Hicks & Ors v R.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from convictions returned at The Crown Court following a trial before Judge Duncan. Five appellants (Appellant 1, Appellant 2, Appellant 3, Appellant 4 and Appellant 5) were convicted on 20 March 2025 (majority 11–1) of a single count of Conspiracy to Cause a Public Nuisance contrary to s.1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. Sentences were imposed on 16 May 2025 (each with a surcharge order): Appellant 1 — 15 months custody and prosecution costs; Appellant 2 — 12 months custody and prosecution costs; Appellant 3 — 11 months custody suspended for 2 years with unpaid work and supervision, plus costs; Appellant 4 — 12 months custody suspended for 24 months with unpaid work and supervision, plus costs; Appellant 5 — 12 months custody suspended for 24 months with unpaid work and supervision.

The prosecution alleged the group intended to penetrate the perimeter fence at The Airport on 24 July 2024 to disrupt airport activities in support of an organisation (referred to in the trial material as Company A). Seven of ten defendants on the indictment were stopped near the airport perimeter; others were arrested subsequently at a house in The City or at a canal boat in The City. Items including cutting equipment and protective gear were recovered; an electronic device permitted access to messages on an electronic communications application which the prosecution relied on.

The appellants appealed against conviction. Applications were made to rely on fresh evidence under s.23 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 relating principally to alleged research by "Juror 5" and related juror complaints and police investigation material. The Registrar referred the applications to the full court. Reporting of parts of the judgment and an annexed table of searches was partially postponed under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 pending related criminal proceedings concerning Juror 5; those paragraphs are redacted in the source opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the convictions are unsafe because Juror 5 conducted internet research during deliberations, shared it with the jury and thereby created a risk of bias (Ground 1).
2. Whether appellants were prejudiced by late practical arrangements and a short notice trial resumption affecting fairness (Ground 2).
3. Whether prejudicial police conduct during trial (including an arrest seen by jurors and an arrest elsewhere) rendered the trial unfair (Ground 3).
4. Whether the trial judge erred in handling alleged misleading characterisation by the prosecutor of media coverage and in directing the jury about counsel's professional standards (Ground 5).
5. Whether the judge erred by implying the existence of a climate emergency was a matter of opinion contrary to agreed facts (Ground 6).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• Ground 1: Juror 5 researched the case online during deliberations, biased himself and the jury; fresh evidence from Juror 4 and police investigation supports this and may afford an appeal ground.
• Ground 2: The appellants (self-representing ones in particular) say they were given less than half a working day to re-make arrangements when the trial start date moved, causing substantial prejudice and interfering with Article 6 rights.
• Ground 3: Prejudicial police conduct occurred — an arrest of Appellant 4 during trial (allegedly due to bail confusion) and an unnecessary arrest of a friend in court in sight of jurors — and the judge should have discharged the jury rather than give directions; demeanour effects prejudiced the jury.
• Ground 5: The prosecutor mischaracterised the extent of media coverage (described it as a "side-bar"), the jury were prevented from seeing press coverage, and the judge wrongly told the jury the prosecutor could not be misleading because of professional conduct rules.
• Ground 6: The judge wrongly suggested the climate emergency was a matter of opinion contrary to Agreed Facts (which recorded government and scientific findings); that undermined the appellants' reliance on the emergency as motive and credibility.

Respondent's (Prosecution) Arguments

• Ground 1: The prosecution's written position is summarized in the source; oral submissions for the respondent were made by Attorney Jarvis and Attorney Fielding as recorded.
• Ground 2: Even if short notice caused inconvenience or loss, it did not affect the safety of convictions returned weeks later; the case management decision was reasonable to use court resources and start the trial promptly.
• Ground 3: The trial judge appropriately investigated which jurors had seen the court arrest and confirmed they could continue; her handling was proper and the incidents were irrelevant or not prejudicial to the verdicts.
• Ground 5: The judge was right to direct jurors not to consult press coverage and to treat counsel's comments as submissions rather than evidence; counsel may comment on evidence and the judge’s direction about counsel's professional obligations was appropriate.
• Ground 6: The agreed facts about climate change were of only tangential relevance to the core issue (whether appellants agreed to commit a public nuisance); the judge's directions were appropriate and the appellants do not complain about directions on the elements of the offence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered all grounds and the application to admit fresh evidence under s.23 Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6: The court reviewed trial transcripts and case management material and concluded each of these grounds was not properly arguable.

• Ground 2 (case management and short notice): The Resident Judge's decision to adjourn the start and then fix it a week later was a reasonable case management choice to make best use of court resources. The court found no arguable unfairness affecting the safety of convictions; financial loss to appellants did not render convictions unsafe.
• Ground 3 (police conduct and arrests): The court accepted Judge Duncan's enquiries at trial, her finding that jurors who witnessed the court arrest could continue was proper, and her direction that the incident was unconnected with the defendants was accurate in the relevant sense. The decision not to discharge the jury fell within reasonable options for a trial judge and did not render convictions unsafe.
• Ground 5 (prosecutor's characterisation of media and judge's direction): The court analysed the judge's direction that counsel's comments in closing are submissions, not evidence, and her general reassurance about counsel's professional duties. The judge had heard the evidence and speeches and concluded there was no misleading by counsel warranting correction. Her direction did not require the jury to accept counsel's comments and was within a reasonable approach.
• Ground 6 (agreed facts and climate emergency): The court explained the agreed facts about government and scientific statements were placed before the jury to assist assessment of the defendants' asserted beliefs and credibility. The judge directed the jury that their personal views on the climate emergency were irrelevant to legal guilt; she did not tell them to ignore the agreed facts. The direction was appropriate given the limited relevance of those facts to the elements of the offence.

Ground 1 (juror conduct): Significant portions of the court's analysis on the alleged juror research and the accompanying investigation are redacted in the source (paragraphs 32–89 and an annexed table). The court nevertheless recorded that it admitted the fresh evidence under s.23 because it "may" afford a ground for allowing an appeal, and granted leave to appeal on that basis. After carrying out the required exercise (details redacted), the court concluded the fresh evidence did not in fact afford a ground for allowing the appeal and dismissed Ground 1.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED

Disposition: The court received the fresh evidence under s.23 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, granted leave to appeal on Ground 1 but concluded the fresh evidence did not establish a ground for allowing the appeal; leave to appeal on Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 was refused. All applications and the appeal were dismissed.

Implications: The convictions and sentences imposed by Judge Duncan at The Crown Court stand. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent; the court treated the contested issues as matters resolved within the appropriate exercise of judicial case management and trial-direction discretions. Parts of the reasoning and an annexed table of searches are subject to a reporting postponement in the source opinion and were redacted in the provided text.