Roper, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 January 2025, in the Crown Court sitting in The City before Judge Dean, the Applicant (then aged 41) pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment to one count of entering into, or becoming concerned in, a money laundering arrangement contrary to section 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. On 3 February 2025 Judge Dean sentenced the Applicant to three years and ten months' imprisonment. The Applicant renewed an application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by a single judge. The offending occurred between December 2019 and June 2020 and involved laundering very large sums of cash (total c. £10 million) generated from the wholesale supply of Class A drugs by others. The Applicant worked at Company A on [Number] Main Street in The City, used an EncroChat device, and received and handled packages of cash; police recovered large quantities of cash, EncroChat messages and CCTV. The prosecution assessed the Applicant's laundering at c. £1.9 million; the defence put it at £1.5 million and the judge sentenced on the lower figure.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge failed to identify the evidence justifying rejection of the Applicant's factual assertions at sentence.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to give the defence an opportunity to deal with evidence identified by the judge as justifying a higher (level B) culpability finding, where the Crown did not dispute the Applicant's assertions and the judge had been directed to messaging said to support a lower (level C) culpability.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The judge did not identify the evidence justifying rejection of the Applicant's account as set out in his factual statement.
• The judge failed to give the defence an opportunity to address evidence the judge identified as supporting a finding of level B culpability, despite the Crown not disputing the Applicant's assertions and defence pointing to messaging supporting level C culpability.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The prosecution stated it did not agree with the Applicant's assertions but accepted there was no evidence to contradict them, leaving assessment to the court.
• The prosecution calculated the sums laundered by the Applicant at c. £1.9 million and submitted that the Applicant fell into medium culpability.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the factual material before the sentencing judge: EncroChat messages, CCTV, invoices issued by the Applicant, bank details provided for depositing cash, and evidence that the Applicant received 4.5% of the sums handled. The sentencing judge examined the messages and concluded the Applicant played more than a minimal (level C) role, engaging in relatively sophisticated arrangements and liaising with those above him in the chain. The judge adopted medium culpability (the prosecution's categorisation) and harm category 3 under the Sentencing Council guidelines, producing a five‑year starting point. The judge then applied mitigation for effective good character and other personal mitigation, reducing the starting point (the transcript notes ambiguity about the precise arithmetic, given different figures used), arriving at 4 years and 6 months before allowance for the guilty plea. The judge reduced that figure by just under 15% for an advanced guilty plea (but not on the day of trial), yielding the effective sentence of three years and ten months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal assessed whether the sentencing judge had dealt properly with the limited factual dispute and concluded that the judge had appropriately reviewed the messages and assessed the Applicant's role; the judge's approach was within the Sentencing Council guidance.

Holding and Implications

RENEWED APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED

Direct effect: the sentence of three years and ten months' imprisonment stands. The court found the sentencing exercise was conducted properly and within the Sentencing Council guidelines. No broader legal precedent was established by this refusal.