | Considered illustrative that control/agency can found liability; Court found no equivalent control here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in three main analytical strands: (1) whether a duty in negligence existed; (2) whether the factual findings below (notably that the poles had been in place from 14:45) were sustainable on appeal; and (3) whether a public nuisance claim could succeed against the Defendant.
On duty in negligence the Court applied the modern framework from Tindall and related authorities: as a baseline a public authority does not owe a private-law duty to prevent harm caused by third parties unless the authority's conduct made matters worse or an exception applied (assumption of responsibility or special/control relationship). The Court held that the Defendant's regulatory/licensing role and the existence of detailed licence conditions and an internal SOPP did not, on the facts, amount to an assumption of responsibility to the Plaintiff nor to the special level of control required to displace the baseline rule. The Court stressed East Suffolk-style baseline reasoning: previous regulatory steps or internal standards do not alone convert omissions into actionable private-law breaches.
On fact-finding, the Court applied appellate standards for reviewing primary findings (Volpi). It concluded Judge Evans' finding that the poles had been in place from the start of the late shift (14:45) involved non-sequiturs and was plainly wrong because the evidence did not support any finding of timing or duration sufficient to establish that the Defendant had knowledge or missed an inspection that would have discovered the obstruction before the accident.
On nuisance, the Court analysed whether the Defendant could be said to have permitted, adopted or continued the nuisance caused by the third-party trader. While acknowledging authorities (including Diboll) where market/managing authorities were held liable in nuisance, the Court held that here the Plaintiff could not show Defendant knew or ought to have known the poles' presence or that Defendant had created or adopted the nuisance. The Court relied on Ali to emphasise that an authority that is not occupier of the highway is not automatically liable for obstructions on the highway absent stronger facts. Because the timing/duration of the poles' presence could not be established, the Plaintiff could not show knowledge/opportunity to abate and thus could not establish adoption or continuation of nuisance.
Applying these conclusions cumulatively, the Court found that the Plaintiff's negligence claim failed (no duty established) and the nuisance claim failed for want of knowledge/adoption and causation. The Court therefore allowed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR THE DEFENDANT
Direct effect: the County Court judgment for the Plaintiff is set aside and judgment is entered for the Defendant. The Court held that (a) no private-law duty of care in negligence was owed by the Defendant in respect of the third-party trader's placement of the poles on the highway, for the reasons given; (b) the County Court's key factual finding on duration (presence from 14:45) was plainly wrong; and (c) the public nuisance claim failed because the Plaintiff could not show knowledge/adoption or causative continuation by the Defendant. The judgment does not purport to establish a novel broad duty of care for licensing authorities; it confines liability to circumstances falling within established exceptions (assumption of responsibility or special/control), and it does not announce a new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities.
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