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Huntley & Anor, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 7 April 2025, Defendant A and Defendant B (partners) attended the garden of a neighbour to complain about a bonfire. A violent group assault occurred against Victim 1 and Victim 2, involving breaking glass, weapons made from sofa frames (with screws), repeated blows, and injury to a child present (the Child). Emergency responders attended; Emergency Responder 1 was grabbed by the throat and sustained pain, and Officer 1 was headbutted while arresting Defendant A. Both defendants were remanded; the Child was taken into care.
At the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing Defendant A pleaded guilty to intentional strangulation and assault of an emergency worker; both defendants initially pleaded not guilty to a section 18 wounding count but later pleaded guilty to that count at a Case Management Hearing. At first sentencing the Crown Court (Judge Lawrie) deferred sentence and imposed conditions to be observed during the deferment period. The deferment was intended to enable assessment of rehabilitation and the welfare of the Child; the defendants were released, the Child returned to their care, and both engaged with services and complied with conditions.
The Solicitor General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. The Court of Appeal (Judge Popplewell, Judge Wall and Judge Menary sitting) heard argument and substituted suspended custodial sentences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Crown Court judge's decision to defer sentence in this case was wrong in principle and thus whether the resulting non-custodial sentences were unduly lenient such that leave should be granted under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
- If deferment was wrong, what sentence was appropriate at the original sentencing date, and what remedial sentence the Court of Appeal should impose given the defendants' compliance and the Child's welfare since deferment.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney Holland (on behalf of the Solicitor General)
- Submitted that the section 18 offence fell into category A (persistent and sustained attack) and category 3 harm, engaging a guideline starting point of five years' imprisonment (range four to seven years).
- Argued that aggravating features (group activity, weapons, children present, injuries, previous convictions, intoxication) meant immediate custody well in excess of two years was appropriate and that the judge should not have deferred sentence.
- Asked the court to grant leave to refer and consider the sentence on its merits despite the passage of the deferment period.
Attorney Clough (for Defendant A)
- Submitted the offence could properly be treated as category 3B with a lower starting point and that mitigation (guilty plea, PTSD, efforts to address addiction, serious medical condition, primary carer status) could reduce an appropriate sentence to two years or less, enabling suspension.
- Argued that related offences should not materially increase the sentence for the section 18 count.
Attorney Young (for Defendant B)
- Accepted the section 18 offence fell within category A3 but emphasised stronger mitigation: no recent serious violent convictions, the offending was one-off while drunk, out of character since the Child's birth, remorse, and successful engagement during deferment.
- Stressed the substantial detrimental impact on the Child if custody were imposed now and relied on the defendants' compliance and rehabilitation during deferment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Petherick [2012] EWCA Crim 2214 | Guidance on article 8 rights of a dependent child in sentencing parents and the need to balance interference with family life against legitimate sentencing aims. | The court applied Petherick to assess weight to be given to the Child's welfare when balancing mitigation from care responsibilities against the seriousness of the offending. |
| R v Blackadder [2024] EWCA Crim 318; [2024] Cr App R(S) 16 | Guidance on deferment: judge who defers should usually conduct sentencing at the end of deferment and clearly state the alternative sentences. | Cited to criticise the Crown Court judge's failure to specify the sentence if conditions were or were not met and to support the conclusion that the deferment was wrongly used. |
| R v Swinbourne [2023] EWCA Crim 906; [2024] 1 Cr App R(S) 8 | Deferment should be sparingly used and only where the court can state clearly what sentence will follow compliance or non-compliance; deferment inappropriate if a lesser non-custodial sentence would never be justified. | Used to support the proposition that the judge erred in deferring where immediate custody was required and in failing to specify the sentence alternatives. |
| R v Ferreira [2021] EWCA Crim 537 | Decision to defer sentence is itself a sentence for the purposes of section 36 CJA 1988; Attorney General may refer deferment decisions. | Applied to confirm the court's jurisdiction to hear the reference despite the passage of the deferment period. |
| HH (as referenced in Petherick extract) | Principles on considering interests of children in sentencing (as discussed in Petherick). | Referred as part of the legal framework for assessing the impact on the Child. |
| M v South Africa (as cited) | Illustrative authority that the more serious the offence the less likely family-impact mitigation will render custody disproportionate. | Used to temper the weight of child-impact mitigation in a serious offence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeal determined that the deferment of sentence by the Crown Court judge was wrong in principle. The court analysed the position at the time of the original sentencing: the section 18 offence was plainly category A (persistent, prolonged attack) with category 3 harm and multiple aggravating factors (group activity, weapons, children present, injuries including a glassing and weaponised wood with screws, intoxication, prior convictions, multiple victims). Mitigation was limited: partial remorse, late guilty pleas, some mitigation from engagement and carer status, and medical issues for Defendant A.
The court concluded that an appropriate sentence at the original hearing would have been no less than four years' custody for each defendant (with adjustment for related offences in Defendant A's case), making immediate custody appropriate and not within the scope for suspension. The judge therefore erred in deferring sentence and in failing to specify the sentences to follow compliance or non‑compliance, contrary to the guidance in Swinbourne and Blackadder.
The court then considered post-deferment events: both defendants complied with conditions, engaged with services, the Child had been returned and was thriving, and there was a real risk that immediate custody now would lead to the Child's placement for adoption with catastrophic consequences. Balancing the seriousness of the offending and victims' interests against the legitimate expectation created by the unlawful deferment and the changed circumstances, the court exercised discretion to impose custodial sentences at the two-year level but suspended them as a merciful measure.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Leave to refer under section 36 was granted. The Court quashed the sentences below and substituted the following sentences, to run from 21 January 2026:
- On the section 18 count (count 1) for each defendant: two years' imprisonment, suspended for 24 months, subject to the same requirements as previously imposed during the community order.
- For Defendant A, on the strangulation count (count 2): 12 months' imprisonment, suspended for 24 months (to run concurrently).
- For Defendant A, on the assault of an emergency worker count (count 3): one month's imprisonment, suspended for 24 months (to run concurrently).
Implications: The immediate effect is that the substituted custodial sentences are suspended and the previously imposed community requirements continue as conditions of suspension; both defendants remain in the community provided they comply. The decision emphasises that deferment must be used only in appropriate cases and that failure to state alternative sentences or to follow guidance on deferment risks correction on appeal. The court did not purport to establish a novel sentencing principle beyond applying existing authorities; the ruling addresses the proper application of deferment and the balancing of child welfare against the seriousness of offending in the circumstances of this case.
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