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Griffiths-Davies, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Attorney General applied for leave to refer under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 against a sentence of four years and four months' imprisonment imposed by Judge Woodhall at the Crown Court at The City on 5 January 2026. The Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including: causing a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity (count 1), distribution and making of indecent photographs of children (counts 3–7), possession of prohibited images of children (count 8) and possession of extreme pornographic images (count 9). All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Ancillary orders included an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order and a 15 year Restraining Order.
Factual summary: the Victim (a six‑year‑old child entitled to lifelong anonymity) was photographed naked from the neck down by the Defendant in June 2023 holding a sign bearing the name of a Telegram group. The photograph was submitted to that group as part of a membership requirement. The Defendant was a member of several messaging groups dedicated to child sexual abuse material. A Company A investigation led to the Defendant's arrest on 1 March 2024. Large numbers of category A, B and C images were found on the Defendant's devices and the Defendant distributed images within the groups. The Defendant had developmental vulnerabilities in the Victim, and the Defendant was aware of those vulnerabilities. The Defendant gave no comment in police interviews. The Defendant (aged 43 at sentence) had no previous convictions and pleaded guilty, receiving a one‑third credit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentence of four years and four months' imprisonment for the offence of causing a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity (and the total concurrent sentence) was unduly lenient.
- Whether a victim surcharge order was appropriate given that some offending predated 1 October 2012.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney Martin (on behalf of the Attorney General)
- Contended the judge's reduction from the guideline starting point (eight years) to a sentence after trial of five years was unjustified and amounted to an unduly lenient sentence when applied to the section 8 offence.
- Submitted the judge had overstated the lesser seriousness of the sexual activity and had been unduly influenced by the production/indecent images guideline.
- Advanced that, at most, a small downward adjustment was appropriate but that the presence of three culpability A factors pointed towards uplift or no downward adjustment; in written submissions suggested no downward adjustment from eight years, and in oral submissions proposed an appropriate sentence after trial for the section 8 offence of six and a half years.
Attorney Baxter (for the Defendant)
- Argued the judge adopted a careful, structured, and guideline‑compliant approach, made no error of principle and exercised permissible sentencing discretion.
- Submitted the resulting sentence was appropriate and, if lenient, not unduly lenient.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v W [2022] EWCA Crim 1793 | Cited in correspondence as a case where the victim was 5 or 6 and not treated as particularly vulnerable due to "extreme youth" for guideline purposes. | Used to support the view that the judge's conclusion that the Victim's age did not amount to "extreme youth" was not erroneous. |
| R v KC [2019] EWCA Crim 1632 | Cited in correspondence as a case where the victim was aged 7 to 8 on similar issue. | Referenced when assessing whether the Victim's age amounted to "extreme youth"; assisted the Court in concluding no criticism of the judge on that point. |
| R v Bajwa [2025] EWCA Crim 1496 | Cited in correspondence as a case where the victim was 8 and not treated as "extremely young" for the guideline factor. | Referenced to support the judge's approach to the "extreme youth" guideline factor. |
| Attorney General's Reference No 4 of 1989 [1990] 1 WLR 41 | Authority on principles governing Attorney General's References and the test for unduly lenient sentences. | Referred to as part of the body of authorities summarising the test the Court must apply in considering whether a sentence is unduly lenient. |
| Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (R v Bryn Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 | Authority cited in the Court's summary of principles applicable to Attorney General's References. | Included among authorities summarising that a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range a judge could reasonably have considered appropriate. |
| Attorney General's Reference No 6 of 2012 [2012] EWCA Crim 2746 | Authority on the approach to Attorney General's References. | Cited as part of the principled framework for determining whether to intervene on an Attorney General's Reference. |
| Attorney General's Reference (R v Howard) [2016] EWCA Crim 1511; [2017] 1 Cr App R(S) 8 | Authority on the test and purpose of Attorney General's References and the limited circumstances for interference. | Used by the Court to restate the correct test and to explain why the reference should be refused. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the sentencing exercise of Judge Woodhall: categorisation of count 1 as category 2A (vulnerability and abuse factors) and category A (abuse of trust, planning, sharing); starting point under the section 8 guideline of eight years with a range of five to ten years; and the judge's decision to move down from the starting point towards the lower end of the range after considering the nature of the activity (a single incident consisting of a photograph of the Victim standing naked) and the overlap with the production/indecent images guideline as a cross‑check.
The Court considered submissions from Attorney Martin that the downward adjustment was unjustified and that the starting point should not have been reduced to five years after trial (and that an appropriate figure after trial might have been six and a half years). The Court emphasised the principles governing Attorney General's References: intervention is only appropriate where a sentence falls outside the range a judge could reasonably consider; sentencing discretion is broad and the trial judge is particularly well placed to assess competing considerations; and mitigation (including previous good character, remorse and mental health) and proportionality must be respected.
Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the sentencing judge was entitled to treat the particular activity as less serious than many offences in that category, to take account of mitigation and to use the production guideline as a cross‑check without falling into error. Although a longer sentence could have been justified, the overall sentence (including an 18‑month uplift for other offending, which was not challenged) was not outside the reasonable range. Accordingly, leave to refer was refused. The Court also noted the procedural point that because some offending predated 1 October 2012 a victim surcharge order would not have been appropriate and any record to the contrary should be corrected.
Holding and Implications
LEAVE TO REFER WAS REFUSED.
Implications: the sentence of four years and four months' imprisonment (total concurrent sentence as pronounced) stands. The Court found no error of principle justifying interference under an Attorney General's Reference. The decision restores and confirms the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion in this case; no novel precedent was established. The Court also identified a limited procedural point: if a victim surcharge was recorded, the record should be corrected because some offending predated the surcharge regime.
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