Director of Public Prosecutions v Ratinskis (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Phelan on 12 June 2026, concerns two cases stated under s.39(5) of the Valuation Act 2001 arising from appeals to the Valuation Tribunal against valuations issued following a 2019 revaluation. The valuation officer, pursuant to s.17(2)(b), split the previously single unit of valuation for The Airport into three separate entries: (i) the Main Airport (terminal buildings, piers, taxiways and runways), (ii) the Car Parks, and (iii) a set of ancillary properties designated "External Buildings". Final valuation certificates were issued on 10 September 2019 and the updated valuation list published on 17 September 2019.

The Appellant filed three appeals to the Tribunal (14 October 2019) challenging the split and the valuation methods. The three appeals were consolidated and heard together over 21 days between September 2020 and September 2021. Two of the three Tribunal decisions (Car Parks and External Buildings) were delivered on 16 June 2023; the third decision (Main Airport) was not delivered due to changes in the Tribunal's constitution and remains undecided, requiring a rehearing. The Appellant sought cases stated to the High Court on points of law arising from the Tribunal's decisions; the cases were stated and transmitted under s.39 and filed in the Central Office on 4 February 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision under s.17(2)(b) to split The Airport into three properties.
2. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding it could not consider whether the s.17(2)(b) power was properly exercised.
3. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by excluding risk factors when forecasting future income in the Receipts & Expenditure (R&E) valuation.
4. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by accepting that risk factors exist but nevertheless concluding the Car Parks are low-risk and fixing the tenant's share at 20% without properly reflecting those risks.
5. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by issuing decisions in the Car Parks and External Buildings appeals without issuing a decision in the related Main Airport appeal even though they were heard together.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Airport is an integrated economic unit; Car Parks and External Buildings are functionally essential and should have been treated as a single "relevant property" for rating purposes.
• The Tribunal has de novo jurisdiction to determine all matters affecting valuation, including the correct unit of valuation; the splitting decision is inseparable from valuation and therefore appealable under s.34.
• The contractor's method (s.50) should apply to The Airport as a whole; alternatively, if split, the Car Parks should be valued by R&E and External Buildings by comparative rental evidence (applying evidence to support a lower combined NAV).
• Procedural unfairness and prejudice arose from the Tribunal deciding two appeals while the third remained undecided.

Respondent's Arguments

• The power to split under s.17 is vested in valuation/revision officers and is an administrative decision amenable to judicial review only, not to appeal to the Tribunal under s.34.
• The Tribunal's jurisdiction is strictly statutory; s.34 does not expressly provide for appeals against s.17 decisions and the Tribunal may only determine valuation for properties as defined by the valuation officer.
• Different valuation methods may be employed and weighed; a dual or hybrid approach to Car Parks valuation was appropriate and the Tribunal's adoption of R&E and fixing of tenant's share was a permissible exercise of its valuation function (subject to fact/findings at trial).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory construction of the Valuation Act 2001 focusing on ss.17, 19, 28, 34, 37, 48, 49 and 50.

1) Statutory framework: s.17(1) prescribes separate valuation of each "relevant property"; ss.17(2) and (3) vest permissive powers in valuation officers to combine or split properties; s.17(4) treats such parts as single/separate properties for all purposes. Section 34 sets out appeal rights to the Tribunal (against determinations under ss.19 or 28, "any other detail" in the valuation list, inclusion/exclusion decisions, and certain revision-manager decisions). Section 37 confers the Tribunal powers to determine value and, inter alia, to amalgamate or subdivide relevant properties and determine valuation in accordance with s.49; s.37(4) permits the Tribunal to use any method or combination of methods to arrive at valuation.

2) Competing constructions: The Respondent and the Tribunal adopted a narrow reading: s.17 decisions are administrative and not appealable under s.34, leaving judicial review as the sole remedy. The Appellant argued s.34 and s.37 together implicitly permit the Tribunal to decide the correct unit of valuation as part of its de novo valuation function.

3) Interpretive analysis: Applying established interpretive principles (as per Heather Hill) and authority in Carlton Hotel (recognition of an extensive appellate regime), the Court concluded s.34 should be read broadly. The Court emphasised (a) the language of s.34 referring to an appeal "in relation to a property" rather than a narrowly defined "relevant property", (b) the Tribunal's express powers in s.37(2)(b)(v) & (vi) to amalgamate or subdivide properties and determine valuation under s.49, and (c) the absence of principled contextual grounds to read down Tribunal powers so as to exclude review of a s.17 split.

4) Precedent and distinctions: The Court distinguished Honeybridge on its facts (no decision under s.17 appealed and absence of adversarial argument), and relied on Carlton Hotel to support an expansive appellate remit over valuation methodology and related matters. The Court also noted Celtic Roads establishes the Tribunal's statutory basis but does not resolve the present statutory interpretation question.

5) Practical considerations and remedies: The Court recognised practical consequences (administrative convenience argued for splitting), acknowledged potential neutrality in aggregate valuation depending on methods used (and s.37(4)/s.50 permitting part-only application of contractor's method), but held that the Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide the correct unit of valuation (and thereby the proper valuation methodology to apply) is implicit in the statutory appeal scheme. Because the Tribunal had taken an incorrect view of its jurisdiction, its decisions on valuation could not be treated as properly made and the matter must be remitted.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court answered the case stated questions as follows:

• I. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision under s.17(2)(b) to split The Airport into three properties? No.
• II. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding it could not consider whether the s.17(2)(b) power was properly exercised? No.
• III–V. The Court concluded responses to the valuation methodology and related procedural questions were not required because the matters will be reheard by a newly constituted Tribunal with the broader jurisdiction clarified by this ruling.

Implications:

• The two Tribunal determinations are set aside to the extent they proceeded on a mistaken view that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider the unit of valuation. The matters are to be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing before a different division with authority to determine, de novo, the proper unit(s) of valuation and applicable valuation methodology in accordance with the Court's interpretation of ss.34 and 37.
• The Court did not decide the substantive valuation issues (risk factors, tenant share, or contractor's method application); those issues will be open to the Tribunal on rehearing. No new technical valuation rule was established by the Court beyond its statutory-interpretive holding on jurisdiction and appealability.