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Shrives, R. v

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
May 22, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Crown appealed under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 by way of a reference that the sentence was unduly lenient following a trial in the Crown Court before Judge Gold. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of 12 offences, comprising multiple sexual offences against three child victims (referred to here as Victim 1, Victim 2 and Victim 3) and one offence of making indecent images. The victims were granted lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. On 9 January 2026 the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to a total of seven years' imprisonment, structured as consecutive sentences between victims and concurrent sentences inter se. The individual sentences recorded in the transcript were: counts against Victim 1 — 18 months and 2 years; counts against Victim 2 — three counts at 3 years each (counts 3–7 noted as 3 years on each of counts 3–7) and one count at 2 years (count 8); counts against Victim 3 — three counts at 2 years each (counts 9–11); and count 12 (making indecent photographs) — 3 months. The Attorney General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient; leave was granted and the matter determined by the Court of Appeal panel (Judges Popplewell, Steyn and Eyre).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentence of seven years' imprisonment was unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
  2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the offending and the available mitigation (including the Defendant's age, good character, delay and very serious physical and mental health issues) such that the sentence fell below the range reasonably available to the judge.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Holt (on behalf of the Solicitor General)

  • Emphasised the multiplicity of offending against young children over approximately 20 years and the presence of multiple aggravating features (abuse of trust/grooming, touching of naked genitalia, isolation in one incident, and repeated offending), requiring significant uplift from a notional single-offence starting point.
  • Acknowledged mitigation (advanced age, unblemished record, delay between charge and trial, and severe injuries from a road traffic collision), but submitted that the custodial sentence was insufficient given the scale of offending — in particular, that the sentence imposed was at best the least appropriate for the offending against Victim 2 alone, where a single offence starting point was 4 years and the top of the range 7 years.
  • Submitted that either the sentencing judge gave an excessive reduction for mitigation or failed to impose a sentence reflecting the aggregate seriousness of all offending.

Attorney Saimbhi (on behalf of the Defendant)

  • Submitted that the sentencing judge, having presided over the trial, was best placed to assess both seriousness and mitigation and that the judge was entitled to give significant weight to the Defendant's age, very poor physical and mental health, and the indignity and difficulty of custodial conditions in the local prison.
  • Argued that the sentence was "compassionate" and, although towards the lower end of available ranges, was within the judge's discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v W [2022] EWCA Crim 1793 Illustration that a victim being as young as 5 or 6 does not necessarily amount to "extreme" youth for the purposes of categorisation under the guidelines. The court relied on the authority to correct an asserted contention that a victim aged about 6 could be treated as "extreme youth" in the guideline context, noting that the Crown's submission on that point was mistaken.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the seriousness of the offending: multiple, long-running sexual offences against three child victims, some conduct beginning when victims were very young. The Court noted that the sentencing judge's remarks were brief and did not refer expressly to the guideline categories or identify the individual starting points he adopted. Nevertheless, the Court stressed that sentencing involves an evaluative exercise in which the trial judge—having heard the evidence and observed the Defendant—was well placed to assess both seriousness and mitigation.

The Court accepted that there was significant mitigation: the Defendant's advanced age, lack of previous convictions, substantial and long-term physical and cognitive injuries arising from a road traffic collision (including bilateral leg amputations, cardiac impairment and cognitive/memory deficits), and a lengthy delay between arrest and charge and prosecution. The judge was entitled to treat the Defendant's physical and mental difficulties, and the particularly onerous effect of imprisonment upon him, as significant mitigating factors in addition to good character and delay.

Although the sentence could be described as merciful or at the lower end of the available range, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed did not fall below the range reasonably available to the sentencing judge. The Court therefore determined that the sentence was not unduly lenient.

Holding and Implications

DECISION: Leave to refer was granted, but the sentence was NOT found to be unduly lenient and was upheld.

Implications: The direct effect is that the seven-year total sentence imposed by the trial judge remains in force as structured (consecutive between victims, concurrent inter se). The Court emphasised the sentencing judge's discretion to weigh mitigation of severe ill-health, delay and good character against the seriousness of multiple child sexual offences; no new legal principle or precedent was established beyond the application of existing sentencing principles.